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Abstract
This thesis primarily develops novel game-theoretic tools, and applies these tools to study
civil litigation in common law jurisdictions— the process throughwhich a private plaintiff
seeks judicial remedies against a private defendant.
First, this thesis models civil litigation as a simultaneous-move contest between two
litigants, each of whom exerts costly efforts to maximize her monetary payoff. A success
function describes the litigants’ respective probabilities of success based on their efforts and
exogenous relative advantages. Instead of having a functional form, the success function
satisfies general and intuitive assumptions which capture frequently-used functional forms.
Another generalization is the cost-shifting rule, which allows the winner to recover an
exogenous proportion of her litigation costs from the loser. There exists a unique Nash
equilibrium with positive efforts. In equilibrium, more cost shifting makes the outcome
of the case more predictable, but typically increases the litigants’ collective expenditure.
Second, further developing the litigation game, this thesis allows monetary and emo-
tional variables to motivate a plaintiff and a defendant to exert costly efforts; the emotional
variables capture their relational emotions toward each other, and a non-monetary joy of
winning. In equilibrium, negative relational emotions (but not positive joy of winning)
amplify the effects of cost shifting. Negative relational emotions increase the equilibrium
relative effort and probability of success of the more advantageous litigant.
The novel tools developed to study litigation have broader implications. Generalizing
the litigation games is a contest game of complete information, in which two players
simultaneously spend to compete for a prize. They have potentially different probability-
of-success functions and spillovers. Each success function satisfies general and intuitive
assumptions without having a particular functional form. Applications of this game
capture optimism and pessimism in military conflicts, and asymmetric R&D contests.
Finally, in addition to litigation efforts and costs, the great variety of legal remedies
affects substantive behaviors. This thesis will reveal that, when private actions produce
social harm, the actor has incentives to take a socially optimal action if she owes liabilities
that optimize externalities. The proposed theory of externalities optimization generalizes
the existing theory of externalities internalization, and explains apparently-unrelated rules
that optimize incentives when complete internalization fails. Illustrating the proposed
theory is an innovative model in which the actor owes a restitutionary liability to disgorge
some of her private gain and a liability to compensate for some of the social harm.
iii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 A Robust Theory of Incentives in Civil Litigation: Non-Specified Probability-
of-Success Functions and Arbitrary Cost-Shifting Rules 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 The Litigation Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 Cost Shifting Affects Legal Predictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Cost Shifting Distorts Relative Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6.1 When More Cost Shifting Increases Distortion . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.2 When More Cost Shifting Decreases Distortion . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7 Cost Shifting Affects Expenditure in Litigated Cases . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7.1 Sufficiently Balanced Relative Advantages or Sufficiently Convex
Cost Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7.2 ExtremeRelativeAdvantages and InsufficientlyConvexCost Func-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.8 Remarks on Generality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.8.1 Multiple Judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.8.2 Arbitrary Judgment Sum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.8.3 How Changes in Relative Advantages Affect Expenditure . . . . 37
2.9 Remarks on Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.9.1 Settlement Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.9.2 Relative Merits of Suits that Proceed to Litigation . . . . . . . . . 41
2.9.3 Incentives to File or Defend the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.10 Normative Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Varieties of Emotions in Civil Litigation: A Robust Theory 48
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 The Emotional Litigation Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 Equilibrium: Existence, Uniqueness, and the Role of Emotional Variables 59
3.4 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.1 Relative Efforts and Probabilities of Success . . . . . . . . . . . 64
iv
3.4.2 Monetary Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.5.1 Cost Shifting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.5.2 Mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.3 Unresolved Questions: Filing, Settlement, and Causes of Emo-
tional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4 Contests with Non-Specified Success Functions and Nonlinear Spillovers 73
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 The Contest Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Application: Optimism and Pessimism in Military Conflicts . . . . . . . 86
4.4.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5 Application: R&D Spillovers with Asymmetric Advantages . . . . . . . 91
4.5.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.5.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5.3 Robustness of the Tullock Success Function . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.6 Remarks on Generality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.6.1 Uncertain Success Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.6.2 Homogeneous Expenses and Spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6.3 Relationship with Tullock Contests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5 Restitution for Wrongs: A Theory of Externalities Optimization 105
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.1.1 Intuition and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.1.2 Relationship with Existing Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2.2 Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2.3 Remarks on Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.3 Welfare Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.3.1 When Social Optimality Requires Positive Action . . . . . . . . 118
v
5.3.2 When Social Optimality Requires No Action . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.3.3 Information Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.4 Doctrinal Application: Restitution for Wrongs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.4.1 Equitable Standards and Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4.2 Competing Equities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.4.3 The Gap-Filling Role of Restitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A Appendices 137
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.2 Derivatives of Illustrative Success Functions for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . 163
A.3 Proofs for Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
A.4 Proofs for Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
A.5 Modifications of the Model in Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
A.5.1 Positive Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
A.5.2 Endogenous Choice between Restitution and Compensation . . . 184
A.5.3 Action-Dependent Restitution and Compensation . . . . . . . . . 185
A.5.4 Two-Player Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
A.5.5 General Technical Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
vi
1 Introduction
Afocus of law and economics research is civil litigation in common law jurisdictions— the
process throughwhich a person or entity— the plaintiff— seeks judicial remedies against
another person or entity — the defendant. Civil litigation is costly to the private litigants
and to the public. A litigant’s costs include paying for lawyers, conducting discovery of
evidence, researching the law, preparing and making legal arguments, and other costly
activities taken to maximize her own payoff. The costs to the public include providing
courts, judges, and effectuating judicial rulings coercively when the losing litigant resists
enforcement. US$1 million is the median annual litigation spend of various companies
across the globe, according to a recent survey of corporate counsel.1 The protection of
rights and enforcement of duties under substantive laws — such as property law, contract
law and tort law— depends on the accurate and efficient operation of the litigation system.
Moreover, at stake are values that inhere in the rule of law, especially predictability in the
judicial determination of litigated cases. Legal predictability is attractive to the liberal
ideal of the rule of law because it gives fair notice to individuals of the legal consequences
of their choices and holds public officials accountable for their exercises of public powers.2
Understanding the economics of civil litigation and the strategic interaction of litigants is
thus fundamental to the functioning of a society governed by the rule of law.
To be addressed in this thesis are several important questions that the vast literature
on the economics of civil litigation has left unresolved.3 The first question concerns the
cost-shifting rules that modern judicial systems apply to allocate litigation costs between
the litigants. Influencing the strategic interaction of the litigants, the cost-shifting rule
affects the predictability and accuracy of the outcome of the case, as well as the costs spent
on litigation. On one end of the costs-shifting spectrum is the traditional American rule
which requires that each litigant bears her own costs. On the other end is the traditional
English rule which requires that the loser pays the winner’s costs. In modern times,
most legal systems across the globe apply intermediate cost-shifting rules that operate
1See the 2016 Annual Litigation Trends Survey by Norton Rose Fulbright,
an international law firm, at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/
20160915-2016-litigation-trends-annual-survey-142485.pdf.
2For a survey of the philosophical literatures on the rule of law and its relationshipwith legal predictability
and accessibility, see The Rule of Law (June 22, 2016), Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, https:
//plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/. For a survey of the seminal papers on the complex
relationship between high probability suits induced by cost shifting and the substantive behaviors giving
rise to the dispute, see Katz and Sanchirico (2012), pp. 278-86.
3For surveys, see, for example, Katz and Sanchirico (2012), Spier (2007) and section 2.1 in chapter 2 of
this thesis.
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somewhere in between the extremes; even American and English jurisdictions now apply
intermediate cost-shifting rules (see Katz and Sanchirico 2012, pp. 273-75, and section
2.1 in chapter 2 of this thesis). Yet only a small literature has studied intermediate cost-
shifting rules, and its conclusions depend on restrictive assumptions.4 Hence the first
question for this thesis is: How do intermediate and extreme cost-shifting rules affect
litigation efforts and costs, as well as other inherent values of the rule of law, especially
legal predictability and accuracy? Chapter 2 will answer this question.
Second, while litigation models premised on pure self interest and monetary pref-
erences aptly describe commercial litigation, they do not capture well-documented be-
havioral traits that emotional litigants tend to exhibit. Litigation is essentially a contest,
and participants in contest experiments consistently exert significantly greater efforts than
equilibrium predictions based on pure self interest and monetary preferences. A natural
explanation is that, in addition to the monetary outcome of winning, participants tend
to consider non-monetary and relative outcomes (see, for example, Mago, Samak, and
Sheremeta 2016, Price and Sheremeta 2011, Sheremeta 2010). Moreover, litigants in-
volved in divorce and inheritance disputes often exhibit spiteful behaviors. For example,
an American judge recalled a divorce case in which the husband spent millions just to
keep the wife from having a painting that was sold for less than half a million (Duncan
2007 p. 125). These empirical findings and observations raise the second question for
this thesis: How do these different emotional preferences — namely, preferences for the
non-monetary value of winning and for relative outcomes — affect litigation outcomes?
Chapter 3 will answer this question.
To answer these questions, this thesis will develop and apply novel techniques in contest
theory — a class of game-theoretic models in which each player spends to increase her
probability of winning a prize. Contest-theoretic models aptly describe civil litigation
because the litigants’ incentives to make costly efforts are driven by the monetary or
non-monetary benefits of winning. Moreover, recent developments in contest theory have
captured spillovers (see, for example, Chowdhury and Sheremeta 2011a, Siegel 2009,
2010, and section 4.1 in chapter 4), and cost shifting in civil litigation essentially creates
spillovers by shifting some or all of the winner’s litigation costs to the loser. In addition, the
literature has introduced emotional variables into simple contest models (see Dechenaux,
Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2015 at pp. 614-616 and section 3.1 in chapter 3), inviting an
analysis of emotions in civil litigation.
4Section 2.1 in chapter 2 contains a survey of the literature on cost shifting.
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A game-theoretic approach to studying civil litigation also complements other method-
ologies. The present approach will focus on capturing the litigants’ incentives, how they
interact, and how they respond to changes in legal, monetary and emotional variables. This
approach will complement empirical approaches by offering insights that are not restricted
by concerns of external validity and selection bias. Overcoming concerns of selection bias
is important because reliable sources of litigation data — for example, actual reported
cases — are often distorted by the litigants’ (endogenous) decisions to sue or settle. In
addition, the present game-theoretic approach complements doctrinal analysis of specific
statutes and cases by offering a general theory of litigation that accounts for a broader
range of variables affecting litigation incentives.
Moreover, a contest model has a success function that maps the players’ strategies into
their respective probabilities of winning and losing. The existing contest models typically
assume the success function takes a specific functional form (see Serena and Corchón’s
2017 survey). While the chosen functional form may appropriately capture some types of
contests in the real world, it may poorly capture other contests. It can be hard to ascertain
which of the existing functional forms is “ideal”. Moreover, while specifying a “nice”
functional form can simplify the solution process, the resulting positive predictions and
policy recommendations may not be robust to alternative functional forms. To ensure
that the implications of the contest model do not depend on the modeler’s idiosyncrasies,
the theoretical foundations of the contest model should be sufficiently robust. This thesis
therefore aims to answer a theoretical problem that is not confined to civil litigation: Can
a contest model be sufficiently general to capture a large class of success functions, in
order to give rise to robust positive predictions and policy recommendations? Chapter 4
will answer this question.
Finally, in addition to questions of litigation efforts and costs, how the great variety
of legal remedies affects substantive economic behaviors has fascinated economists and
lawyers. Behaviors that generate private gain to the actor but impose social harm are
ubiquitous. Modern law and economics commenced with Coase’s (1960) analysis of such
a problem of externalities. Absent reputational concerns or other-regarding preferences,
the actor has perverse incentives to take socially suboptimal actions without regard to the
resulting social harm. The standard legal remedy internalizes externalities completely; a
contractual or tortious remedy can make the actor pay for the social harm arising from
her actions, and thereby removes her perverse incentives. Yet there are many obstacles to
complete internalization of externalities. For instance, transaction costs and asymmetric
3
information may prevent a socially optimal contract, and imperfection in the judicial
process may hinder efforts to measure social harm with a sufficient degree of accuracy
(see section 5.1 in chapter 5). The final problem for this thesis is: How can legal remedies
generate socially optimal incentives when insurmountable obstacles prevent complete
internalization of externalities? Chapter 5 will answer this question with a decision-
theoretic model.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are primarily of interest to economists and technically-inclined
lawyer-economists, and chapter 5 to generalist lawyer-economists. While chapters 2, 3
and 4 take axiomatic approaches to develop contest theory and elicit its implications for
civil litigation and beyond, chapter 5 is drafted with the minimum level of technicality
needed to facilitate an intuitive analysis. Hence, when compared to chapters 2, 3 and 4,
chapter 5 adopts a less mathematically demanding methodology, but has a more detailed
discussion of legal doctrine.
4
2 ARobust Theory of Incentives in Civil Litigation: Non-
Specified Probability-of-Success Functions and Arbi-
trary Cost-Shifting Rules
2.1 Introduction
A civil lawsuit typically has two opposing litigants: a plaintiff who seeks judicial remedies
at the expense of a defendant. Participation in litigation is costly. A litigant’s costs include
paying for lawyers, conducting discovery of evidence, researching the law, preparing and
making legal arguments, and other costly activities taken to maximize her own payoff.
The amount of costs involved in running a lawsuit is a major concern to litigants and the
society at large. A recent survey of corporate counsel from various companies across the
globe reports the median annual litigation spend to be US$1 million.5 The protection of
rights and enforcement of duties under substantive laws — such as property, contracts
and torts — depends on the ability of the judicial system to operate fairly and efficiently.
Understanding the economics of civil litigation and the strategic interaction of litigants is
thus fundamental to the functioning of a society governed by the rule of law.
A litigation model typically includes a success function that maps litigation efforts to
the litigants’ respective probabilities of success. The existing litigation models typically
assume the success function takes a specific functional form (see Katz and Sanchirico 2012
and the discussion below). While the chosen functional form may appropriately capture
some judicial systems in the real world, it may poorly capture other judicial systems. It
can be hard to ascertain which of the existing functional forms is “ideal”. Moreover, while
specifying a “nice” functional form can simplify the solution process, the resulting positive
predictions and policy recommendations may not be robust to alternative functional forms.
To ensure that the implications of the litigation model do not depend on the modeler’s
idiosyncrasies, the theoretical foundations of the model should be sufficiently robust.
We therefore propose a litigation model that imposes general and intuitive assumptions
on its success function without specifying its functional form. A success function that
satisfies general assumptions has broader economic implications than a success function
that takes a specific functional form. Departing from the standard practice of specifying
5See the 2016 Annual Litigation Trends Survey by Norton Rose Fulbright,
an international law firm, at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/
20160915-2016-litigation-trends-annual-survey-142485.pdf.
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a functional form, the present model captures a large class of success functions, including
those frequently used in the existing literature, as well as their convex combinations.6
The present generalization of success function thus enables us to formulate a robust
theory of incentives in civil litigation. The generality of the present model can facilitate
verification of whether the positive predictions and normative recommendations obtained
in the existing literature (see below) remain valid under weaker assumptions. The present
model also can give rise to novel positive predictions and normative recommendations
that the existing, more specialized models cannot obtain.
Modern judicial systems apply a cost-shifting rule to allocate litigation costs between
the winner and loser of a civil suit.7 Litigants in American jurisdictions also may contract
for the application of a particular cost-shifting rule (see Prescott, Spier, and Yoon 2014,
pp. 66-67, 123). Influencing the strategic interaction of the litigants, the cost-shifting
rule affects the predictability and accuracy of the outcome of the case, as well as the
costs spent on litigation. On one end of the costs-shifting spectrum is the traditional
American rule which requires that each litigant bears her own costs. On the other end is
the traditionalEnglish rulewhich requires that the loser pays the winner’s costs. However,
unlike the typical litigation model in the existing literature, most modern legal systems
across the globe apply intermediate cost-shifting rules that operate somewhere in between
the extremes (Katz and Sanchirico 2012, pp. 273-75). Hence, to capture a great diversity
of judicial systems, we construct a general model of litigation to analyze intermediate and
extreme cost-shifting rules.
The present litigation model is a simultaneous-move game of complete information
with two risk-neutral players — a plaintiff and a defendant — each of whom exerts costly
effort to maximize her own payoff. A generally-formulated success function describes the
litigants’ respective posterior probabilities of success based on their efforts and an exoge-
nous prior. The prior reflects the relative advantages of the litigants. The defendant pays
a monetary judgment sum to the plaintiff if and only if the plaintiff wins. A cost-shifting
rule allows the winner to recover an exogenous proportion of her litigation costs from
the loser. Characterizing the cost-shifting rule as a fixed proportion of costs recoverable
captures the extreme American and English rules as well as the intermediate rules that
shift a part of the winner’s costs.
The present formulation of success function is novel and general; it does not take
6Subsection 2.8.1 will reveal that the ability to capture the convex combinations of different success
functions enables the model to cover cases where the identity of the judge is uncertain.
7Unless stated otherwise, litigation costs in this paper include attorneys’ fees.
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a functional form, but satisfies general assumptions (Assumptions 1-6 in section 2.2).
Roughly, under these assumptions: a litigant’s posterior probability of success is unaffected
by a mere change in her label as “plaintiff” or “defendant”, or by proportionate changes in
efforts; her posterior probability of success is strictly increasing with her prior probability
of success, and is strictly increasing with her effort at a diminishing rate; the curvature of
the success function is sufficiently small compared to the cost function’s — ensuring the
quasiconcavity of the litigant’s payoff function; in the special case where the cost function
is linear and the English rule applies to allow full recovery of the winner’s costs from the
loser, a litigant cannot win almost surely by exerting infinitely more effort than the other
litigant does. These assumptions capture a large class of success functions; in particular,
they capture the Tullock success function — which is the standard in rent-seeking and
contest-theory literatures — that expresses a contestant’s probability of success as the
ratio of her effort relative to total efforts.
The Litigation Game that we construct has a unique Nash equilibrium with positive
effort levels. In equilibrium, the relativelymore advantageous litigant is more likely towin,
and her equilibrium probability of success increases if the proportion of costs recoverable
increases. Hence more cost shifting reduces uncertainty, making the outcome of the case
more predictable ex ante. Moreover, litigation efforts may cause distortion in the sense
of driving posterior probabilities of success away from the prior. If this obfuscatory
effect disappears when the litigants exert equal efforts, then more cost shifting necessarily
increases distortion in equilibrium.
Influencing litigation efforts in equilibrium, the cost-shifting rule also affects the costs
of exerting such efforts. Call the sum of both litigants’ costs litigation expenditure. If
the relative advantages of the litigants are sufficiently balanced or the cost function is suf-
ficiently convex,8 then more cost shifting increases litigation expenditure in equilibrium.9
In other cases, how cost shifting affects litigation expenditure depends on the curvatures
of the success function and cost function. Intuitively, an increase in the proportion of costs
recoverable raises the stakes by widening the difference in monetary outcome between
winning and losing. More cost shifting also reduces the expected marginal cost of exerting
8Section 2.7 precisely defines the notions of sufficiently balanced advantages and sufficiently convex cost
functions.
9Baye, Kovenock, and Vries (2005) and Klemperer (2003), Appendix 1 proved a largely similar result
with an auction-theoretic model in which two symmetric litigants have private information over their own
types and the highest spender wins. A difference is expected litigation costs under the English rule (the loser
bears all of the winner’s costs) are unbounded in their models, but are bounded in our model. Remark 5
will reveal the present Assumption 5 ensures bounded litigation costs and, together with other assumptions,
guarantees the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium with finite efforts.
7
effort (Katz and Sanchirico 2012, p. 275). Unless she has very poor prospects, a litigant
has incentives to exert more effort in equilibrium to take advantage of a more generous
cost-shifting rule.
Even though in many jurisdictions most civil lawsuits settle before the court gives
judgment (Hodges, Vogenauer, andTulibacka 2010, p. 165), they settle in the shadowof the
law; that is, the litigants reach a settlement with an expectation of what the outcome would
be if the court were to adjudicate their dispute. Studying litigation outcomes in the absence
of a settlement is thus absolutely essential to understanding settlement negotiations. The
(equilibrium) litigation expenditure that arises in the present Litigation Game is the surplus
that the litigants would share in a pre-game that models their settlement negotiations, and
the litigants’ (equilibrium) payoffs in the Litigation Game are their outside options in that
pre-game. This paper thus provides the parameters for future research projects that more
comprehensively study settlement negotiations.10
The choice of cost-shifting rules affects the policy goals of reducing litigation ex-
penditure and improving legal predictability and accuracy. This paper establishes that a
more generous cost-shifting rule improves legal predictability in equilibrium, but increases
litigation expenditure in cases with balanced advantages or sufficiently convex cost func-
tions. This paper also identifies sufficient conditions for concluding that distortion to the
litigants’ relative advantages is monotonic with the proportion of costs recoverable. How
distortion affects legal accuracy depends on the extent to which relative advantages reflect
the inherent merits of the case.
The present generalization of success function overcomes many limitations that arise
from specifying the functional form of the success function in a litigation model. First,
empirical work on litigation needs to wrestle with the problem of selection bias that arises
from decisions to file or settle suits. That problem hiders efforts to ascertain empirically
which of the existing functional forms (for example, compare the success functions in
Plott 1987 and Carbonara, Parisi, and von Wangenheim 2015) prevails. By comparison,
positive predictions arising from the present axiomatized success function extend as far as
the generality and defensibility of its assumptions. Secondly, the present generalization of
success function expands the range of real-world scenarios beyond those captured by the
existing functional forms. Consider a scenario in which the litigants exert efforts before
they observe the identity of the judge who is assigned to their case. Suppose each of the
potential judges rules according to a different success function. Assuming the litigants
10Subsection 2.9 and section 2.10 contain discussions of future research directions.
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have a common prior probability for each judge being assigned to their case, we prove that
a special case of the Litigation Game captures this scenario.
This paper builds on the vast body of literature on the economics of cost shifting,
the seminal papers in which are surveyed by Katz and Sanchirico (2012).11 To our best
knowledge, only a few authors have considered intermediate cost shifting when litigation
efforts are endogenous. Some authors formulate that an exogenous quantity marks the
limit below which the winner’s costs are fully recoverable and above which her costs
are fully unrecoverable (for example, Hyde and Williams 2002, Carbonara et al. 2015,
Farmer and Pecorino 2016, pp. 214-15, Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno 2017, Appendix
D.2). Some other authors formulate that an exogenous proportion of the winner’s costs
is recoverable (for example, Plott 1987, Hause 1989, Gong and McAfee 2000, Luppi and
Parisi 2012). The proportion formulation often predicts that more cost shifting increases
litigation costs in equilibrium, a result that is consistently verified in the empirical literature
(most recently, Fenn, Grembi, and Rickman’s 2017 natural experiment from the United
Kingdom). We further develop the proportion formulation due to its greater generality,12
and generalizes the success functions and cost functions used by these authors. However,
we do not consider optimism or divergent beliefs regarding probabilities of success, while
some authors do (for example, Hause 1989, Hyde andWilliams 2002). Nor do we consider
cost-shifting rules that are one-sided or conditional on the margin of victory (for example,
Bebchuk and Chang 1996). Moreover, the success function in our model is exogenously
given, while the success functions in Skaperdas and Vaidya’s (2012) litigation model (with
no cost shifting) are derived from the inference process of a Bayesian judge.
We analyze intermediate cost-shifting rules mainly because they represent the reality
in modern judicial systems, including the modern American and English systems. After
the American Revolution, American jurisdictions eventually departed from the English
position of shifting the “necessary” or “reasonable” costs of conducting litigation, for
reasons including a failure to increase statutory caps on costs recoverable and distrust
of lawyers. The general application of the American rule was subject to exceptions
11See, for example, Spier (2007) (at pp. 300-05) for an earlier survey.
12That the proportion formulation of cost-shifting rules generalizes the American and English rules (by
setting the proportion to zero or one) implies it generalizes the quantity formulation in the following sense.
Suppose, under the quantity formulation, litigation costs in an equilibrium fall below the limiting quantity.
Then infinitesimal changes in efforts affect each litigant’s payoff in the same way as if the English rule
were applied, and applying the English rule would induce the same equilibrium. Alternatively, suppose
equilibrium litigation costs under the quantity formulation exceed the limiting quantity, then the following
steps would obtain the same equilibrium from applying the American rule: include in the (fixed) judgment
sum in dispute the part of costs that does not exceed the limiting quantity; and apply the American rule to
render fully unrecoverable the part of costs that exceeds the limiting quantity.
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including bad faith proceedings which are considered unwarranted, baseless or vexatious,
and contempt proceedings enforcing prior judgments. The U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure now provide for shifting of costs other than lawyers’ fees by default, and allow
for shifting of lawyers’ fees in narrow circumstances.13 In addition, most non-American
jurisdictions now apply intermediate cost-shifting rules (Katz and Sanchirico 2012, pp.
273-75). There is a recoverability gap in many jurisdictions that allow for cost shifting
by judicial discretion; respondents to a 2009 survey reveal this gap to be 25 percent of
the winner’s actual costs in England, 30-45 percent in Australia, and 33-50 percent in
Singapore (Hodges et al. 2010, p. 20). Hence the heavily-analyzed “American rule”
(no shifting of the winner’s costs) and “English rule” (full shifting of the winner’s costs)
should be understood as ideal extremes that bound the cost-shifting spectrum.
In addition to realism, amodel that permits intermediate cost shifting reveals surprising
results that a comparison of the extreme American and English rules cannot obtain. For
instance, a comparison of (equilibrium) litigation expenditures under the American and
English rules obtains the result that more cost shifting generates additional incentives to
spend in the litigated cases (see generally Katz and Sanchirico 2012, p. 275). The present
analysis reveals that this result does not always hold once we account for intermediate cost
shifting. For instance, in cases where the litigants have extremely asymmetric relative ad-
vantages and insufficiently convex cost functions, an increase in cost shifting that amounts
to a small departure from the American rule may decrease litigation expenditure in equi-
librium (see section 2.7, especially the discussion of Figure 4). Thus the conventional
wisdom that more cost shifting necessarily encourages spending in the litigated cases is
not robust to more general formulations of the litigation model.
This paper builds on the literature on contest theory. Tullock (1980) formulates the
standard success function, which gives a contestant’s probability of success as the ratio of
her own effort relative to the aggregate effort of all contestants. Lazear and Rosen (1981)
studied optimal labor contracts based on rank-order tournaments, and Lazear (1989)
considered sabotage in a competitive workplace. Cornes and Hartley (2005), (2012)
refine the Tullock contest model to incorporate risk aversion and general technologies.
Einy, Haimanko, Moreno, Sela, and Shitovitz (2015) prove the existence of pure-strategy
Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the Tullock contest model with incomplete information. Ser-
ena and Corchón (2017) offer a recent survey of the contest-theory literature, while Konrad
13See the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
the case of Marx v. General Revenue Corporation, 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2013).
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(2009) and Vojnović (2016) provide textbook treatments.
Section 2.2 constructs a model of litigation that simultaneously generalizes the success
function, cost function and cost-shifting rule. A large class of success functions and cost
functions, including those commonly used to study litigation, are special cases of the
present assumptions. Moreover, the model’s formulation of cost-shifting rules covers
the extreme ones as well as the intermediate ones which operate in the vast majority of
jurisdictions across the globe. Section 2.3 finds and characterizes the unique nontrivial
Nash equilibrium, making explicit and quantifying the strategic aspects of civil litigation.
Section 2.4 studies how the equilibrium relative efforts and probabilities of success change
in response to infinitesimal changes in, respectively, the litigants’ relative advantages,
the cost-shifting rule, and the cost function. Sections 2.5-2.7 respectively analyze how
cost shifting affects legal predictability, distortion to relative advantages, and litigation
expenditure. Section 2.8 illustrates howour litigationmodel captures uncertainty regarding
the identity of the judge, and the frequently-used Tullock contest model. Section 2.10
concludes with a discussion of the normative implications and limitations of our positive
predictions. Appendix A.1 contains all proofs. Appendix A.2 contains calculations that
facilitate the presentation of examples.
2.2 The Litigation Game
TheLitigationGame is a simultaneous-move game of complete information characterized
by two players, Plaintiff and Defendant, their common set of actions R+ and respective
payoff functions uP, uD : R2+ → R. Their payoff functions and all exogenous parameters are
common knowledge. Each player’s payoff is her expected monetary outcome in litigation;
she is implicitly assumed to be risk neutral.14
Plaintiff and Defendant respectively exert eP, eD ≥ 0 levels of effort. Let each litigant’s
cost of exerting effort be given by a homogeneous cost function C : R+ → R+ with an
exogenous degree of homogeneity k ≥ 1 that satisfies additional assumptions to be set out
below. Given a pair of efforts (eP, eD), the judicial process determines whether, under the
law, Defendant is to transfer a judgment sum 1 to Plaintiff.15 This transfer takes place with
(posterior) probability given by a success function θ : R2+ → [0, 1] satisfying assumptions
14The simplifying assumption of risk neutrality is particularly apt to describe litigants which are large
corporations, each holding a portfolio of lawsuits, and the dispute between them does not concern a sum
that is large relative to their wealth.
15The assumption that the judgment sum is equal to 1 is made without loss of generality because the exact
sum merely scales the litigants’ effort levels in equilibrium. See subsection 2.8.2.
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to be set out below.
The function θ(·) has an exogenous parameter 0 < µ < 1 which represents Plaintiff’s
prior probability of success. Defendant’s prior probability of success is 1 − µ. Plaintiff
(respectively, Defendant) is relatively more advantageous if µ > 0.5 (µ < 0.5). Relative
advantages reflect institutional factors that do not vary with litigation efforts but influence
the outcome of the case. These factors may reflect the inherent merits of the case. These
factors also may reflect the judge’s consideration of some salient but legally irrelevant
characteristic of the case (see, for example, Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2015).
Moreover, the judge may rely on her own personal and professional experiences, and may
have her own biases and policy preferences (see, for example, Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007,
2008). The litigants take these exogenous factors as given.
An exogenous parameter 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 characterizes the applicable cost-shifting rule,
where the value of λ satisfies additional assumptions to be set out below. This parameter
is the proportion of the winner’s costs recoverable from the loser. Important instances
of all cost-shifting rules are the extremes. The English rule characterized by λ = 1
allows for full recovery of the winner’s costs from the loser, whereas the American rule
characterized by λ = 0 allows for no recovery.
Remark 1. We interpret litigation efforts and probabilities of success as follows. Suppose,
given the facts that characterize the relevant dispute and given the litigation efforts, a
random variable will realize one of two outcomes— “Plaintiff wins” or “Defendant wins”
— at the end of the litigation process. Before such realization, the litigants first exert some
minimum sunk efforts to initiate the litigation process, and then exert additional efforts to
influence the realization of the outcome. Sunk efforts are referable to activities to acquire
knowledge of the “rules of the game”, commence legal proceedings and present the bare
minimum “amounts” of evidence and legal arguments to obtain a judicial ruling; these
activities may involve initial consultations with lawyers, filing the required documents and
giving notice to the interested persons. Additional efforts refer to activities beyond the
bareminimum, such as conducting extensive discovery, adducing voluminous evidence and
making lengthy legal arguments.16 Plaintiff’s (respectively, Defendant’s) prior probability
of success µ (respectively, 1 − µ) is the probability that the outcome realizes in her favor
16For simplicity, we assume there is no agency cost in the relationship between each litigant and her
lawyer(s). An extension of the Litigation Game, which is beyond the scope of this paper, may model the
principal-agent relationship between a litigant and her lawyer. See Spier (2007) (at pp. 307-311) for a
survey of the law-and-economics literature on the lawyer-client relationship. See also Baumann and Friehe
(2012a) for a Tullock contest model that captures the interaction of cost-shifting rules and contingent-fee
arrangements.
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conditional on exertion of sunk efforts and no additional efforts. The variables eP and
eD are the additional efforts that the litigants exert to influence the realization of the
outcome. The facts, sunk efforts and the practical operation of the judicial system affect
the prior probabilities of success, but additional efforts do not affect these probabilities.
Plaintiff’s (respectively, Defendant’s) posterior probability of success θ (respectively, 1−θ)
is the probability that the outcome realizes in her favor after exertion of sunk efforts and
additional efforts. Because the Litigation Game is a model of the litigants’ strategic
interaction after their exertion of sunk efforts, we call variables eP and eD “efforts” and
drop the “additional” label for simplicity.
We now state assumptions to guarantee equilibrium existence and uniqueness. On its
subdomain R2++, the success function θ(·) is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies
Assumptions 1-6, where Assumptions 5 and 6 also constrain the degree of homogeneity
k of the cost function and the proportion λ of costs recoverable.17
Assumption 1. Holding the efforts and the prior constant, whether a litigant is labeled
“Plaintiff” or “Defendant” does not affect her posterior probability of success. Formally,
θ(e1, e2; µ0) = 1 − θ(e2, e1; 1 − µ0), for any real numbers e1, e2 > 0 and 0 < µ0 < 1.
Assumption 2. Holding the prior constant, proportionate changes in effort levels do not
affect Plaintiff’s posterior probability of success. Formally, θ(eP, eD; µ) = θ(xeP, xeD; µ),
for all scalar x > 0.
Assumption 1 requires a litigant’s posterior probability of success to be unaffected by
merely changing her label from “Plaintiff” — whose effort, prior and posterior proba-
bilities of success are respectively denoted eP, µ, θ — to “Defendant” — whose effort,
prior and posterior probabilities of success are respectively denoted eD, 1 − µ, 1 − θ. The
parameter µ captures any asymmetry between the litigants that does not vary with their
litigation efforts.18 Assumption 2 further requires Plaintiff’s probability of success to be
unaffected by proportionate changes in effort levels.
Assumption 3. Holding the efforts constant, Plaintiff’s posterior probability of success is
strictly increasing with her prior probability of success. Formally, ∂θ∂µ > 0.
17These assumptions do not impose restrictions in cases where one litigant spends zero effort. Hence
these assumptions can capture success functions under which a litigant has a positive probability of losing
even though the other litigant spends zero effort. For an example of such a success function, see θL defined
by (11) in subsection 2.6.2. For a real-life example, see rule 65 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
18For example, if the burden or standard of proof that a litigant bears is dependent on her label as “Plaintiff”
or “Defendant”, then the parameter µ captures such asymmetry.
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Assumption 4. Holding the prior and Defendant’s effort constant, Plaintiff’s posterior
probability of success is strictly increasingwith andweakly concave in her effort. Formally,
∂θ
∂eP
> 0 and ∂2θ
∂e2P
≤ 0.
Assumption 3 requires that holding all else constant, an increase in Plaintiff’s prior
probability of success strictly increases her posterior probability of success. The strict
inequality in Assumption 3 captures the intuition that Plaintiff is more likely to win if she
becomes relatively more advantageous. Assumption 4 further requires that holding all
else constant, more effort by Plaintiff strictly increases her posterior probability of success
but at a diminishing rate. The strict inequality in Assumption 4 ensures that Plaintiff does
not make costly effort in vain.
Remark 2. Assumption 3 reflects the observation that as the litigants’ relative advantages
(which the exogenous prior captures) play a greater role in determining the outcome of
the case, the relatively more advantageous litigant is more likely to succeed. However,
the judge must attribute some weight to the litigants’ efforts; she sees their evidence and
hears their arguments. The judge cannot ignore litigation efforts because in an adversarial
system of civil litigation, which the Litigation Game aims to capture, greater constitutional
and moral principles mandate that litigants be given an opportunity to present their case
and have their arguments heard. The judge also may have to give adequate reasons.19
Assumption 4 thus reflects the observation that the litigants’ participation in the litigation
process is not in vein.
Assumption 5. For the interested pair of cost-shifting rule characterized by λ and cost
function characterized by k, the following condition holds
∂2
∂e2P
(
θ
1−λθ
)
∂
∂eP
(
θ
1−λθ
) < C′′(eP)
C′(eP) . (1)
Assumption 5 requires that the curvature of the ratio θ/(1 − λθ)— being Plaintiff’s
distorted20 posterior probability of success — be small when compared to the curvature
19An early constitutional protection of procedural fairness was clause 39 of the Magna Carta 1215.
Modern constitutional protections include the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, and articles 6 and 45 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
20The ratio θ/(1 − λθ) is distorted by the cost-shifting rule λ in sense that it lies between Plaintiff’s
posterior probability of success θ and her relative posterior probability of success θ/(1 − θ); that is,
θ ≤ θ/(1 − λθ) ≤ θ/(1 − θ).
14
of the cost function, in the precise sense described by condition (1). This technical
assumption ensures that Plaintiff’s payoff function is strictly quasiconcave in her own
effort.21
Assumption 6. If the cost function is linear and the English rule applies to allow full
recovery of the winner’s costs from the loser, then as she exerts infinitely more effort than
Defendant does, Plaintiff’s probability of success does not approach 1. Formally, that
k = λ = 1 implies limeD/eP→0 θ < 1.
In the special case where the marginal cost of exerting effort is constant and the English
rule applies, Assumption 6 prevents Plaintiff from winning almost surely (and recovering
all her costs almost surely) by exerting infinitely more effort than Defendant does. This
technical assumption prevents Plaintiff from incurring explosive litigation costs under the
expectation that all her costs are borne by Defendant.
Remark 3. As an alternative to Assumption 6 and the assumption that the cost-shifting
rule is a (positive) proportion (that is, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1), the following condition (A6’) is also
sufficient for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium with positive efforts (see
Proposition 1 in section 2.3):
−∞ < λ < 1
limeD/eP→0 θ
. (A6’)
If the success function θ satisfies limeD/eP→0 θ < 1,22 then adopting condition (A6’)
would allow the Litigation Game to capture a cost-shifting rule that requires the loser
to reimburse more than the winner’s costs (that is, λ > 1). Adopting (A6’) also would
capture a cost-shifting rule that requires the winner to reimburse the loser (that is, λ < 0).
However, we are not aware of real-world cost-shifting rules that satisfy λ < 0 or λ > 1.
Adopting condition (A6’) also would complicate the proof of the present equilibrium
existence and uniqueness result. Hence we do not adopt condition (A6’).
Plaintiff and Defendant respectively have payoff functions uP, uD : R2+ → R given by
uP = θ[1 − (1 − λ)C(eP)] − (1 − θ)[C(eP) + λC(eD)] (2)
uD = −θ[1 + C(eD) + λC(eP)] − (1 − θ)(1 − λ)C(eD). (3)
21Remark 5 will discuss the extent to which Assumption 5 guarantees equilibrium existence in existing
models of litigation using the Tullock success function.
22One such success function is θL defined by (11) in subsection 2.6.2.
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Plaintiff’s payoff uP is the weighted average of her monetary outcome in the event
that she wins, 1 − (1 − λ)C(eP), and her monetary outcome in the event that she loses,
−C(eP) − λC(eD). Weights θ and 1 − θ are her probabilities of winning and losing
respectively.
Defendant’s payoff uD is the weighted average of her monetary outcome in the event
that she loses, −1 − C(eD) − λC(eP), and her monetary outcome in the event that she
wins, −(1 − λ)C(eD). Weights θ and 1 − θ are respectively her probabilities of losing and
winning.
The exogenous parameters and the litigants’ payoff functions are common knowledge
between them. The cost-shifting rule (λ) is common knowledge because it represents
matters of law and community values. The prior probability of success µ is also common
knowledge between the litigants because they have had the opportunity to observe the true
facts and circumstances of the case as well as the institutional factors of the judicial system.
Similarly, the degree of homogeneity of the cost function (k) is common knowledge
because it reflects legal services commonly available in the market. To focus on the study
of litigation efforts and probabilities of success, further assume there is no settlement or
risk of default.
The solution concept adopted is a Nash equilibrium that is nontrivial in the sense of
comprising positive efforts by both litigants. A pair of positive efforts denoted (e∗P, e∗D)
is a nontrivial Nash equilibrium if given the other player’s effort, each player chooses an
effort to maximize her payoff.
To facilitate presentation, letΛ ⊂ [0, 1] represent a collection of cost-shifting rules that
shift some λ ∈ Λ proportion of the winner’s costs to the loser. Let K ⊂ [1,+∞) represent
a collection of homogeneous cost functions of some degree k ∈ K . LetΘ(Λ,K) denote the
set of twice continuously differentiable functions θ : R2+ → [0, 1] that satisfy Assumptions
1-6 when the applicable pair of cost-shifting rule and cost function is characterized by
some (λ, k) ∈ Λ × K . Then Θ([0, 1], [1,+∞)) denotes the set of twice continuously
differentiable functions that satisfy Assumptions 1-6 for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and all k ≥ 1.
Unless stated otherwise, all lemmas, propositions and corollaries assume the success
function θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}) where (λ, k) characterizes the pair of cost-shifting rule and cost
function that applies to the case between the litigants.
Remark 4. The Litigation Game captures uncertainty regarding the identity of the judge
who will be assigned to the litigants’ case. Consider a modified model in which a judge
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chosen from a finite collection of n ≥ 1 judges will hear and decide the case. A success
function θi(·) ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}) characterizes judge i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Judge i rules in favor of
Plaintiff with posterior probability θi(eP, eD; µ) and in favor of Defendant with posterior
probability 1 − θi(eP, eD; µ). Plaintiff and Defendant exert efforts before they observe the
identity of the chosen judge. They assign a common prior probability pi ≥ 0 to judge i
being chosen, where
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. The prior belief (p1, p2, ..., pn) is common knowledge
between the litigants. Subsection 2.8.1 will reveal a special case of the Litigation Game
that adopts the success function θ =
∑n
i=1 piθi captures this modified model.23
2.3 Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness
This section proves the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium. Lemma
1 allows any nontrivial Nash equilibrium to be characterized by a system of first order
conditions (hereinafter, FOCs). Appendix A.1 contains all proofs.
Lemma 1. Each litigant’s payoff function is strictly quasiconcave in her own effort.
Lemma 1 implies given the other litigant’s effort, a litigant’s FOC characterizes her
best reply.24 A pair of positive efforts (e∗P, e∗D) ∈ R2++ constitutes a Nash equilibrium if
and only if it satisfies system (4):

∂uP
∂eP
= ∂θ∂eP
[1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD)] − (1 − λθ)C′(eP) = 0
∂uD
∂eD
=
∂(1−θ)
∂eD
[1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD)] − (1 − λ(1 − θ))C′(eD) = 0.
(4)
System (4) reveals how the presence of cost shifting affects the litigants’ incentives to
exert costly efforts. For instance, holding Defendant’s effort eD fixed, more cost shifting
(λ increases) increases Plaintiff’s marginal benefits of exerting effort eP by shifting a
greater proportion of her costs C(eP) into the “prize” of winning: 1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD).
This shift also decreases her marginal costs of exerting effort: (1 − λθ)C′(eP). The same
observations apply to Defendant’s incentives to exert costly effort when we hold Plaintiff’s
effort fixed.
Lemma 2 finds a unique, positive effort ratio which will be used to characterize the
nontrival Nash equilibrium. To simplify notation, define an auxiliary variable s = eD/eP
23For real-life examples of this modified model, see Wallace, Mack, and Roach Anleu (2014), especially
pp. 687-89.
24Theorem 8 of Diewert, Avriel, and Zang (1981) holds any local maximizer of a strictly quasiconcave
function is the unique global maximizer.
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whenever Plaintiff’s effort eP > 0; s is the ratio of Defendant’s effort relative to Plaintiff’s.
Assumption 2 implies that for any two pairs of positive efforts (eP, eD), (e′P, e′D) ∈ R2++
such that eD/eP = e′D/e′P, the success function satisfies θ(eP, eD; µ) = θ(e′P, e′D; µ). By a
slight abuse of notation, denote θ(s; µ) = θ(eP, eD; µ), θs = ∂∂s θ(s; µ) and θss = ∂
2
∂s2 θ(s; µ).
Lemma 2. There exists a unique positive effort ratio s∗ > 0 satisfying
s∗ =
[
1 − λθ(s∗; µ)
1 − λ(1 − θ(s∗; µ))
]1/k
. (5)
The value of s∗ satisfies the following properties:
1. If the American rule applies (that is, λ = 0), then s∗ = 1.
2. If the cost-shifting rule allows the winner to recover at least some costs from the loser
(that is, λ > 0) and Plaintiff’s prior probability of success µ > 0.5 (respectively,
= 0.5, < 0.5), then s∗ < 1 (respectively, = 1, > 1).
Proposition 1 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium.
It also characterizes the litigants’ relative efforts in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium with positive efforts (e∗P, e∗D), which
is characterized by25
e∗P =
[
C(1)[ks∗k−1[1 − λ(1 − θ(s∗; µ))]/(−θs(s∗; µ)) − λ(1 + s∗k)] ]−1/k, e∗D = s∗e∗P
where Lemma 2 gives s∗.
This Nash equilibrium satisfies the following properties:
1. If the American rule applies or relative advantages are equal, then the litigants exert
the same levels of effort in equilibrium. Formally, λ = 0 or µ = 0.5 implies e∗P =
e∗D. Moreover, that relative advantages are equal implies posterior probabilities of
success are equal in equilibrium. Formally, µ = 0.5 implies θ(s∗; µ) = 0.5.
2. If the cost-shifting rule allows the winner to recover at least some costs from the
loser, then the relatively more advantageous litigant exerts relatively more effort and
has a relatively greater posterior probability of success in equilibrium. Formally,
λ > 0 and µ > 0.5 (respectively, µ < 0.5) implies e∗P > e
∗
D and θ(s∗; µ) > 0.5
(e∗P < e
∗
D and θ(s∗; µ) < 0.5).
25Parts 5 and 9 of Lemma 9, a technical lemma contained in Appendix A.1, respectively imply that both
the numerator and denominator of e∗kP are positive.
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Proposition 1 reveals that the applicable cost-shifting rule and the prior determine
the litigants’ relative efforts in the nontrivial Nash equilibrium. That the American rule
applies to deny the winner of any recovery of her costs is sufficient to induce equal
equilibrium efforts. If the cost-shifting rule allows at least some recovery and she is
relatively more advantageous (respectively, relatively less advantageous), then Plaintiff’s
equilibrium effort is greater than (smaller than) Defendant’s. The litigants exert equal
efforts in equilibrium if their relative advantages are equal.26
All subsequent analyses of equilibrium properties are referable to the unique nontrivial
Nash equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1. We are not interested in any equilibrium
that is trivial in the sense that at least one litigant exerts zero effort.
As a preliminary to subsequent discussions of the equilibrium implications of vari-
ations in exogenous parameters, Corollary 1 ensures that a nontrivial Nash equilibrium
actually exists within the interested range of exogenous parameters.
Corollary 1. Consider a success function θ ∈ Θ({λ¯}, {k}) and a pair of cost-shifting
rule and success function characterized by some 0 ≤ λ¯ ≤ 1 and k ≥ 1. There exists a
unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium under the same success function θ and any pair of
cost-shifting rule and cost function characterized by λ ≤ λ¯ and k ≥ k.
Given a success function θ ∈ Θ({λ¯}, {k}) where λ¯ characterizes the most generous
cost-shifting rule and k the least convex cost functionwhich arouse our interest, Corollary 1
enables us to analyse equilibriumproperties for all combinations of cost-shifting rule λ ≤ λ¯
and cost function k ≥ k. Corollary 1 also enables us to analyse how equilibrium properties
respond to variations in the applicable pair of cost-shifting rule and cost function, to the
extent that such variations do not extend beyond the scope of [0, λ¯] × [k,+∞).27 It follows
that if θ ∈ Θ({1}, {1}), then we can analyse equilibrium properties for all cost-shifting
rules and cost functions.
Remark 5. The existing literature finds that the English rule (λ = 1) often does not admit a
nontrivial Nash equilibrium. Using the following Tullock success function θT : R2+ → [0, 1]
where
θT (eP, eD; µ) =

µeP
µeP+(1−µ)eD if eP + eD , 0
µ otherwise,
(6)
26Corollary 2 in section 2.4 will reveal that more cost shifting increases the equilibrium relative effort
and probability of success of the relatively more advantageous litigant.
27By a slight abuse of notation, let [0, λ¯] = {0} if λ¯ = 0.
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Farmer and Pecorino (1999) (at pp. 281-82) and Carbonara et al. (2015) (at pp. 8-9)
showed that the English rule induces a nontrivial Nash equilibrium if and only if litigation
efforts are insufficiently influential on posterior probabilities of success.28 The conditions
guaranteeing equilibrium existence in their models are special cases of Assumption 5 in
the present Litigation Game. Some algebra using Appendix A.2 reveals θT satisfies
∂2
∂eP2
(
θT
1−λθT
)
∂
∂eP
(
θT
1−λθT
) ≤ 0 ≤ C′′(eP)
C′(eP)
where the first weak inequality holds strictly if λ < 1 and with equality if λ = 1, and
the second weak inequality holds strictly if k > 1 and with equality if k = 1. Hence
condition (1) in Assumption 5 is satisfied if and only if k > 1 or λ < 1; that is, θT ∈
Θ([0, 1), [1,+∞)) ∪ Θ([0, 1], (1,+∞)), but θT < Θ({1}, {1}). If the cost-shifting rule
permits less than full recovery (λ < 1) or the cost function is strictly convex (k > 1), then
Proposition 1 proves the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium when
θT operates.
Assumption 5 does not cover the litigation models of Hause (1989), Hyde and Williams
(2002). Their models allow for generally-formulated success functions and divergent
beliefs regarding posterior probabilities of success, but assume the English rule induces a
Nash equilibrium.29 With a minor modification to introduce divergent beliefs, the Tullock
success function θT provides a counter-example that satisfies the conditions imposed
by Hause (1989) or Hyde and Williams (2002) but does not induce a nontrivial Nash
equilibrium under the English rule.
2.4 Comparative Statics
This section calculates the equilibrium effects of variations in the prior, cost-shifting
rule and degree of homogeneity of the cost function. To facilitate presentation, let
θ∗ = θ(e∗P, e∗D; µ) denote Plaintiff’s posterior probability of success in the nontrivial Nash
equilibrium, and call it her equilibrium probability of success. Defendant’s equilibrium
probability of success is 1− θ∗. Call s∗ = e∗D/e∗P Defendant’s equilibrium relative effort.
Plaintiff’s equilibrium relative effort is 1/s∗.
28Using a special case of the success function θL given by (11) in subsection 2.6.2, Plott (1987) (at p.
189) also proved the English rule induces a nontrivial Nash equilibrium if and only if the litigants’ efforts
do not completely determine posterior probabilities of success.
29Hause (1989), pp. 165-66, and Hyde and Williams (2002), pp.137-39, 147-48.
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Corollary 2 reveals how equilibrium relative efforts and probabilities of success re-
spond to infinitesimal variations in the applicable cost-shifting rule.
Corollary 2. Consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium (e∗P, e∗D).
1. Suppose Plaintiff’s is relatively more advantageous. Then her equilibrium rela-
tive effort and probability of success are increasing with the proportion of costs
recoverable. Formally, µ > 0.5 implies d(1/s
∗)
dλ > 0 and
dθ∗
dλ > 0.
2. Suppose the relative advantages are equal. Then each litigant’s equilibrium rel-
ative effort and probability of success do not change with the proportion of costs
recoverable. Formally, µ = 0.5 implies ds∗dλ = 0 and
dθ∗
dλ = 0.
3. Suppose Defendant’s is relatively more advantageous. Then her equilibrium rel-
ative effort and probability of success are increasing with the proportion of costs
recoverable. Formally, µ < 0.5 implies ds∗dλ > 0 and
d(1−θ∗)
dλ > 0.
Corollary 2 proves that the relative advantages of the litigants determine how equi-
librium relative efforts and probabilities of success respond to infinitesimal variations in
the applicable cost-shifting rule. If one litigant is relatively more advantageous (that is,
µ , 0.5), then parts 1 and 3 prove that she exerts relativelymore effort in equilibrium. Parts
1 and 3 also reveal that more cost shifting increases the equilibrium probability of success
of the relatively more advantageous litigant. Intuitively, more cost shifting incentivizes
the relatively more advantageous litigant — who has better prior prospects of winning —
to exert relatively more effort. Then that both relative advantages and relative effort are
in favor of the relatively more advantageous litigant; a greater equilibrium probability of
success for her follows.
Corollary 3. Consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium (e∗P, e∗D).
1. If the American rule applies, then an increase in a litigant’s prior probability of
success does not affect her equilibrium relative effort, but increases her equilibrium
probability of success. Formally, λ = 0 implies d(1/s
∗)
dµ = 0,
dθ∗
dµ > 0 for Plaintiff and
ds∗
d(1−µ) = 0,
d(1−θ∗)
d(1−µ) > 0 for Defendant.
2. If the cost-shifting rule allows the winner to cover at least some costs from the loser,
then a litigant’s relative effort and equilibrium probability of success are increasing
with her prior probability of success. Formally, λ > 0 implies d(1/s
∗)
dµ > 0,
dθ∗
dµ > 0
for Plaintiff and ds∗d(1−µ) > 0,
d(1−θ∗)
d(1−µ) > 0 for Defendant.
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Corollary 3 proves that the equilibrium effects of changes in a litigant’s relative advan-
tages depends on the applicable cost-shifting rule. Part 1 proves that under the American
rule (that is, λ = 0), becoming more advantageous does not incentivize a litigant to exert
relatively more effort in equilibrium. Nonetheless, the increase in her prior probability
of success (which represents her relative advantages) has a direct effect that improves her
equilibrium probability of success. Part 2 proves that if cost shifting takes place (that is,
λ > 0), becoming more advantageous incentivizes a litigant to exert relatively more effort
in equilibrium. Then the increase in her prior probability of success directly improves her
equilibrium probability of success, and indirectly does so through increasing her relative
effort.
Remark 6. Corollary 3 implies that in equilibrium, each of the effort ratio s∗ and the
posterior probability θ∗ is a bijective function of the prior probability µ. This result does
not suggest that the judge, who does not know µ, has enough information to infer it and
decide the case without giving weight to litigation efforts. As discussed in Remark 1, we
interpret the prior and litigation efforts as influencing the posterior probabilities that a
random variable — representing the practical operation of the judicial system — realizes
one of two values: “Plaintiff wins” or “Defendant wins”. Consistently with reality, the
judge observes the realized value of this random variable, but does not observe the effort
ratio or posterior probability. Hence the judge has insufficient information to infer µ.
Corollary 4. Consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium (e∗P, e∗D).
1. If the American rule applies or the relative advantages are equal, then changes in
the degree of homogeneity of the cost function does not affect each litigant’s relative
effort and probability of success in equilibrium. Formally, if λ = 0 or µ = 0.5, then
ds∗
dk = 0 and
dθ∗
dk = 0.
2. If the cost-shifting rule allows the winner to recover at least some costs from the
loser and one litigant’s case is relative more advantageous, then that litigant’s
equilibrium relative effort and probability of success are decreasing with the degree
of homogeneity of the cost function. Formally, that λ > 0 and µ > 0.5 (respectively,
µ < 0.5) implies d(1/s
∗)
dk < 0 and
dθ∗
dk < 0 (respectively,
ds∗
dk < 0 and
d(1−θ∗)
dk < 0).
Corollary 4 proves the effects of changes in the degree of homogeneity (that is, k) of the
cost function depends on the applicable cost-shifting rule. The value of k corresponds to
the convexity of the cost function; as k increases, the cost function becomes more convex.
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Part 1 proves changes in k do not affect equilibrium relative efforts or probabilities of
success in cases where the American rule applies (λ = 0) or neither litigant is relatively
more advantageous (µ = 0.5). In other cases, a greater k incentivizes the relatively
more advantageous litigant to exert relatively less effort in equilibrium, which indirectly
decreases her equilibrium probability of success. Intuitively, each litigant’s equilibrium
effort typically falls below the judgment sum 1. As the cost function becomes more convex
(k increases), a chosen level of costs “produces” more effort, and the magnitude of the
additional effort “production” falls when the chosen level of costs increases. An increase
in k thus has a milder impact on the incentives of the relatively more advantageous litigant,
because she incurs a relatively greater level of costs in equilibrium; the results in part 2
reflect this milder impact on her incentives to exert costly effort.
2.5 Cost Shifting Affects Legal Predictability
This section reveals how changes in the applicable cost-shifting rule affects legal pre-
dictability in equilibrium. Consider two arbitrary cost-shifting rules 0 ≤ λ1, λ2 ≤ 1 and
a success function θ ∈ Θ({λ1, λ2}, {k}). Corollary 1 proves the existence and uniqueness
of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium under each of these cost-shifting rules. Let θ∗1, θ
∗
2 denote
Plaintiff’s equilibrium probabilities of success under λ1, λ2 respectively. We say the cost-
shifting rule λ2 makes the outcome of the case more predictable than the cost-shifting
rule λ1 does if and only if
|θ∗2 − 0.5| > |θ∗1 − 0.5|. (7)
Intuitively, the worst scenario for legal predictability occurs when the litigants win
with equal probabilities in equilibrium. Then θ∗2 is better for legal predictability than
θ∗1 is in the sense that θ
∗
2 is further away from 0.5 than θ
∗
1 is. Changing the applicable
cost-shifting rule from λ1 to λ2 improves legal predictability from Plaintiff’s perspective
by changing her equilibrium probability of success from θ∗1 to θ
∗
2. The same reasoning
applies to legal predictability from Defendant’s perspective; condition (7) is equivalent
to |(1 − θ∗2) − 0.5| > |(1 − θ∗1) − 0.5|, where 1 − θ∗2, 1 − θ∗1 are Defendant’s equilibrium
probabilities of success under λ2, λ1 respectively.
In an equal-advantages case (µ = 0.5), part 2 of Corollary 2 renders trivial the
question whether more cost shifting improves or impairs legal predictability. This is
because variations in the cost-shifting rule does not affect equilibrium relative efforts or
23
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Figure 1: Plaintiff’s equilibrium probabilities of success as functions of her prior proba-
bility of success under two cost-shifting rules, λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.8, in the T1 Game.
probabilities of success. Intuitively, no litigant has an advantage over the other. Any
variation in the cost-shifting rule affects the incentives of both litigants equally, and in
equilibrium they exert equal efforts and win with equal probabilities.
Applying the results in Corollary 2 to cases in which one litigant is relatively more
advantageous, Corollary 5 reveals howvariations in cost shifting affects legal predictability.
Corollary 5. Consider two cost-shifting rules 0 ≤ λ1 < λ2 ≤ 1, where the success
function θ ∈ Θ({λ2}, {k}) and Plaintiff’s equilibrium probability of success is θ∗1 under
λ1 and θ∗2 under λ2. If one litigant is relatively more advantageous, then increasing the
applicable cost-shifting rule from λ1 to λ2 makes the outcome of the case more predictable.
Formally, µ , 0.5 implies |θ∗2 − 0.5| > |θ∗1 − 0.5|.
Corollary 5 proves that if one litigant is relatively more advantageous (µ , 0.5), then
more cost shifting improves legal predictability in equilibrium. Intuitively, the relatively
more advantageous litigant is more likely to win in equilibrium (according to Proposition
1), and more cost shifting (λ1 → λ2) incentivizes her further to increase her equilibrium
effort relative to the other litigant’s (according to Corollary 2). This increase in her relative
effort further increases her equilibrium probability of success, thereby improving legal
predictability in her favor (|θ∗2 − 0.5| > |θ∗1 − 0.5|).
Figure 1 illustrates Corollary 5 with a special case of the Litigation Game, called the
T1 Game, that adopts a linear cost function (k = 1) and the Tullock success function θT
given by (6) in Remark 5. Figure 1 plots the relationship between Plaintiff’s equilibrium
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probability of success θ∗ and prior probability of success µ under two cost-shifting rules
λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.8. The blue solid curve (respectively, green dashed curve) depicts θ∗
as a function of µ when λ1 = 0.5 (respectively, λ2 = 0.8). For all µ , 0.5, the value of
θ∗ on the green dashed curve is further away from 0.5 compared to that on the blue solid
curve.
2.6 Cost Shifting Distorts Relative Advantages
This section explores how changes in the applicable cost-shifting rule influence the extent
to which the litigants’ relative advantages affects their equilibrium probabilities of success.
Define distortion ∆ : (0, 1) × [0, 1] × [1,+∞) → R by the magnitude of the difference
between Plaintiff’s equilibrium probability of success θ∗ and prior probability of success
µ
∆(µ, λ, k) = |θ∗ − µ|, (8)
where θ∗ is a function of µ, the applicable cost-shifting rule λ and the degree of homo-
geneity k of the cost function. Distortion from Defendant’s perspective is ∆(µ, λ, k) =
|1 − θ∗ − (1 − µ)|, which is the magnitude of the difference between her equilibrium
probability of success 1 − θ∗ and prior probability of success 1 − µ.
The present notion of distortion captures an argument, by Hirshleifer and Osborne
(2001) (pp. 185-86) and others, that “justice” requires a litigant’s equilibrium probability
of success to match the inherit merits of her case, as reflected by her relative advantages.
Intuitively, distortion measures the extent to which litigation efforts drive equilibrium
probabilities of success away from the litigants’ relative advantages, as captured by the
prior. A large (respectively, small) distortion means that, compared to relative advantages,
litigation efforts have a significant (insignificant) influence on equilibrium probabilities of
success. If changing a cost-shifting rule increases (respectively, decreases) distortion, then
this change increases (decreases) the influence that litigation efforts have on equilibrium
probabilities of success.
Our previous assumptions are not sufficient for answering the question how cost
shifting affects distortion in every case. That question is trivial in equal-advantages cases
(µ = 0.5) because, as part 2 of Corollary 2 proves, each litigant’s equilibrium probability
of success is not affected by any variation in the cost-shifting rule. However, if the relative
advantages are unequal (µ , 0.5), how cost shifting affects distortion is not immediately
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Figure 2: Plaintiff’s equilibrium probabilities of success as functions of her prior proba-
bility of success under two cost-shifting rules, λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.8.
clear. To illustrate potential complexities, consider Figure 2, which depicts for a special
case of the Litigation Game the relationship between Plaintiff’s equilibrium probability of
success θ∗ and her prior probability of success µ under two cost-shifting rules, λ1 = 0.5
and λ2 = 0.8. The blue solid curve (respectively, green dashed curve) depicts θ∗ as a
function of µ when λ1 = 0.5 (respectively, λ2 = 0.8). For any case characterized by a µ
satisfying µ′ < µ < 0.5 or 0.5 < µ < µ′′, the value of θ∗ on the green dashed curve is
further away from µ compared to that on the blue solid curve. In these cases, increasing
the cost-shifting rule from λ1 to λ2 increases distortion. For any case characterized by
a µ satisfying µ < µ′ or µ > µ′′, the value of θ∗ on the green dashed curve is closer to
µ compared to that on the blue solid curve. In these cases, increasing the cost-shifting
rule from λ1 to λ2 decreases distortion. For a case characterized by µ = µ′ or µ = µ′′,
increasing the cost-shifting rule from λ1 to λ2 does not affect distortion.
2.6.1 When More Cost Shifting Increases Distortion
We now propose additional conditions that are sufficient to answer the question whether
more cost shifting increases or decreases distortion in cases where one litigant is relatively
more advantageous.
Assumption 7. If litigation efforts are positive and equal, then Plaintiff’s posterior prob-
ability of success equals her prior probability of success. Formally, eP = eD > 0 implies
θ(eP, eD; µ) = µ.
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Assumption 7 imposes a condition in respect of all positive effort levels eP, eD > 0,
not just the equilibrium pair of efforts (e∗P, e∗D). It requires that a litigant’s posterior
probability of success accurately reflects her relative advantages if litigation efforts are
equal. Intuitively, under Assumption 7, equal efforts do not distort the litigants’ relative
advantages. Satisfaction of Assumption 7 does not depend on the applicable cost-shifting
rule or cost function.
Adding Assumption 7, Proposition 2 proves the relatively more advantageous litigant
has an equilibrium probability of success that is no smaller than her prior probability of
success. To facilitate presentation, letΘ7 denote the set of twice continuously differentiable
functions θ : R2+ → [0, 1] that satisfy Assumption 7.
Proposition 2. Suppose the success function θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}) ∩ Θ7 and one litigant is
relatively more advantageous (that is, µ , 0.5). In the nontrivial Nash equilibrium,
the equilibrium probability of success of the relatively more advantageous litigant is no
smaller than her prior probability of success. Her equilibrium probability of success is
greater than her prior probability of success if the cost-shifting rule makes at least some
costs recoverable. Formally:
1. That µ > 0.5 implies θ∗ ≥ µ, holding strictly if λ > 0.
2. That µ < 0.5 implies 1 − θ∗ ≥ 1 − µ, holding strictly if λ > 0.
Corollary 6. Consider two cost-shifting rules 0 ≤ λ1 < λ2 ≤ 1, where the success function
θ ∈ Θ({λ2}, {k})∩Θ7. If one litigant is relatively more advantageous, then increasing the
applicable cost-shifting rule from λ1 to λ2 increases distortion in equilibrium. Formally,
µ , 0.5 implies ∆(µ, λ2, k) > ∆(µ, λ1, k).
Using the results in Proposition 2, Corollary 6 proves that adding Assumption 7 is
sufficient for concluding that in any unequal-advantages case, more cost shifting increases
distortion in equilibrium. Intuitively, Assumption 7 ensures that in any unequal-advantages
case and under any cost-shifting rule, the equilibrium probability of success of the more
advantageous litigant is no smaller than her prior probability of success. Then allowing for
more cost shifting increases her relative effort (according to Corollary 2), which further
pushes her equilibrium probability of success above her prior probability of success.
Figure 1 illustrates Corollary 6 using the T1 Game, which satisfies Assumption 7.
Figure 1 plots the relationship between Plaintiff’s equilibrium probability of success θ and
her prior probability of success µ under two cost-shifting rules λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.8.
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The blue solid curve (respectively, green dashed curve) depicts θ∗ as a function of µ when
λ1 = 0.5 (λ2 = 0.8). For all µ , 0.5, the value of θ∗ on the green dashed curve is further
away from µ compared to that on the blue solid curve.
2.6.2 When More Cost Shifting Decreases Distortion
We now propose an alternative assumption that imposes a sufficient condition for ensuring
that more cost shifting decreases distortion in unequal-advantages cases. To facilitate
presentation, denote θµ = ∂θ∂µ , θµµ =
∂2θ
∂µ2
, θss = ∂
2θ
∂s2 and θsµ =
∂2θ
∂s∂µ , and define functions
α, β : R++ → R++ by
α(s; µ, λ, k) = k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs
β(s; µ, λ, k) = k(2 − λ)
2sk
(1 + sk)2 + λ(2 − λ)sθs
where θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}), and µ, λ, k are exogenous parameters in functions α, β.30
Assumption 8. If Plaintiff is relatively more advantageous (that is, µ > 0.5) and her effort
is no less than some positive effort by Defendant (that is, 0 < s ≤ 1), then at least one of
the following conditions holds:
α2θµµ − 2λ(2 − λ)αsθµθsµ ≥ −λ2(2 − λ)2sθ2µ
{
sθss +
[
1 − kλ(2θ − 1)
2 − λ
]
θs
}
(9)
or
β2θµµ − 2λ(2 − λ)βsθµθsµ ≥ −λ2(2 − λ)2sθ2µ
{
sθss +
[
1 − k(1 − s
k)
1 + sk
]
θs
}
. (10)
Given a pair of cost-shifting rule λ and a cost function k, Assumption 8 imposes
restrictions on the first, second and cross derivatives of the success function θ(s; µ).31 As
Proposition 3 will prove, adding Assumption 8 ensures that Plaintiff’s equilibrium proba-
bility of success is convex (respectively, concave) in her prior probability of success when
her case is relatively more (respectively, less) advantageous. To facilitate presentation,
let Θ8(Λ,K) denote the set of twice continuously differentiable functions θ : R2+ → [0, 1]
that satisfy Assumption 8 when the applicable cost-shifting rule and cost function are
characterized by λ ∈ Λ ⊂ [0, 1] and k ∈ K ⊂ [0,+∞) respectively.
30Part 9 of Lemma 9, a technical lemma in Appendix A.1, implies α, β > 0.
31Part 6 of Lemma 9, a technical lemma in Appendix A.1, reveals that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 imply
θµ > 0, θs < 0 and θss ≥ 0. Assumption 8 imposes additional restrictions in respect of their magnitude.
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Proposition 3. Suppose the success function θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}) ∩ Θ8({λ}, {k}) and one
litigant is relatively more advantageous (that is, µ , 0.5). If her case is relatively more
(respectively, less) advantageous, then Plaintiff’s equilibrium probability of success is a
convex (respectively, concave) function of her prior probability of success. The convexity
(respectively, concavity) is strict if condition (9) or (10) holds strictly. Formally:
1. That µ > 0.5 implies d2θ∗dµ2 ≥ 0, holding strictly if condition (9) or (10) holds strictly.
2. That µ < 0.5 implies d2θ∗dµ2 ≤ 0, holding strictly if condition (9) or (10) holds strictly.
Corollary 7. Consider two cost-shifting rules 0 ≤ λ1 < λ2 ≤ 1, where the success function
θ ∈ Θ({λ2}, {k}) ∩Θ8({λ1, λ2}, {k}). If one litigant is relatively more advantageous, then
reducing the cost-shifting rule from λ2 to λ1 increases distortion in equilibrium. Formally,
µ , 0.5 implies ∆(µ, λ2, k) < ∆(µ, λ1, k).
Using the results in Proposition 3, Corollary 7 proves that adding Assumption 8 is suf-
ficient for concluding that in any unequal-advantages case, reducing cost shifting increases
distortion in equilibrium. Intuitively and as confirmed by Proposition 3, Assumption 8
imposes conditions on the success function to ensure that in any unequal-advantages case
and under any cost-shifting rule, the equilibrium probability of success of the more ad-
vantageous litigant is no greater than her prior probability of success. Then reducing cost
shifting, which decreases her relative effort (according to Corollary 2), further pushes her
equilibrium probability of success below her prior probability of success. This in term
increases distortion.
Figure 3 illustrates Corollary 7 using a special case of the Litigation Game, called the
Lk Game, that adopts a strictly convex cost function (that is, k > 1) and the following
linear success function θL : R2+ → [0, 1]
θL(eP, eD; µ) =

µη + (1 − η) ePeP+eD if eP + eD , 0
µ otherwise
(11)
where an exogenous weight 0 < η < 1 determines the relative influences of the prior and
of the litigation efforts on the posterior probabilities of success.32 The Lk Game satisfies
Assumption 8 under any pair of cost-shifting rule and cost function.33 Figure 3 depicts
32An increase in η represents an increase in the relative weight that the judicial process gives to the relative
advantages, and a corresponding decrease in the relative weight that it gives to the litigants’ relative effort
level.
33Using Appendix A.2, some algebra reveals that ∂
2θL
∂2µ
= ∂
2θL
∂s∂µ = 0 for all µ, and that µ > 0.5 and
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Figure 3: Plaintiff’s equilibrium probabilities of success as functions of her prior proba-
bility of success under two cost-shifting rules, λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.8, in the Lk Game.
the relationship between Plaintiff’s equilibrium probability of success θ∗ and her prior
probability of success µ under two cost-shifting rules λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.8. The blue
solid curve (respectively, green dashed curve) depicts θ∗ as a function of µ when λ1 = 0.5
(respectively, λ2 = 0.8). For all µ , 0.5, the value of θ∗ on the green dashed curve is
closer to µ compared to that on the blue solid curve.
2.7 Cost Shifting Affects Expenditure in Litigated Cases
This section considers the effects of cost shifting on litigation costs in the nontrivial Nash
equilibrium (e∗P, e∗D). Litigation expenditure (in equilibrium), denoted C∗, is defined as
the sum of Plaintiff and Defendant’s respective litigation costs in equilibrium
C∗ = C(e∗P) + C(e∗D). (12)
The present definition of litigation expenditure only represents the litigation costs borne
by those litigants who proceed to litigation. This definition does not include the public
costs borne by the judicial system or the society at large, such as the costs of providing
0 < s ≤ 1 imply
s
∂2θL
∂s2
+
[
1 − k(1 − s
k)
1 + sk
]
∂θL
∂s
≥ 0,
holding strictly if k > 1. Hence condition (10) holds for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and all k ≥ 1, implying that
θL ∈ Θ8([0, 1], [1,+∞)).
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Figure 4: How equilibrium litigation expenditure responds to more cost shifting in the T1
Game and T2 Game, where the American rule (λ = 0) is the baseline rule.
judges to adjudicate cases, running and maintaining courts and enforcing judgments. Nor
does this definition attempt to capture how private (and public) litigation costs change
in response to decisions to bring suit, contest suit, or settle. A more comprehensive
(and complex) model that includes the society’s perspective on the costs and benefits of
litigation is required to resolve issues regarding the optimal balance between the litigants’
private interests and the interests of the society. These issues, and those that section 2.10
below will identify, cannot be resolved without a comprehensive and robust analysis of
how cost-shifting rules affect private litigation expenditure. The present section offers that
analysis.
Assumptions 1-6 are not sufficient for answering the question whether more cost
shifting increases litigation expenditure in every case. To see this, consider Figure 4.
For each value of Plaintiff’s prior probability of success µ and under the American rule
(that is, λ = 0), Figure 4 depicts how litigation expenditure responds to infinitesimally
more cost shifting (that is, dC∗dλ ). The purple solid curve represents the T1 Game, which
has a linear cost function characterized by k = 1. The orange dashed curve represents
the T2 Game, which has a strictly convex cost function characterized by k = 2. Each of
these Games adopts the Tullock success function θT given by (6). Consider the T1 Game
first. In cases characterized by sufficiently balanced relative advantages (here, cases with
µ satisfying µ′ < µ < µ′′), more cost shifting increases litigation expenditure (that is,
dC∗
dλ > 0). In cases characterized by extreme relative advantages (here, cases with µ < µ
′
or µ > µ′′), more cost shifting decreases litigation expenditure (that is, dC∗dλ < 0).34 In
34In the T1 Game, the result that (equilibrium) litigation expenditure decreases with the cost-shifting rule
in extreme cases differs from what is often found in the existing literature. The reason for the present result
31
borderline cases characterized by µ = µ′ or µ = µ′′, more cost shifting does not affect
litigation expenditure (that is, dC∗dλ = 0). However, in the T2 Game, more cost shifting
increases litigation expenditure in all cases.
2.7.1 Sufficiently Balanced Relative Advantages or Sufficiently Convex Cost Func-
tions
Motivated by the special cases depicted in Figure 4, this subsection considers the effect of
cost shifting on (equilibrium) litigation expenditure in cases characterized by sufficiently
balanced relative advantages or sufficiently convex cost functions. As a preliminary,
Corollary 8 characterizes the sufficient and necessary condition for litigation expenditure
to be increasing with the proportion of costs recoverable.
Corollary 8. Consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium. Litigation expenditure C∗ is
increasing with the cost-shifting rule λ if and only if the following condition holds:
−(2θ − 1)sθss
θs
> (2θ − 1)
[
1 − kλ(2θ − 1)
2 − λ
]
+
α(2 − λ)sθs
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] −
α
2 − λ (13)
where s = s∗ given by Lemma 2.
Corollary 8 identifies condition (13) as the sufficient and necessary condition for
more cost shifting to increase litigation expenditure. Condition (13) requires that the
relative curvature of the success function θ with respect to effort ratio (that is, − θssθs ) to be
sufficiently large in equilibrium. Corollaries 9 and 10 will use condition (13) and Lemma
2 to ascertain how cost shifting affects litigation expenditure given sufficiently balanced
advantages or sufficiently convex cost functions.
To facilitate presentation, define a function σ : [0, 1] × [1,+∞) → (0, 0.5] by35
σ(λ, k) = max {µ ∈ [0, 1] | θ∗ ≤ (3 − λ)/(4 − λ)} − 0.5.
Corollary 9. Consider two cost-shifting rules 0 < λ1 < λ2 ≤ 1, where the success
function θ ∈ Θ({λ2}, {k}) and (equilibrium) litigation expenditure is denoted C∗1 under
is that neither the Litigation Game nor the proof of its equilibrium assumes deDdeP = 0, while some authors
do (for example, Fenn et al. 2017 at 147-48).
35To see that the function σ(·) exists and 0 < σ(λ, k) ≤ 0.5, first fix a pair of cost-shifting rule λ and
cost function k and use part 1 of Proposition 1 to obtain that µ = 0.5 implies θ∗ = 0.5 in equilibrium,
which in term implies θ∗(4 − λ) > 3 − λ. Then the property dθ∗dµ > 0 from Corollary 3 implies a one-to-one
relationship between µ and θ∗. Hence there exists at most one 0.5 < µ′′ ≤ 1 that induces θ∗(4 − λ) = 3 − λ,
and that all 0.5 < µ < min{1, µ′′} induces θ∗(4 − λ) < 3 − λ.
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λ1 and C∗2 under λ2. Suppose relative advantages are sufficiently balanced in the precise
sense of 0.5 − σ(λ2, k) ≤ µ ≤ 0.5 + σ(λ2, k). Then increasing the proportion of costs
recoverable from λ1 to λ2 increases litigation expenditure. Formally, 0.5 − σ(λ2, k) ≤
µ ≤ 0.5 + σ(λ2, k) implies C∗2 > C∗1 .
Corollary 9 proves that if relative advantages of the litigants are sufficiently balanced,
then more cost shifting increases litigation expenditure. Intuitively, more cost shifting
increases litigation expenditure if both litigants exert more efforts in equilibrium, or if
one litigant’s exertion of additional effort is not offset by a more rapid reduction in effort
by the other litigant. More cost shifting reduces a litigant’s expected marginal cost by
allowing a greater recover of her costs if she wins. By increasing the recoverable-costs
part of the "prize", more cost shifting also widens the difference in monetary outcome
between wining and losing. A litigant must have very poor prospects of success to reduce
equilibrium effort — which further harms her prospects of success — in order to save
costs. In cases characterized by sufficiently balanced relative advantages, no litigant has
very poor prospects of success. Hence, in these cases, more cost shifting incentivizes the
litigant collectively to exert more equilibrium efforts. The function σ(·) defines what is
required for relative advantages to be "sufficiently balanced" in this sense. As a function
of the applicable cost-shifting rule λ and cost function k, σ(·) marks the upper and lower
bounds within which the prior — being the parameter that represents relative advantages
— is considered sufficiently balanced.
Corollary 10. Consider two cost-shifting rules 0 ≤ λ1 < λ2 ≤ 1, where the success
function θ ∈ Θ({λ2}, {k}) and (equilibrium) litigation expenditure is denoted C∗1 under
λ1 and C∗2 under λ2. If the cost function is sufficiently convex in the sense that its degree
of homogeneity k ≥ 2, then increasing the proportion of costs recoverable from λ1 to λ2
increases litigation expenditure. Formally, k ≥ 2 implies C∗2 > C∗1 .
Corollary 10 proves that if the cost function is sufficiently convex, then more cost
shifting increases litigation expenditure (in equilibrium). This holds even in extreme cases
which fall outside the scope of Corollary 9 due one litigant having very favorable prior
probability of success. Hence Corollaries 9 and 10 together provide general conditions
under which more cost shifting increases litigation expenditure. This result expands a
finding in the existing literature, that the English rule (full recovery of the winner’s costs)
encourages greater legal expenditure in litigated cases than the American rule (no recovery
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of the winner’s costs) does.36
2.7.2 Extreme Relative Advantages and Insufficiently Convex Cost Functions
As a result of Corollaries 9 and 10, only in exceptional cases characterized by very
one-sided prior and insufficiently convex cost functions may it be possible for litigation
expenditure to be nonincreasing with the proportion of costs recoverable. We now propose
an additional condition, captured by Assumption 9, that is sufficient for concluding that
even in these exceptional cases, more cost shifting increases litigation expenditure.
Assumption 9. Suppose the prior is very favorable to Plaintiff in the sense that µ >
0.5 + σ(λ, k), and the cost function is insufficiently convex in the sense that k < 2. If
Plaintiff’s effort is no less than some positive effort by Defendant (that is, 0 < s ≤ 1), then
one of the following condition holds:
−(2θ − 1)sθss
θs
> (2θ − 1)
[
1 − kλ(2θ − 1)
2 − λ
]
+
α(2 − λ)sθs
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] −
α
2 − λ (14)
or
−(2θ − 1)sθss
θs
> (2θ − 1)
[
1 − k(1 − s
k)
1 + sk
]
+
β(1 + sk)2sθs
k(2 − λ)sk −
β
2 − λ . (15)
Assumption 9 requires the relative curvature of the success function with respect to
effort ratio (that is, − θssθs ) to be sufficiently large. For example, the Lk Game, which adopts
the success function θL defined in (11) in subsection 2.6.2, satisfies Assumption 9.37
To facilitate presentation, let Θ9(Λ,K) denote the set of twice continuously differen-
tiable functions θ : R2+ → [0, 1] that satisfyAssumption 9when the applicable cost-shifting
rule and cost function are characterized some λ ∈ Λ ⊂ [0, 1] and some k ∈ K ⊂ [0,+∞)
respectively.
Proposition 4. Consider two cost-shifting rules 0 ≤ λ1 < λ2 ≤ 1, where the success
function θ ∈ Θ({λ2}, {k}) ∩ Θ9([λ1, λ2], {k}) and (equilibrium) litigation expenditure is
36For example, Braeutigam, Owen, and Panzar (1984), Katz (1987) and Plott (1987).
37Using Appendix A.2, some algebra will reveal that µ ≥ 0.5 and 0 < s ≤ 1 implies
−s ∂
2θL
∂s2
/
∂θL
∂s
≥ 1 − k(1 − s
k)
1 + sk
.
The property θs < 0 fromLemma 9, a technical Lemma inAppendixA.1, implies θL ∈ Θ9([0, 1], [1,+∞)).
Hence the Lk Game satisfies Assumption 9 under any cost-shifting rule 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and any cost function
k ≥ 1.
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C∗1 under λ1 and C
∗
2 under λ2. Then increasing the proportion of costs recoverable from
λ1 to λ2 increases litigation expenditure. Formally, θ ∈ Θ({λ2}, {k}) ∩ Θ9([λ1, λ2], {k})
implies C∗2 > C
∗
1 .
Proposition 4 proves that adding Assumption 9 is sufficient for concluding that in all
cases, more cost shifting increases litigation expenditure. This holds even if one litigant
has very favorable relative advantages and the cost function is insufficiently convex.
2.8 Remarks on Generality
2.8.1 Multiple Judges
This subsection demonstrates that the LitigationGame as formulated in section 2.2 captures
uncertainty in respect of the judge who hears and decides the case.
Consider the following modification of the Litigation Game, called the Litigation
Game with Multiple Judges. Suppose that a judge chosen from a finite collection of
n ≥ 1 judges will hear the dispute. A judge denoted i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} rules in favor of
Plaintiff with posterior probability θi(eP, eD; µ) where θi ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}), and rules in favor
of Defendant with probability 1−θi(eP, eD; µ). Before the identity of the judge is revealed,
the litigants observe Plaintiff’s relative advantages µ, the cost function k and cost-shifting
rule λ, and exert effort levels eP, eD. It is common knowledge that the litigants assign the
prior probability 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 to judge i being chosen, where ∑ni=1 pi = 1. Plaintiff and
Defendant’s payoff functions are respectively u˜P, u˜D : R2+ → R given by
u˜P = E{θi[1 − (1 − λ)C(eP)] − (1 − θi)[C(eP) + λC(eD)]},
u˜D = E{−θi[1 + C(eD) + λC(eP)] − (1 − θi)(1 − λ)C(eD)}
where E is the expectation operator with respect to (pi)ni=1.
Remark 7. In reality, some courts disclose the identity of the judicial officer randomly
assigned to the case only late in the litigation process, sometimes on the day of the hearing.
This practice is justified on grounds including promotion of judicial independence and
impartiality as well as discouragement of "judge shopping".38 Under this practice, the
litigants only find out about the identity of the judge after they have exerted significant
38For example, some courts in Australia and Europe follow this practice. See, generally, Wallace et al.
(2014), especially pp. 687-89.
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litigation efforts. The Litigation Game with Multiple Judges captures this practice by
specifying that the litigants exert efforts before they observe the identity of the judge.
The Litigation Game with Multiple Judges is captured by a special case of the original
Litigation Game formulated in section 2.2. To see this, construct a success function
θ =
∑n
i=1 piθi. Lemma 3 establishes that θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}).
Lemma 3. Consider a finite collection of success functions θ1, θ2, ..., θn ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}).
If a success function θ is their convex combination, then θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}). Formally,
for weights p1, p2, ..., pn ≥ 0 satisfying ∑ni=1 pi = 1, that θ1, θ2, ..., θn ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}) and
θ =
∑n
i=1 piθi implies θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}).
An application of Lemma 3 proves that a special case of the original Litigation Game
that adopts the success function θ =
∑n
i=1 piθi falls within the scope of Assumptions 1-6.
Now, some algebra using Plaintiff’s payoff in the Litigation GamewithMultiple Judges
and the linearity of the expectation operator reveals
u˜P = E{θi[1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD)] − C(eP) − λC(eD)}
=
n∑
i=1
(piθi)[1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD)] − C(eP) − λC(eD)
= θ[1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD)] − C(eP) − λC(eD) = uP
where uP is Plaintiff’s payoff (given by (2)) in the (original) Litigation Game formulated
in section 2.2. Similarly, obtain u˜D = uD (given by (3)) for Defendant, where uD is
Defendant’s payoff in the Litigation Game.
Hence the Litigation Game with Multiple Judges is a special case of the (original)
Litigation Game that adopts the success function θ =
∑n
i=1 piθi. Then the Litigation
Game with Multiple Judges has a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium as established by
Proposition 1, and attracts the previous analyses of equilibrium properties of the Litigation
Game.
2.8.2 Arbitrary Judgment Sum
This subsection demonstrates that the LitigationGame as formulated in section 2.2 captures
any positive judgment sum.
Consider the following modification of the Litigation Game, called the Litigation
Game with Arbitrary Judgment Sum. Suppose the judgment sum which may be
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awarded to Plaintiff is characterized by an exogenous parameter J > 0. The cost function
C¯ : R+ → R is homogenous of degree k¯ ≥ 1. Plaintiff and Defendant respectively have
payoff functions u¯P, u¯D : R2+ → R where
u¯P = θ[J − (1 − λ)C¯(eP)] − (1 − θ)[C¯(eP) + λC¯(eD)],
u¯D = −θ[J + C¯(eD) + λC¯(eP)] − (1 − θ)(1 − λ)C¯(eD).
The Litigation Game with Arbitrary Judgment Sum is captured by the original Litiga-
tion Game as formulated in subsection 2.2. To see this, consider the original Litigation
Game with the judgment sum 1 and a cost function C(·) defined by the degree of homo-
geneity k = k¯ and C(1) = C¯(1)/J. From equation (2), Plaintiff’s payoff function in this
game is:
uP = θ[1 − (1 − λ)C(eP)] − (1 − θ)[C(eP) + λC(eD)]
uP = θ
[
1 − (1 − λ)C¯(1)e
k
P
J
]
− (1 − θ)
[
C¯(1)ekP
J
+
λC¯(1)ekD
J
]
⇔ JuP = θ
[
J − (1 − λ)C¯(1)ekP
] − (1 − θ)[C¯(1)ekP + λC¯(1)ekD] = u¯P
where u¯P is Plaintiff’s payoff function in the Litigation Game with Arbitrary Judgment
Sum. Similar steps establish JuD = u¯D, where uD is Defendant’s payoff function in the
original Litigation Game.
Hence each litigant’s payoff function in the Litigation Game with Arbitrary Judgment
Sum is a positive affine transformation of her payoff function in the original Litigation
Game that adopts the judgment sum 1 and the cost function C(·) characterized by k = k¯
andC(1) = C¯(1)/J. Then the Litigation Game with Arbitrary Judgment Sum has a unique
nontrivial Nash equilibrium as established by Proposition 1, and attracts the same analyses
of equilibrium properties as those that apply to the original Litigation Game.
2.8.3 How Changes in Relative Advantages Affect Expenditure
A conventional wisdom in the existing literature on Tullock contest models is a more
asymmetric contest reduces rent dissipation, thereby decreases the total costs of exert-
ing efforts.39 This subsection shows that this conventional wisdom does not necessary
39For such a result in a Tullock contest with asymmetric technologies, see Cornes and Hartley (2005) (at
pp. 940-41). For such a result in a model of litigation, see Carbonara et al. (2015) (at pp. 6-7).
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Figure 5: Litigation expenditure as a function of Plaintiff’s prior probability of success in
the Lk Game and T2 Game.
hold in the Litigation Game. It further proposes a sufficient condition that ensures this
conventional wisdom holds.
In the Litigation Game, the contest between the litigants becomes more asymmetric as
the prior becomes more one-sided. The notion of litigation expenditure sums their total
costs of exerting efforts (see section 2.7). Our previous assumptions are not sufficient
for answering the question whether litigation expenditure increases or decreases when
the prior becomes more one-sided. Figure 5 illustrates potential complexities. Figure 5
depicts litigation expenditure (C∗) as a function of Plaintiff’s prior probability of success
µ in the Lk Game and in another special case of the Litigation Game, called the T2 Game,
that adopts the Tullock success function θT given by (6) and a homogeneous cost function
of degree k = 2. The purple solid curve represents the Lk Game and the orange dashed
curve the T2 Game. In the Lk Game, litigation expenditure increases when the prior
becomes more one-sided. By contrast, in the T2 Game, litigation expenditure decreases
when the prior becomes more one-sided.
Motivated by Figure 5, we proposeAssumption 10 as a sufficient condition for ensuring
that litigation expenditure increases when the prior becomes more one-sided
Assumption 10. Suppose Plaintiff’s case is relatively more advantageous (that is, µ > 0.5)
and her effort is no less than Defendant’s positive effort (that is, 0 < s ≤ 1). Then at least
one of the following conditions holds:
λ(2 − λ)θµ
{
sθss +
[
1 − k(1 − s
k)
(1 + sk)
]
θs
}
≥ βθsµ (16)
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or
λ(2 − λ)θµ
{
sθss +
[
1 − kλ(2θ − 1)
2 − λ
]
θs
}
≥ αθsµ. (17)
Assumption 10 imposes restrictions on the curvature of the success function θ with
respect to Defendant’s relative effort s and Plaintiff’s prior probability of success parameter
µ. For example, the success function θL given by (11), which the Lk Game adopts, satisfies
condition (16) strictly (respectively, with equality) if the applicable pair of cost-shifting
rule and cost function satisfies λ > 0 and k > 1 (respectively, λ = 0 or k = 1).
Proposition 5 proves adding Assumption 10 is sufficient for concluding that as the
prior becomes more favorable to one litigant, litigation expenditure does not decrease. To
facilitate presentation, letΘ10({λ}, {k}) denote the set of twice continuously differentiable
functions θ : R2+ → [0, 1] that satisfy Assumption 10 when the applicable pair of cost-
shifting rule and cost function is characterized by (λ, k).
Proposition 5. Suppose the success function θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}) ∩ Θ10({λ}, {k}). Then as
the prior becomes more favorable to one litigant, (equilibrium) litigation expenditure does
not decrease; it increases if condition (16) or (17) holds strictly. Formally, that µ > 0.5
(respectively, µ < 0.5) implies dC∗dµ ≥ 0 (respectively, dC
∗
dµ ≤ 0), holding strictly if condition
(16) or (17) holds strictly.
Proposition 5 identifies a class of success functions — those that satisfy Assumption
10 in addition to Assumptions 1-6— under which litigation expenditure weakly decreases
when the prior becomes more balanced. Any one of these success functions violates the
conventional wisdom that a more asymmetric contest decreases the total costs of exerting
efforts.
We now propose alternative conditions the satisfaction of which is sufficient to uphold
this conventional wisdom. Consider Assumption 11, which imposes restrictions on the
curvature of the success function θ with respect to Defendant’s relative effort s and
Plaintiff’s prior probability of success µ.
Assumption 11. Suppose Plaintiff’s case is relatively more advantageous (that is, µ > 0.5)
and her effort is no less than some positive effort by Defendant (that is, 0 < s ≤ 1). Then
at least one of the following conditions holds:
λ(2 − λ)θµ
{
sθss +
[
1 − k(1 − s
k)
(1 + sk)
]
θs
}
≤ βθsµ (18)
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or
λ(2 − λ)θµ
{
sθss +
[
1 − kλ(2θ − 1)
2 − λ
]
θs
}
≤ αθsµ. (19)
Assumption 11 captures the Tullock success function θT given by (6). Some algebra
reveals that θT satisfies condition (19) strictly (respectively, with equality) if the applicable
cost function is characterized by λ < 1 (respectively, λ = 1)
Proposition 6 proves that adding Assumption 10 is sufficient for concluding that as the
prior becomes more favorable to one litigant, litigation expenditure does not increase. To
facilitate presentation, letΘ11({λ}, {k}) denote the set of twice continuously differentiable
functions θ : R2+ → [0, 1] that satisfy Assumption 10 when the applicable pair of cost-
shifting rule and cost function is characterized by (λ, k).
Proposition 6. Suppose the success function θ ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}) ∩ Θ11({λ}, {k}). Then as
the prior becomes more favorable to one litigant, (equilibrium) litigation expenditure does
not increase; it decreases if condition (18) or (19) holds strictly. Formally, if µ > 0.5
(respectively, µ < 0.5), then dC∗dµ ≤ 0 (respectively, dC
∗
dµ ≥ 0), holding strictly if condition
(18) or (19) holds strictly.
Proposition 6 proves that if the success function satisfies Assumption 10 in addition
to Assumptions 1-6, then litigation litigation expenditure weakly increases when the prior
becomes more balanced. Such a success function respects the conventional wisdom that
a more asymmetric contest decreases the total costs of exerting efforts.
2.9 Remarks on Settlement
The Litigation Game can offer valuable insights on the litigants’ choices between settle-
ment and litigation. To provide a comprehensive analysis of litigation efforts in a general
and robust model, the present paper largely abstracts away from pre-litigation behaviors
and the society’s perspective on litigation. For instance, outside the present scope is
a comprehensive treatment of settlement negotiations to divide the saved litigation ex-
penditure. Assuming that litigation takes place, Corollaries 9-10 and subsection 2.8.3
reveal how changes in the parameters affect litigation expenditure in equilibrium. Using
these results, this section will offer several remarks on settlement. These remarks are
necessarily tentative because the present focus is on litigation rather than pre-litigation
behaviors, and because wemake the assumptions that the litigants are risk-neutral and non-
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emotional players in a one-shot game (see section 2.2). We also assume that the litigants
have sufficiently large budgets, so their equilibrium efforts are the result of unconstrained
optimization.40
2.9.1 Settlement Range
If the litigants can negotiate for a settlement before they decide whether to litigate, then
the Litigation Game gives the range of acceptable settlement amounts. Assuming that
Plaintiff settles if she is indifferent between settling or litigating, the lower bound of the
range of acceptable settlement offers occurs when Defendant makes a take-it-or-leave it
offer which is equal to Plaintiff’s equilibrium payoff in proceeding to litigation, that is,
uP(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k). The upper bound occurs when Plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
which is equal to the magnitude of Defendant’s equilibrium payoff in litigation, that is,
−uD(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k). The range of mutually acceptable settlement amounts is the closed
interval [uP(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k),−uD(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k)]. The length of this interval is
−uD(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k) − uP(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k) = −U∗ = C∗ > 0.
Hence settlement and avoidance of litigation will generate surplus to the litigants.
Corollaries 9-10 reveal that more cost shifting increases litigation expenditure (C∗) at
least in cases where the litigants’ relative advantages are sufficiently balanced or the cost
function is sufficiently convex. In these cases, more cost shifting by increasing the size of
the surplus arising from settlement disincentivizes the litigants from bringing their case
to litigation. In other cases, how cost shifting affects the settlement surplus would depend
on the specific properties of the success function and of the cost function (see subsections
2.7.2). How the size of the surplus is shared between the litigants would depend on their
relative bargaining powers.
2.9.2 Relative Merits of Suits that Proceed to Litigation
A frequently-obtained result in the existing literature is that by increasing the stakes of
proceeding to litigation, cost shifting can discourage unmeritorious suits. Underlying this
result is the assumption that a greater litigation expenditure dampens incentives to proceed
to litigation (see Spier 2007 at pp. 264-265, Katz and Sanchirico 2012 at pp. 278-280).
40Budget constraints sometimes can give contestants incentives to settle their contests by making side-
payments, even when those side-payments are not enforceable in a court of law. Compare Beviá and Corchón
(2010) and Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2013).
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Maintaining this assumption, this subsection will reveal the functional form of the success
function also matters. Following the typical practice in the existing contest models of
litigation (for example, Farmer and Pecorino 1999 at pp. 272-274, Carbonara et al. 2015
at pp. 118-120), let the relative-advantages parameter µ in the Litigation Game represent
Plaintiff’s relative merits, and 1− µ Defendant’s relative merits. As µ approaches 0.5, the
case becomes more balanced.
Subsection 2.8.3 considers the relationship between µ and (equilibrium) litigation
expenditure, C∗. If the litigants can avoid proceeding to litigation, then they collectively
save C∗. Depicted in Figure 5 is the T2 Game, in which C∗ increases when the case
becomes more balanced (µ approaches 0.5). This suggests that the litigants have less
incentives to proceed to litigation when the case becomes more balanced. Thus, adopting
the Tullock success function given by (6) and a quadratic cost function (k = 2), the T2
Game suggests that relatively extreme cases (µ approaches 0 or 1) are more likely to
proceed to litigation.
However, also depicted in Figure 5 is the Lk Game, in which C∗ increases when the
case becomes more extreme (µ approaches 0 or 1). Thus, adopting the linear success
function given by (11), the Lk Game suggests that relatively balanced (µ approaches 0.5)
are more likely to proceed to litigation. This result, which holds in the special case of a
quadratic cost function (k = 2), is in stark contrast to what the T2 Game suggests.
Hence how the litigants’ relative merits affect their incentives to proceed to litigation
critically depends on the functional form of the success function. This observation
highlights the need for a robust model of litigation and the value of predictions that
are premised on general assumptions rather than particular functional forms.
2.9.3 Incentives to File or Defend the Case
A litigant’s incentives to file or defend a case can depend on her participation constraint,
in the sense of proceeding to litigation gives her a better payoff than not filing or defending
the case at all (Farmer and Pecorino 1999 at p. 276, Carbonara et al. 2015 at pp. 120,
125). In the Litigation Game, if we assume that Plaintiff obtains zero payoff upon not
filing her case, then her participation constraint is
uP(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k) > 0, (20)
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which captures the intuition that she would proceed to litigation only if she could not do
better by not filing her case. Similarly, if we assume that Defendant can pay the judgment
sum 1 upon not defending the case against her, then her participation constraint is
uD(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k) > −1, (21)
which captures the intuition that she would proceed to litigation only if she could not do
better by not defending the case.
Specifying the Tullock success function θT given by (6), Farmer and Pecorino (1999)
and Carbonara et al. (2015) reveal that how cost shifting affects the litigants’ incentives to
proceed to litigation critically depends on their relative merits and legal technologies. To
use the notation of the present Litigation Game, let the relative-advantages parameter µ
and the degree of homogeneity k of the cost function respectively capture relative merits
and legal technologies. Among the findings of Farmer and Pecorino (at pp. 279-280)
is that for some values of k, under the American rule (λ = 0), Plaintiff would file suit
only if µ is sufficiently large, and Defendant would defend only if µ is sufficiently small.
They (at p. 284) predict similar outcomes under the English rule (λ = 1) for some other
values of k. Moreover, Carbonara et al. (2015) discover a similar result under intermediate
cost-shifting rules that limit the quantity of costs recoverable.41 They (at pp. 132-133)
establish that as the limiting quantity increases, fewer cases characterized by an extreme
µ would proceed to litigation, and whether litigation would eventually cease depends on
k. A well-known result following from these findings is that in many cases, more cost
shifting tends to disincentivise the litigation of “one-sided” cases characterized by extreme
relative merits.42 Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno (2017) recently obtain a similar result with
a settlement model in which each litigant has private information about her own evidence.
Without specifying the success function, section 2.7 of this paper reaches a similar
conclusion. To see this, suppose the litigants’ participation constraints (20) and (21) are
satisfied under some initial proportion of cost-shifting, λ = λ0 where 0 ≤ λ0 ≤ 1. Then
an infinitesimal increase in λ (from λ0 to λ0 + δλ for a very small δλ > 0) would not
lead to violation of the participation constraints. Corollary 9 predicts that for cases with
sufficiently balanced relative merits (µ sufficiently close to 0.5), the increase in λ would
lead to greater litigation expenditure (C∗ increases). This encourages the litigants to settle
41The quantity formulation of cost-shifting rules is a special case of the proportion formulation in the
Litigation Game. See footnote 12.
42See Carbonara et al. (2015) (at pp. 134-137) for a discussion of the normative aspects of this result.
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rather than litigate. Corollary 10 makes a similar prediction if k is sufficiently high. These
predictions confirm the robustness of the well-known result that more cost shifting often
discourages the litigation of cases with extreme relative merits.
2.10 Normative Discussion
This section discusses the normative implications and limitations of our positive predic-
tions regarding how cost shifting affects legal predictability, accuracy and expenditure.
Fixing the pre-litigation behaviors (for example, the injurious activity in a tort case),
section 2.2 develops a contest model of litigation to analyze the litigants’ strategic in-
teraction under different cost-shifting rules governing the allocation of litigation costs.
This Litigation Game generalizes large classes of success functions, cost functions and
cost-shifting rules. In particular, the present characterization of cost-shifting rules covers
the extreme ones that shift either all or none of the winner’s costs to the loser, as well as the
intermediate ones that shift a proportion of such costs. Premising on the unique nontrivial
Nash equilibrium that Section 2.3 finds and characterizes, the positive predictions of the
Litigation Game are general and thus facilitate a normative analysis of whole classes of
judicial systems. Yet the Litigation Game is about efforts to litigate; it does not model
every behavior that is or should be subject to legal regulation. The following thus elicits
the normative implications of cost shifting to the extent that litigation efforts are the only
variables, and discusses how these results facilitate future research into other normatively
relevant variables.
First, cost shifting affects the policy objective of improving predictability in the judicial
determination of litigated cases. This policy is particularly relevant to commercial litigants.
Vague standards (such as "reasonableness"), the open texture of language and judicial
discretion are among the factors that render imperfectly predictable the application of
substantive law in a case and therefore the outcome of the case. From a utilitarian
perspective, improved legal predictability better enables individuals and businesses to
make plans for the future. Legal predictability is also attractive to the liberal ideal of
the rule of law because it gives fair notice to individuals of the legal consequences of
their choices and holds public officials accountable for their exercises of public powers.43
43For a survey of the philosophical literatures on the rule of law and its relationshipwith legal predictability
and accessibility, see The Rule of Law (June 22, 2016), Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, https:
//plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/. For a survey of the seminal papers on the complex
relationship between high probability suits induced by cost shifting and the substantive behaviors giving
rise to the dispute, see Katz and Sanchirico (2012), pp. 278-86.
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Fixing the pre-litigation behaviors, Corollary 5 in section 2.5 establishes that more cost
shifting unambiguously drives equilibrium litigation efforts to improve legal predictability.
This result reveals the desirability of cost shifting to the extent that litigation efforts are the
only variables and the society aims to improve legal predictability. Future research may
consider a pre-game in which the litigants choose their pre-litigation behaviors, and study
how more cost shifting by improving legal predictability in the Litigation Game affects
those choices.
Secondly, there is a complex relationship between cost-shifting rules and the policy
objective of deciding cases accurately to reflect their inherent merits. Using a standard
model of tort liability for harmful activities, Kaplow and Shavell (1996) illustrate that
greater accuracy ameliorates the misalignment between the levels of precautions that
informed injurers take and the magnitude of the harm that they are likely to generate.44
However, they also reveal that greater accuracy has limited incentive-alignment effects
when the injurers are not informed. They fix the amount of litigation costs and vary
the pre-litigation behaviors (levels of precautions and decisions to learn about harm),
while we fix the pre-litigation behaviors and vary litigation costs. We nonetheless reach a
similarly complex conclusion regarding how cost-shifting rule by determining equilibrium
litigation efforts (and costs) affects accuracy. Assuming that a litigant’s prior probability of
success (that is, her relative advantages before exerting efforts, see section 2.2) accurately
reflects the inherent merits of her case,45 section 2.6 reveals that the properties of the
success function determinewhethermore cost shifting increases or decreases the difference
between her prior and equilibrium probabilities of success. That difference, which we call
distortion (see (8) in section 2.6), measures accuracy in the expected outcome of the case.
Section 2.6 also provides exact sufficient conditions (Assumptions 7, 8) for ensuring that
distortion is monotonic with the proportion of costs recoverable. Future research may seek
empirical evidence on whether a particular judicial system satisfies one of these conditions
to ascertain the relationship between cost shifting and accuracy in that system.
Thirdly, the present results regarding litigation efforts under different cost-shifting
rules do not resolve questions concerning social welfare or incentives to settle or proceed
to trial. Landes (1971), Posner (1972) and Gould (1973) found that settlement decisions
depend on risk preferences and disagreements on the likelihood of success. Katz and
44See also Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) (pp. 185-86), arguing that “justice" requires a litigant’s
equilibrium probability of success to match her merits, as reflected by her relative advantages.
45The existing models of cost shifting generally adopt this assumption (for example, Plott 1987, p. 188,
Katz 1988, p. 129-30, Gong and McAfee 2000, p. 223, Carbonara et al. 2015, p. 5).
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Sanchirico (2012) (pp. 278-86) surveyed the seminal contributions on the relationship
between cost shifting and decisions to bring suit or settle. Many contributions account
for information asymmetry, but make the assumption that once a case proceeds to trial,
individual or total litigation efforts and costs do not vary with the extent of cost shifting.46
While the present paper challenges that assumption,47 it does not account for information
asymmetry.48 Moreover, Shavell (1997) observes that a private litigant’s decisions to
bring suit, settle or incur litigation costs are socially suboptimal due to two externalities:
the negative externality arising from her lack of incentives to consider the costs that she
exerts on others, such as the other litigant or the state; and the positive externality arising
from her lack of incentives to consider the social benefits of litigation, such as deterrence
of future injuries. In particular, he uses examples with fixed litigation costs to illustrate
that a suboptimal amount of suits arise under the English rule (which shifts all of the
winner’s costs to the loser). In a similar vein, Spier (1997) reveals the social suboptimality
of private incentives to settle suits against negligent injurers, but she (at pp. 620-21) also
finds conditions under which the English rule outperforms the American rule (no shifting
of the winner’s costs). Section 2.9 reaches similarly complex conclusions, applying the
Litigation Game with endogenous litigation costs and proportionate cost-shifting rules.
If we account for the possibly of settlement, then in cases where the litigants’ relative
advantages are sufficiently balanced or the cost function is sufficiently convex, more cost
shifting by increasing the size of the surplus arising from settlement incentivizes the
litigants to settle. However, this result may not hold in the other cases (see section 2.7).
Moreover, section 2.9 reveals that the relationship between the litigants’ relative advantages
and their incentives to proceed to litigation critically depends on the functional form of
the success function.
Finally, future research may introduce additional features to the present model of
litigation. For example, introducing divergence in the litigants’ valuation of the judgment
sum would enable an analysis of the judge’s decisions regarding both the winner of the
46For example, Bebchuk (1984), p. 406; Bebchuk and Chang (1996), pp. 376, 378-81; Klement and
Neeman (2005), p. 289; Klerman and Lee (2014), pp. 216, 224; Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1998), pp. 524;
Reinganum andWilde (1986), p. 559; Spier (1994), p. 200; Talley (1995), p. 473. Assuming total litigation
costs are fixed, Anderlini, Felli, and Immordino (2018) recently prove that the choice of cost-shifting rule
does not affect whether a given suit is settled or litigated.
47See Corollaries 9, 10 and Proposition 4.
48See Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno (2017), especially Appendix D.2, for a settlement model that accounts
for information asymmetry without assuming fixed total litigation costs. These authors use the Tullock
success function, and formulate the cost-shifting rule to impose an exogenous cap on the quantity of costs
recoverable. We capture a class of success functions, and formulate the cost-shifting rule as an exogenous
proportion of costs recoverable. For a comparison of the proportion and quantity formulations of cost-
shifting rules, see footnote 12 and accompanying text.
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case and the magnitude of the judgment sum. Introducing budget constraints also would
enable an analysis of the implications of divergence in the litigants’ wealth levels or
provisions of legal aid. Moreover, it may be fruitful to study cost-shifting rules with the
incomplete-information Tullock contest model developed by Einy et al. (2015).
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3 Varieties of Emotions in Civil Litigation: A Robust
Theory
3.1 Introduction
A civil lawsuit typically involves a plaintiff who seeks judicial remedies at the expense
of a defendant. Civil lawsuits generate private and social benefits, such as enforcing the
substantive law, guiding future conduct and deterring future injuries (Shavell 1997). Civil
lawsuits also impose enormous costs on the litigants and on the public, such as the costs of
hiring lawyers, discovering evidence, providing judges, and running courts.49 Moreover,
some litigants incur legal costs that well exceed the monetary value of the subject of the
dispute.50
Economic analysis of litigation efforts and costs typically employs a contest model
with rational and self-interested contestants.51 However, contest experiments consistently
suggest that, rather than being purely self-interested, contestants tend to consider relative
and non-monetary payoffs.52 Litigation models may give rise to misleading predictions
and policy recommendations if they neglect well-documented behavioral traits. This short-
comingmay undermine our understanding of the civil justice system, which is fundamental
to the functioning of a society governed by the rule of law.
A contest model of civil litigation typically specifies two players — a plaintiff and a
defendant— who simultaneously exert costly efforts to maximize their respective payoffs.
Based on the litigants’ efforts and an exogenous parameter reflecting their (prior) relative
advantages, a success function gives their respective (posterior) probabilities of success.
The defendant transfers a judgment sum to the plaintiff if and only the plaintiff wins. A
cost-shifting rule specifies the extent to which the loser pays the winner’s litigation costs.
To our best knowledge, chapter 2 of this thesis offers the most general contest model of
litigation. Further extending that model, we introduce non-monetary and two different
kinds of emotional preferences, and reveal that these preferences have very different
49For example, a recent survey reports that various companies across the globe spend on aver-
age $US 1 million on litigation per annum. See the 2016 Annual Litigation Trends Survey by Nor-
ton Rose Fulbright, an international law firm, at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/
20160915-2016-litigation-trends-annual-survey-142485.pdf.
50For example, an American judge recalled a divorce case in which the husband spent millions just to
keep the wife from having a painting that was sold for less than half a million. See Duncan (2007) p. 125.
51See the subsequent summary of the literature on cost shifting and Katz and Sanchirico’s (2012) survey
of seminal papers. Other important applications of contest models include optimal labor contracts (see, for
example, Lazear and Rosen 1981).
52See the survey in Dechenaux et al. (2015) (at pp. 614-616).
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implications on (equilibrium) litigation outcomes.
In the presentEmotionalLitigationGame, each litigant acts tomaximize an emotional
payoff that represents her expectations regarding her monetary outcome, her non-monetary
joy of winning and her negative or positive relational emotions toward the other litigant.
The joy of winning arises from winning the lawsuit, while negative (respectively, positive)
relational emotions arise from harming (benefiting) the other litigant. To capture a great
diversity of judicial systems, this game adopts general formulations of the success function,
litigation cost function and cost-shifting rule. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium with
positive effort levels.
The two different forms of non-monetary considerations— relational emotions and joy
of winning — have different implications on the equilibrium properties of the Emotional
Litigation Game. Intuitively, a greater joy of winning directly increases the litigant’s
marginal benefits of exerting costly efforts to increase her probability of success; more
negative relational emotions generate similar direct effects because the litigant has a
heightened desire to harm her adversary. However, unlike changes in the joy of winning,
changes in relational emotions have indirect effects in cases where a cost-shifting rule
operates to shift some or all of the winner’s costs to the loser. Cost shifting creates
externalities (in expectation) because, when she chooses her effort level, a litigant expects
that with a positive probability some or all of her costs are borne by her adversary.
More negative relational emotions indirectly amplify such externalities because a litigant
derives a greater value from inflicting expected costs on her adversary. Moreover, more
negative relational emotions (or more cost shifting) heighten incentives to exert efforts in
an asymmetric manner; the litigant with stronger relative advantages experiences greater
increases in incentives to exert efforts, because her expected reward from doing so is
greater than the weaker litigant’s. Formalizing these observations, we prove that more
negative relational emotions increase the equilibrium relative effort and probability of
success of the relatively more advantageous litigant. Except in rare circumstances, more
negative relational emotions also increase the litigants’ total litigation costs in equilibrium.
Drastically different normative implications arise from the subtle differences between
relational and outcome-dependent emotions. Our equilibrium analysis suggests that the
presence of relational emotions typically strengthens the cost-shifting rule, while the
presence of joy of winning has no such effect. Hence, as section 3.5 will further elaborate,
to understand and optimize cost shifting in civil litigation requires taking into account and
responding differently to these two forms of emotions. While both outcome-dependent
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and relational emotions typically increase costs in litigated cases, only relational emotions
interact with the cost-shifting rule.
Unlike most other contest models of litigation, the present model gives rise to con-
clusions that do not depend on the specific functional form of the success function, the
degree of homogeneity of the cost function, or the extent of cost shifting. Building upon
the axiomatization effort of chapter 2 of this thesis, the present model imposes general
and reasonable assumptions on the success function without specifying its functional
form. Subsuming oft-used functional forms, these assumptions accommodate judges with
very different styles and ways of aggregating the litigants’ (prior) relative advantages and
litigation efforts. These assumptions also capture uncertainty regarding the identity or
decisionmaking style of the judge.53
The literature on the economics of civil litigation is vast, and Sanchirico (2012)
contains recent surveys of the seminal contributions.54 Specifying extreme cost-shifting
rules that either shift all or none of the winner’s costs to the loser, Braeutigam et al. (1984)
and Katz (1987) were among the early proponents of applying contest models to study
litigation efforts and costs. In reality, intermediate cost shifting is the norm (Hodges et al.
2010, p. 20), and authors that applied contest models to study intermediate cost shifting
include Carbonara et al. (2015), Farmer and Pecorino (2016), Gong and McAfee (2000),
Hause (1989), Hyde andWilliams (2002), Luppi and Parisi (2012) and Plott (1987), while
Baye et al. (2005) and Klemperer (2003) applied auction-theoretic models. More recently,
chapter 2 of this thesis axiomatized the contest model to study intermediate cost shifting
under general formulations of the success function and cost function. While the success
function in most models is exogenously given, the success functions in Skaperdas and
Vaidya’s (2012) litigation model (with no cost shifting) are derived from the inference
process of a Bayesian judge.
We take the unorthodox step to incorporate emotional considerations into a litigation
model in order to capture well-documented behavioral traits. As Millner and Pratt (1989)
first observed and Dechenaux et al. (2015) (at pp. 614-616) recently surveyed, a variety of
contest experiments consistently reveal that subjects typically exert significantly greater
efforts than the equilibrium predictions of contest models based on pure self interest. An
53More precisely, if a finite number of success functions satisfy the present assumptions, then their convex
combination also satisfies the present assumptions. Thus these assumptions capture the scenario in which
each of the potential judges rules according to a different success function and the litigants have a common
prior probability for each judge being assigned to their case. For a more detailed discussion, see chapter 2
of this thesis, subsection 2.8.1.
54An earlier survey is in Spier (2007).
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explanation is, in addition to the monetary outcome of winning, subjects tend to con-
sider non-monetary and relative outcomes (see, for example, Mago et al. 2016, Price and
Sheremeta 2011, Sheremeta 2010).55 The present Emotional Litigation Game introduces
the notions of joy of winning and relational emotions to capture, respectively, the non-
monetary value of winning and concerns over relative outcomes. Moreover, the Tullock
contest experiments conducted byHerrmann andOrzen (2008) and Fonseca (2009) suggest
that the subjects’ spiteful preferences to harm their adversaries explain their over-exertion
of efforts. For our purposes, their results are most relevant because the Tullock contest
model is widely used to study civil litigation. In addition, may real-life litigants exhibit
spiteful behaviors,56 and in severe cases, courts have sanctioned vexatious litigants who
repeatedly brought frivolous lawsuits to harass their adversaries.57 Our equilibrium anal-
ysis thus pays close attention to those special cases involving litigants who have negative
relational emotions to harm each other.
Interdependent preferences are also prevalent in non-contest situations, such as con-
spicuous consumption (Veblen 1899) and ultimatum and dictator games (see, for example,
the recent survey in Dhami 2016, ch. 5).58 For instance, Cameron (1999) conducted high-
stake experiments in Indonesia to confirm the frequently-obtained result that participants
in ultimatum games tend to realize much fairer distribution of surplus than the equilibrium
prediction based on rational and self-interested agents. Inequality aversion is one of the
explanations that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) captured with their well-known formulation of
utility functions. Using a variety of games, Charness and Rabin (2002) presented experi-
mental results supporting alternative explanations based on concerns for joint surplus and
reciprocity. While inequality aversion and concerns for joint surplus are not our focus, the
present model nonetheless may be interpreted to capture these preferences (see Remark
10 in section 3.2).
55Alternative explanations for the over-extension of efforts include risk aversion, endowment effect as
well as probability distortion, mistakes, judgmental biases, and problems with the experimental design. See
Sheremeta (2013), Chowdhury and Moffatt (2017) and the papers surveyed by Dechenaux et al. (2015) at
p. 617. See also Eisenkopf, Friehe, Wohlschlegel, et al. (2018) for an experiment which does not find that
negative emotions have an impact on efforts or on decisions to initiate the contest.
56In fact, an American judge observed that the adversarial litigation system — which is prevalent in
common law jurisdictions — heightens antagonism and angst in divorce cases. See Duncan (2007) p. 11.
57For example, U.S. federal trial courts may prohibit vexatious litigants from filing lawsuits without prior
permission. See the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit in the case of Safir v. U.S. Lines,
Inc. 792 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1986). Anglo-Australian courts also have a similar power. See, for example,
section 8 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) and the opinion of the English Court of Appeal
in the case of Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113. A list of vexatious litigants in
England is available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/vexatious-litigants.
58Earlier surveys of the literature on interdependent preferences include Camerer and Thaler (1995) and
Sobel (2005).
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The present model does not cover some forms of interdependent preferences or in-
formational structures that other authors have captured. Rabin (1993) constructed a
complete-information model that endogenously generates intentions-based reciprocity.
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) offered an incomplete-information model that captures con-
cerns for relative outcomes. Capturing preferences for reciprocity, Segal and Sobel (2007)
presented a representation theorem for games with players who have preferences over
strategies in addition to outcomes. Segal and Sobel (2008) used their model to introduce a
condition for ensuring that a player is more likely to be kind to an opponent who treats him
nicely. Pollak (1976) examined demand behaviors with a model in which interdependent
preferences operate through past consumption.
The present paper builds upon a small literature that explores the role of emotions in
civil litigation. To our best knowledge, Huang andWu (1992) first considered the effect of
emotions on pretrial bargaining and on decisions to bring suit or settle, while Baumann and
Friehe (2012b) first studied emotions in a contest model with endogenous litigation efforts.
Using a Tullock contest model with no cost shifting, Baumann and Friehe (2012b) showed
that the equilibrium implications of introducing outcome-dependent emotions are similar
to raising the stakes (see Baumann and Friehe 2012b at pp. 196, 203-04).59 Extending
Plott’s (1987) litigation model, Angenendt (2014) considered the how loss aversion affects
well-known predictions regarding extreme cost-shifting rules. We complement their work
by using a generally-formulated litigation model; by introducing intermediate cost shifting
and relational emotions; and by revealing that relational emotions and outcome-dependent
emotions have drastically different equilibrium implications.60 However, the present
model does not subsume Baumann and Friehe’s (2012b) model or analysis. Unlike us,
Baumann and Friehe (2012b) (at. pp.196, 202-12) allowed the litigants to have asymmetric
outcome-dependent emotions, and they used the functional forms of the contest success
function and emotions to study incentives to sue and accuracy in adjudication. Moreover,
the present model does not capture how emotional preferences affect incentives to settle a
dispute, while a body of empirical literature uses bargaining models to explore that issue
(for example, see Farmer and Tiefenthaler 2001and the papers surveyed in Baumann and
Friehe 2012b at pp. 197-99).
Section 3.2 constructs the Emotional Litigation Game to introduce emotional variables
into a general contest model that captures whole classes of success functions, cost func-
59The present Emotional Litigation Game captures outcome-dependent emotions as “the joy of winning".
See section 3.2.
60See especially Corollary 11 in section 3.3 and the normative discussion in section 3.5.
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tions and cost-shifting rules. Section 3.3 proves the existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium with positive efforts, and reveals the different roles of relational emotions and
joy of winning. Section 3.4 reveals how changes in relational emotions or joy of win-
ning affect equilibrium outcomes. In particular, more negative relational emotions distort
equilibrium outcomes in favor of the relatively more advantageous litigant, but typically
increase the litigants’ total costs. Section 3.5 concludes with a discussion of normative
implications and future research directions. Appendix A.3 contains all proofs.
3.2 The Emotional Litigation Game
The Emotional Litigation Game is a simultaneous-move game of complete information
characterized by two risk-neutral players, Plaintiff and Defendant, their common set of
actions R+, and their payoff functions u˘P, u˘D : R2+ → R. Each payoff function has
monetary and non-monetary components, including the joy of winning and the player’s
emotions regarding the other player. The payoff functions and all exogenous parameters
are common knowledge.
Plaintiff and Defendant simultaneously and respectively exert eP, eD ≥ 0 levels of
efforts. Giving each litigant’s monetary cost of exerting effort is a homogeneous cost
function C : R+ → R+ with an exogenous degree of homogeneity k ≥ 1, where k
satisfies additional assumptions to be set out below. An exogenous parameter 0 < µ < 1
represents Plaintiff’s prior probability of success; Defendant’s prior probability of success
is 1 − µ. Plaintiff (respectively, Defendant) is relatively more advantageous if µ > 0.5
(µ < 0.5).61 Given a prior parameter µ and a pair of efforts (eP, eD), the judicial process
with probability θ(eP, eD; µ) requiresDefendant to transfer a judgment sumof 1 to Plaintiff,
where the success function θ : R2+ → [0, 1] satisfies additional assumptions to be set out
below. Upon determination of the outcome of the case, a cost-shifting rule requires
the loser to pay an exogenous 0 ≤ λ˘ ≤ 1 proportion of the winner’s costs, where λ˘
satisfies additional assumptions to be set out below. In particular, λ˘ = 0 characterizes the
American rule that allows for no recovery, and λ˘ = 1 the English rule that allows for full
recovery. Containing these monetary variables are Plaintiff and Defendant’s respective
61Relative advantages reflect institutional factors that do not vary with litigation efforts but influence the
outcome of the case. See Remark 1 in chapter 2 of this thesis for a detailed discussion of relative advantages
and litigation efforts.
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monetary payoffs uP, uD : R2+ → R given by
uP = θ[1 − (1 − λ˘)C(eP)] − (1 − θ)[C(eP) + λ˘C(eD)] (22)
uD = −θ[1 + C(eD) + λ˘C(eP)] − (1 − θ)(1 − λ˘)C(eD). (23)
Each litigant’smonetary payoff is her expectedmonetary outcome. Plaintiff’smonetary
payoff uP is the weighted average of her monetary outcome in the event that she wins,
1− (1− λ˘)C(eP), and her monetary outcome in the event that she loses, −C(eP) − λ˘C(eD).
Weights θ and 1 − θ are respectively her probabilities of winning and losing. Similarly,
Defendant’s monetary payoff uD is the weighted average of her monetary outcome in the
event that she loses, −1−C(eD) − λ˘C(eP), and her monetary outcome in the event that she
wins, −(1 − λ˘)C(eD). Weights θ and 1 − θ are respectively her probabilities of losing and
winning.
Remark 8. Litigation efforts and probabilities of success have the following interpreta-
tion. Suppose, given the facts that characterize the relevant dispute and given the litigation
efforts, a random variable will realize one of two outcomes — “Plaintiff wins” or “De-
fendant wins” — at the end of the litigation process. Before such realization, the litigants
first exert some minimum sunk efforts to initiate the litigation process, and then exert addi-
tional efforts to influence the realization of the outcome. “Sunk efforts” capture activities
to acquire knowledge of the “rules of the game”, commence legal proceedings and present
the minimum “amounts” of evidence and arguments to obtain a judicial ruling. “Addi-
tional efforts” refer to activities beyond the bare minimum, such as conducting extensive
discovery, adducing voluminous evidence and making lengthy arguments. A litigant’s
prior probability of success (µ for Plaintiff and 1− µ for Defendant) is the probability that
the outcome realizes in her favor conditional on exertion of sunk efforts and no additional
efforts. The facts, sunk efforts and the practical operation of the judicial system affect
her prior probability of success. The litigant’s posterior probability of success (θ for
Plaintiff and 1 − θ for Defendant) is the probability that the outcome realizes in her favor
after exertion of sunk efforts and additional efforts. Because the Emotional Litigation
Game models the litigants’ strategic interaction after their exertion of sunk efforts, we call
variables eP and eD “efforts” and drop the “additional” label for simplicity.
Instead of acting solely tomaximize hermonetary payoff, each litigant acts tomaximize
an emotional payoff that includes the following non-monetary variables. In addition to
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any monetary transfer, the winner derives an exogenous value υ ≥ 0, called her joy of
winning.62 Moreover, each litigant derives value fromher feelings about the other litigant’s
outcome; an exogenous ξ < 1 captures such relational emotions, meaning that each
litigant is indifferent between one unit of her own monetary payoff (or joy of winning) and
ξ units of the other litigant’s. Containing these non-monetary variables and the monetary
payoffs are Plaintiff and Defendant’s respective emotional payoffs u˘P, u˘D : R2+ → R given
by63
u˘P = uP + θυ + ξ[uD + (1 − θ)υ] (24)
u˘D = uD + (1 − θ)υ + ξ[uP + θυ]. (25)
Plaintiff’s emotional payoff u˘P sums her monetary payoff uP, her expected joy of
winning θυ and her relational emotions regarding Defendant’s outcome, ξ[uD + (1− θ)υ].
Similarly, Defendant’s emotional payoff u˘D sums her monetary payoff uD, her expected joy
of winning (1− θ)υ and her relational emotions regarding Plaintiff’s outcome, ξ[uP + θυ].
Remark 9. While we interpret υ and ξ to represent the joy of winning and relational
emotions respectively, they can capture non-emotional preferences. For instance, υ can
represent a litigant’s monetary benefits of winning beyond the judgment sum, such as
the monetary value of having a reputation as a strong litigant. Similarly, ξ can capture
monetary spillovers arising from litigation efforts, such as the damages caused by negative
publicity. Moreover, as Remark 10 will explain, υ and ξ can capture concerns for relative
payoff, inequality or joint surplus.
The empirical literature on contests suggests that relational emotions are typically
negative (ξ < 0).64 Under this specification, each litigant has competitive preferences;
her emotional payoff increases when the other litigant’s monetary payoff or expected joy
of winning decreases. To our best knowledge, there is no empirical literature measuring
emotional variables in litigated cases, but the specification of ξ < 0 is intuitively appealing
given the adversarial nature of civil litigation, especially in common law jurisdictions.
62See section 3.1 for a discussion of the experimental literature supporting the existence of non-monetary
utilities of winning, which we call joy of winning to avoid confusion with relational emotions.
63For simplicity, we formulate each litigant’s emotional payoff as an independent function of strategies
(ep, eD) directly, rather than as an interdependent function of her monetary payoff and her opponent’s
emotional payoff. An alternative approach is to start with a system of interdependent payoff functions,
and use it to induce independent payoff functions. For conditions that enable the alternative approach, see
Bergstrom (1999).
64See section 3.1.
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However, the Emotional Litigation Game also allows for the possibility of atypical cases
characterized by 0 < ξ < 1.65
Remark 10. In addition to the joy of winning and relational emotions, the Emotional
LitigationGame can capture a broad variety of non-monetary preferences that are typically
present in contests or in bargaining and other more "cooperative" games (see section 3.1).
First, assuming zero joy of winning (υ = 0) and specifying ξ > −1, a rearrangement
of the litigants’ emotional payoffs (24) and (25) gives
u˘P
1 + ξ
= uP −
(
ξ
1 + ξ
)
(uP − uD), u˘D1 + ξ = uD −
(
ξ
1 + ξ
)
(uD − uP)
where the function u˘P/(1+ ξ) is a strictly positive affine transformation of Plaintiff’s emo-
tional payoff function u˘P in (24); these two functions thus represent the same underlying
preferences. (An analogous logic applies to Defendant.) Hence the Emotional Litigation
Game captures concerns for relative payoffs by interpreting the weight ξ/(1 + ξ) as the
monetary value of relative payoffs. If −1 < ξ < 0, then each litigant’s emotional payoff
increases when her relative payoff increases; that is, she has competitive preferences.
If ξ > 0, then each litigant’s emotional payoff decreases when her relative payoff in-
creases; that is, she has “spiteful” preferences (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt 1999,
Herrmann and Orzen 2008, and Chowdhury, Jeon, and Ramalingam 2018).
Secondly, assuming υ = 0 and specifying 0 < ξ < 1, a rearrangement of the litigants’
emotional payoffs (24) and (25) gives
u˘P = (1 − ξ)uP + ξ(uP + uD), u˘D = (1 − ξ)uD + ξ(uP + uD)
where each litigant’s emotional payoff is a weighted average of her monetary payoff and
joint surplus. Hence the Emotional Litigation Game captures concerns for joint surplus
by interpreting the weight ξ as the extent to which each litigant values joint surplus.
Thirdly, the mere presence of the joy of winning — without concerns for relative
outcomes— may be sufficient to explain the over-exertion of efforts in contest experiments
(see, for example, Sheremeta 2010, pp. 738-739 and the papers surveyed there). The
Emotional Litigation Game captures this possibility by specifying υ > 0 and ξ = 0.
65We exclude the possibility that each litigant values the other litigant’s monetary payoff (or expected joy
of winning) more than her own; that is, ξ ≥ 1. Some algebra using equations (24) and (25) will reveal that,
in the limiting case of ξ = 1, each litigant acts to minimize total litigation costs. An examination of the first
order conditions in system (28) in section 3.3 will also reveal that allowing for ξ ≥ 1 would render the model
uninteresting, because each litigant would only have incentives to exert zero effort in any equilibrium.
56
Moreover, the Emotional Litigation Game captures loss aversion — a well-known
phenomenon in contests (see, recently, Chowdhury et al. 2018). To see this, specify a
constant α > 1, and rearrange the litigants’ emotional payoffs (24) and (25) to obtain
u˘P− αυ1 + α−
ξαυ
1 + α
= uP + θ
[ υ
1 + α
]
−(1−θ)
[ αυ
1 + α
]
+ ξ
[
uD + (1−θ)
[ υ
1 + α
]
−θ
[ αυ
1 + α
] ]
(26)
u˘D− αυ1 + α−
ξαυ
1 + α
= uD + (1−θ)
[ υ
1 + α
]
−θ
[ αυ
1 + α
]
+ ξ
[
uP + θ
[ υ
1 + α
]
−(1−θ)
[ αυ
1 + α
] ]
,
(27)
where equation (26) is a strictly positive affine transformation of Plaintiff’s emotional
payoff function u˘P in (24); thus they represent the same preferences. (The same logic
applies toDefendant.) An examination of the right-hand side of equation (26) (respectively,
(27)) reveals that Plaintiff (Defendant) has loss aversion: her “joy of winning” parameter
here is υ/(1 + α), which is strictly smaller than her “pain of losing” αυ/(1 + α). Hence
the Emotional Litigation Game captures loss aversion by interpreting α/(1 + α) as the
extent to which loss is valued relatively more than gain.
However, the Emotional Litigation Game does not differentiate between advantageous
and disadvantageous inequality aversion, in the sense that a player’s degree of inequity
aversion depends on whether her payoff is greater or smaller than her opponent’s. For
two-player symmetric Tullock contests that differentiate between advantageous and disad-
vantageous inequality aversion, see Herrmann and Orzen (2008) and Chowdhury et al.
(2018).
We now state assumptions to guarantee equilibrium existence and uniqueness.66 On its
subdomain R2++, the success function θ(·) is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies
the following Assumptions 12-17, where Assumptions 16 and 17 also constrain the degree
of homogeneity k of the cost function, the proportion λ˘ of costs recoverable and the extent
of relational emotions ξ.
Assumption 12. Holding the efforts and the prior constant, whether a litigant is labeled
"Plaintiff" or "Defendant" does not affect her posterior probability of success. Formally,
θ(e1, e2; µ0) = 1−θ(e2, e1; 1−µ0), for any positive real numbers e1, e2 > 0 and 0 < µ0 < 1.
Assumption 13. Holding the prior constant, proportionate changes in effort levels do not
66For conditions that give rise to multiple equilibria in Tullock contests, see Chowdhury and Sheremeta
(2011b).
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affect Plaintiff’s posterior probability of success. Formally, θ(eP, eD; µ) = θ(xeP, xeD; µ),
for all scalar x > 0.
Assumption 14. Holding the prior and Defendant’s effort constant, Plaintiff’s posterior
probability of success is strictly increasingwith andweakly concave in her effort. Formally,
∂θ
∂eP
> 0 and ∂2θ
∂e2P
≤ 0.
Assumption 15. Holding the efforts constant, Plaintiff’s posterior probability of success
is strictly increasing with her prior probability of success. Formally, ∂θ∂µ > 0.
Assumptions 12-15 capture intuitions regarding the properties of reasonable success
functions. Assumption 12 requires a litigant’s posterior probability of success to be
unaffected by merely changing her label from "Plaintiff" — whose effort, prior and
posterior probabilities of success are respectively denoted eP, µ, θ — to "Defendant"
— whose effort, prior and posterior probabilities of success are respectively denoted
eD, 1 − µ, 1 − θ. In other words, the parameter µ captures any asymmetry that does not
vary with litigation efforts.67 Under Assumption 13, proportionate changes in effort levels
do not vary Plaintiff’s probability of success. Assumptions 14-15 further require that an
increase in Plaintiff’s prior probability of success or effort strictly increases her posterior
probability of success.
Assumption 16. Interdependence in payoffs is limited in the following precise sense:
1. The cost-shifting rule λ˘ and relational emotions ξ satisfy λ˘(1 − ξ) ≤ 1.
2. Suppose λ˘(1 − ξ) = 1 and the cost function is linear, k = 1. Then Plaintiff does not
win almost surely by exerting infinitely more effort than Defendant does. Formally,
λ˘(1 − ξ) = 1 implies lim
eP/eD→+∞
θ < 1.
Assumption 16 restricts the combined "strength" of the cost-shifting rule λ˘ and re-
lational emotions ξ. Part 1 ensures that each litigant’s marginal costs of exerting effort
are always positive; allowing for λ˘(1 − ξ) > 1 might induce zero marginal costs for
some extremely asymmetric effort pairs. Part 2 ensures that, in special cases involving
"strong" negative relational emotions and cost shifting (precisely, λ˘(1 − ξ) = 1) and a
67For instance, if being called "Plaintiff" requires a litigant to discharge a more onerous burden of proof
than if she were called "Defendant", then the parameter µ should reflect such asymmetry.
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linear cost function (k = 1), Plaintiff does not have incentives to make explosive ef-
forts (eP/eD → +∞) with an expectation that she almost surely inflicts strong negative
relational emotions and unbounded litigant costs on Defendant.68
Assumption 17. For the interested triple of parameters (λ˘, k, ξ), the following condition
holds
∂2
∂e2P
(
θ
1−λ˘(1−ξ)θ
)
∂
∂eP
(
θ
1−λ˘(1−ξ)θ
) < C′′(eP)
C′(eP) .
Assumption 17 is a technical assumption that ensures Plaintiff’s emotional payoff
is strictly quasiconcave in her own effort.69 It ensures that the curvature of Plaintiff’s
distorted posterior probability of success — θ/(1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ)— be small compared to
the curvature of the cost function.
The exogenous parameters and the litigants’ payoff functions are common knowledge
between them. To focus on the study of litigation efforts and probabilities of success,
further assume there is no settlement or risk of default.
The solution concept adopted is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that is non-trivial
in the sense of comprising positive efforts by both litigants. A pair of positive efforts is
such an equilibrium if given the other litigant’s effort, each litigant chooses an effort to
maximize her emotional payoff.
3.3 Equilibrium: Existence, Uniqueness, and the Role of Emotional
Variables
This section proves the existence and uniqueness of a non-trivial Nash equilibrium in the
Emotional Litigation Game. It then presents our main result revealing how the presence
of relational emotions and joy of winning affects equilibrium efforts.
Lemma 4 allows any equilibrium to be characterized by a system of first order condi-
tions (FOCs). Appendix A.3 contains all proofs.
Lemma 4. Each litigant’s emotional payoff function is strictly quasiconcave in her own
effort.
68System (28) to be stated below will formalize these intuitive observations.
69See the Proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix A.3.
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Lemma 4 implies given the other litigant’s effort, a litigant’s FOC characterizes her
best reply.70 A substitution exercise using equations (22)-(25) reveals that a pair of positive
efforts (eP, eD) ∈ R2++ constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies system (28):

0 = ∂θ∂eP (1 − ξ)[1 + υ + λ˘C(eP) + λ˘C(eD)] − [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]C′(eP)
0 = ∂(1−θ)∂eD (1 − ξ)[1 + υ + λ˘C(eP) + λ˘C(eD)] − [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)]C′(eD).
(28)
System (28) reveals how the cost-shifting rule λ˘, relational emotions ξ and joy of win-
ning υ affect a litigant’s incentives to exert costly effort. For instance, holding Defendant’s
effort eD fixed, more cost shifting (λ˘ increases) increases Plaintiff’s marginal benefits of
exerting effort eP by shifting a greater proportion of her costs— C(eP)— into the "prize"
of winning: (1 − ξ)[1 + υ + λ˘C(eP) + λ˘C(eD)]. This shift also reduces her marginal costs
of exerting effort: [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]C′(eP). Performing a similar role as the cost-shifting
rule, more negative relational emotions (ξ decreases) increase Plaintiff’s marginal benefits
of exerting effort by scaling up the "prize" of winning. A decreased ξ also reduces her
marginal costs of exerting effort. By comparison, a greater joy of winning υ increases
Plaintiff’s marginal benefits of exerting effort, but does not affect her marginal costs. The
same observations apply to Defendant’s incentives to exert costly effort when Plaintiff’s
effort is fixed. These intuitive observations have profound equilibrium implications, as
Corollary 11 below will reveal.
Lemma 5 finds a unique, positive effort ratio which will be used to characterize the
nontrival Nash equilibrium. To simplify notation, define an auxiliary variable s = eD/eP
whenever Plaintiff’s effort eP > 0; s is the ratio of Defendant’s effort relative to Plaintiff’s.
Assumption 13 implies that for any two pairs of positive efforts (eP, eD), (e′P, e′D) ∈ R2++
satisfying eD/eP = e′D/e′P, the success function satisfies θ(eP, eD; µ) = θ(e′P, e′D; µ). By a
slight abuse of notation, denote θ(s; µ) = θ(eP, eD; µ) and θs = ∂∂s θ(s; µ).
Lemma 5. There exists a unique positive effort ratio s∗ > 0 that satisfies
s∗ =
[
1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ(s∗; µ)
1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)[1 − θ(s∗; µ)]
]1/k
. (29)
Proposition 7 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a non-trivial Nash equilib-
rium. It also characterizes the litigants’ relative efforts in equilibrium.
70Theorem 8 of Diewert et al. (1981) holds any local maximizer of a strictly quasiconcave function is the
unique global maximizer.
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Proposition 7. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium with positive efforts (e∗P, e∗D), which
is characterized by
e∗P =
[
C(1)
(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)
[
ks∗k−1[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ(s∗; µ))]
−θs(s∗; µ) − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + s
∗k)
] ]−1/k
e∗D = s
∗e∗P
where Lemma 5 gives s∗.71
Proposition 7 finds and characterizes the unique non-trivial Nash equilibrium of the
Emotional Litigation Game; all subsequent references to the Game’s equilibrium refer to
this non-trivial Nash equilibrium. Although the expressions for the equilibrium efforts
are complicated, Lemma 5 immediately reveals that the application of the American rule
(λ˘ = 0) leads to equal equilibrium efforts (s∗ = e∗D/e∗P = 1). Under other cost-shifting
rules, s∗ = 1 also holds in the limit when relational emotions ξ → 1. Remark 11 below
will reveal the equilibrium relative efforts under different cost-shifting rules.
To simplify subsequent discussion and attract the comparative-static analysis in chapter
2 of this thesis that covers all parameters except the joy of winning (υ) and relational
emotions (ξ), Corollary 11 belowwill reveal the exact roles that υ and ξ play in equilibrium.
To facilitate presentation, fix and suppress the relative-advantages parameter µ and the
cost function C(·). Let G(ξ, υ, λ˘) denote the Emotional Litigation Game when a generic
triple ξ, υ, λ˘ of parameters respectively capture the relational emotions, the joy of winning,
and the cost-shifting rule. Using Proposition 7, let e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) and θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) respectively
denote Plaintiff’s equilibrium effort and probability of success in G(ξ, υ, λ˘). Similarly,
let e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘) and s∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘)/e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) denote Defendant’s equilibrium
(absolute) effort and relative effort. Finally, in the special case of υ = ξ = 0, call the
game a Monetary Litigation Game; intuitively, the litigants act only to maximize their
monetary payoffs (see equations (22), (23)).
Presenting our main result, Corollary 11 relates the equilibrium of an Emotional
Litigation Game to the equilibrium of a Monetary Litigation Game with a different cost-
shifting rule characterized by λ˘(1 − ξ).
Corollary 11. Consider the equilibrium (e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘), e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘)) of the Emotional Liti-
gation Game G(ξ, υ, λ˘) and the equilibrium (e∗P(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)), e∗D(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)) of the
71Section 3.4 will reveal that more negative relational emotions or more cost shifting increases the
equilibrium relative effort and probability of success of the relatively more advantageous litigant.
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Monetary Litigation GameG(0, 0, λ˘(1− ξ)). Each litigant’s equilibrium effort inG(ξ, υ, λ˘)
is (1 + υ)1/k(1 − ξ)1/k times her equilibrium effort in G(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)); the litigant has the
same relative effort and posterior probability of success in these equilibria. Formally,
e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) = (1 + υ)1/k(1 − ξ)1/ke∗P(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)),
e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘) = (1 + υ)1/k(1 − ξ)1/ke∗D(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)),
and
s∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = s∗(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)), θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = θ∗(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)).
With normative implications to be discussed in section 3.5, Corollary 11 reveals the
different implications that relational emotions and joy of winning have on equilibrium
efforts. Suppose relational emotions are negative in the Emotional Litigation Game
G(ξ, υ, λ˘); that is, ξ < 0. Such negative relational emotions affect each litigant’s equi-
librium effort directly and indirectly. Indirectly, negative relational emotions render each
litigant’s equilibrium effort in G(ξ, υ, λ˘) to be proportionate to her equilibrium effort in
the Monetary Litigation Game G(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)), in which the cost-shifting rule is scaled
up by (1 − ξ). Directly, each litigant’s equilibrium effort in G(ξ, υ, λ˘) is also scaled up by
(1 − ξ)1/k compared to her equilibrium effort in G(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)). The opposite direct and
indirect effects arise in the presence of positive relational emotions, 0 < ξ < 1. However,
only relational emotions have both such direct and indirect effects on equilibrium efforts.
A positive joy of winning υ > 0 directly scales up equilibrium efforts by (1 + υ)1/k , but
does not vary the effects of cost shifting.
Hence, unlike the joy of winning, the presence of relational emotions modifies the
effects of cost shifting. For instance, equilibrium litigation efforts given negative relational
emotions (ξ < 0) and the cost-shifting rule λ˘ are enlargements of equilibrium litigation
efforts given pure self interest (ξ = 0) and a greater cost-shifting rule λ˘(1 − ξ); in other
words, the presence of negative relational emotions strengthens the cost-shifting rule. The
opposite is true in the presence of positive emotion, 0 < ξ < 1. Because it is typical to
have negative relational emotions ξ < 0 in a litigated case (see section 3.1), the "true"
effects of cost shifting are greater than what they would be if the litigants were purely
self-interested. Section 3.5 will further develop the normative implications of this result.
Moreover, a litigant has the same relative effort and probability of success in the
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equilibrium of the Emotional Litigation Game G(ξ, υ, λ˘) and in the equilibrium of the
Monetary Litigation GameG(0, 0, λ˘(1− ξ)). This is because her (absolute) efforts in these
equilibria are proportional, so are the other litigant’s. Thus each litigant’s relative effort
is the same in these equilibria. This immediately implies she has the same probability
of success in these equilibria because the success function θ only (directly) depends on
relative advantages and relative efforts.
Corollary 11 reveals a bijective relationship between each litigant’s equilibrium ef-
forts in the Emotional Litigation Game G(ξ, υ, λ˘) and the Monetary Litigation Game
G(0, 0, λ˘(1− ξ)). For that reason, callG(0, 0, λ˘(1− ξ)) the transformedMonetary Litiga-
tion Game of G(ξ, υ, λ˘). Except in the special case of λ˘ = 0, ξ = 0 or υ = 0, transforming
G(ξ, υ, λ˘) to G(0, 0, λ˘(1− ξ)) requires changing three parameters: the joy of winning from
υ to 0, the relational emotions from ξ to 0, and the cost-shifting rule from λ˘ to λ˘(1 − ξ).
Section 3.4 below will use this property to simplify the comparative-statics analysis.
Remark 11. The Litigation Game that chapter 2 of this thesis presented is a Monetary
Litigation Game in the present sense. Thus the present Corollary 11 attracts their de-
scription of equilibrium outcomes (see chapter 2, Proposition 1) to the present Emotional
Litigation Game:
1. If the American rule applies or relative advantages are equal, then the litigants
exert the same levels of effort in equilibrium. Formally, λ˘ = 0 or µ = 0.5 im-
plies e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) = e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘). Moreover, equal relative advantages imply equal
equilibrium probabilities of success. Formally, µ = 0.5 implies θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = 0.5.
2. Suppose the cost-shifting rule allows the winner to recover a positive proportion
of her costs from the loser. Then in equilibrium, the relatively more advantageous
litigant exerts relatively more effort and has a relatively greater probability of
success. Formally, λ˘ > 0 and µ > 0.5 (respectively, µ < 0.5) implies e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) >
e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘) and θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) > 0.5 (e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) < e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘) and θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) < 0.5).
3.4 Comparative Statics
This section considers the equilibrium implications of variations in the parameters of the
Emotional Litigation Game.
63
3.4.1 Relative Efforts and Probabilities of Success
This subsection reveals the different implications that relational emotions and joy of
winning have on equilibrium efforts and probabilities of success. Corollary 12 first
considers the implications arising from changes in relational emotions.
Corollary 12. Consider the equilibrium of the Emotional Litigation Game G(ξ, υ, λ˘).
1. Suppose the American rule applies or the litigants’ relative advantages are equal.
Then each litigant’s equilibrium relative effort and probability of success do not
change as relational emotions ξ change. Formally, λ˘ = 0 or µ = 0.5 implies
d
dξ s
∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = 0 and ddξ θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = 0.
2. Suppose the cost-shifting rule allows the winner to recover a positive proportion of
her costs from the loser. Suppose further that Plaintiff is relatively more advanta-
geous. Then more negative relational emotions (ξ decreases) increase Plaintiff’s
equilibrium relative effort and probability of success. Formally, λ˘ > 0 and µ > 0.5
imply ddξ s
∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) > 0 and ddξ θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) < 0.
3. Suppose the cost-shifting rule allows the winner to recover a positive proportion
of her costs from the loser. Suppose further that Defendant is relatively more
advantageous. Then more negative relational emotions (ξ decreases) increase
Defendant’s equilibrium relative effort and probability of success. Formally, λ˘ > 0
and µ < 0.5 imply ddξ s
∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) < 0 and ddξ θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) > 0.
Corollary 12 reveals how variations in relational emotions ξ affect equilibrium effort
ratios and probabilities of success. Consider cases in which the cost-shifting rule allows
the winner to recover at least some of her litigation costs from the loser (λ˘ > 0) and one
litigant is relatively more advantageous (µ , 0.5). Then as relational emotions become
more negative (ξ deceases), that litigant exerts relatively more effort and enjoys a greater
probability of success in equilibrium.
Corollary 13. Consider the equilibrium of the Emotional Litigation Game G(ξ, υ, λ˘).
Variations in the joy of winning υ do not affect each litigant’s relative effort and probability
of success. Formally, ddυ s
∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = 0 and ddυ θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = 0.
Corollaries 12 and 13 reveal that relational emotions and joy of winning have very
different effects on equilibrium relative efforts and probabilities of success. A greater joy of
winning υ affects the litigants in a symmetric manner; to the same extent for both litigants,
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a greater υ increases the marginal benefits of exerting effort to increase the probability
of success. Corollary 13 thus reveals that equilibrium efforts and probabilities of success
remain constant when υ increases. By comparison, relational emotions ξ interact with the
cost-shifting rule (see Corollary 11). Amplifying the effects of cost shifting, more negative
relational emotions (ξ decreases) affect the litigants’ incentives asymmetrically. Corollary
12 confirms that such asymmetric effects distort equilibrium efforts and probabilities of
success in favor of the relatively more advantageous litigant.
3.4.2 Monetary Consequences
This subsection considers how changes in relational emotions or joy of winning affect the
litigants’ monetary payoffs and costs, assuming that these changes do not stop the case
from proceeding to litigation. Only private costs and benefits are considered here.72
Define (equilibrium) litigation expenditure C∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) of the Emotional Litigation
Game G(ξ, υ, λ˘) as the sum of Plaintiff and Defendant’s respective litigation costs:
C∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = C(e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘)) + C(e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘)). (30)
Changes in ξ or υ affect each litigant’s incentives to exert efforts in equilibrium.
Changes in equilibrium efforts then affect litigation expenditure.
Corollary 14 below will reveal that more negative relational emotions (ξ decreases)
typically increase litigation expenditure. To facilitate presentation, define a function
σ : (−∞, 1) × [0, 1] × [1,+∞) → (0, 0.5] by
σ(ξ, λ˘, k) = max {µ ∈ [0, 1] | θ(s∗; µ) ≤ (3 − λ˘(1 − ξ))/(4 − λ˘(1 − ξ))} − 0.5,
where Lemma 5 gives the equilibrium effort ratio s∗, which is a function of all parameters
— including the degree of homogeneity k of the cost function— except the joy of winning
parameter υ (see Corollary 13). The function σ(·) chooses the maximum prior parameter
µ that induces an equilibrium probability θ(s∗; µ) no greater than a value between 2/3 and
3/4 — where that value depends on the cost-shifting rule λ˘ and relational emotions ξ —
and deducts 0.5.73
72A study of social costs and benefits of litigation is beyond the scope of this paper. See Shavell (1997),
Spier (1997) for discussions of the social suboptimality of private incentives to litigate or settle.
73To see that the function σ exists and satisfies 0 < σ ≤ 0.5, suppose µ = 0.5 and fix all other
parameters. Remark 11 confirms that the symmetry between the litigants implies equal (equilibrium
efforts and) probabilities of success, θ(1; 0.5) = 0.5. Then the properties ddµ θ(s∗; µ) > 0 (from Remark
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Corollary 14. Consider the equilibrium of the Emotional Litigation Game G(ξ, υ, λ˘). If
any one of the following sufficient conditions holds, then as relational emotion become
marginally more negative, litigation expenditure increases; that is, ddξC
∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) < 0.
1. The American rule applies, λ˘ = 0.
2. The relative advantages of the litigants are sufficiently balanced, in the precise sense
of 0.5 − σ(ξ, λ˘, k) ≤ µ ≤ 0.5 + σ(ξ, λ˘, k).
3. The cost function C(·) is sufficiently convex, in the precise sense of k ≥ 2.
Corollary 14 offers sufficient conditions for concluding that in equilibrium, more neg-
ative relational emotions (ξ decreases) lead to a greater litigation expenditure. Intuitively
and as confirmed by the expressions for the litigants’ emotional payoffs (in equations
(24), (25)), more negative relational emotions directly increase the emotional reward of
winning, heightening incentives to exert costly efforts. Corollary 11 also reveals that more
negative relational emotions strengthen the effects of cost shifting; this indirectly affects
each litigant’s incentives to exert costly efforts. In equilibrium, the indirect effect on a
litigant’s effort may or may not be in the same direction as the direct effect. However,
litigation expenditure — which sums the litigants’ costs of exerting efforts in equilibrium
— increases if both litigants exert more efforts, or if one litigant’s exertion of additional
effort is not offset by a more rapid reduction in effort by the other litigant. Corollary 14
identifies sufficient conditions for concluding that overall, the direct and indirect effects of
more negative relational emotions increase litigation expenditure.
Part 1 of Corollary 14 reveals that one such sufficient condition is the application of
the American rule to allow for no recovery of the winner’s costs from the loser (λ˘ = 0).
Intuitively, the absence of cost shifting removes the indirect effect that more negative
relational emotions (decreased ξ) have on equilibrium efforts. Independently of the cost-
shifting rule, more negative relational emotions directly increase each litigant’s equilibrium
effort (see Corollary 11). In the absence of any countervailing indirect effect arising from
the "scaling up" of the cost-shifting rule, a greater litigation expenditure follows.
Parts 2 and 3 of Corollary 14 utilize Corollaries 8 and 9 in chapter 2 of this thesis, which
contain sufficient conditions for concluding that more cost shifting increases litigation
expenditure in a Monetary Litigation Game. Intuitively, more cost shifting generally
12) and 0.5 < 2/3 ≤ (3 − λ˘(1 − ξ))/(4 − λ˘(1 − ξ)) imply there exists some µ′ ∈ (0.5, 1] satisfying
0.5 < θ(s∗; µ′) ≤ (3 − λ˘(1 − ξ))/(4 − λ˘(1 − ξ)). The value of σ is uniquely determined by the maximum of
all such µ′.
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increases litigation expenditure. This is because more cost shifting reduces each litigant’s
expected marginal cost of exerting effort by shifting away a greater proportion of her
costs if she wins. More cost shifting also widens the difference in monetary outcome
between winning and losing by increasing the recoverable-costs component of the "prize"
of winning. These observations and their results apply to the present analysis because the
present Corollary 11 reveals that relational emotions and the cost-shifting rule reinforce
each other. Part 2 of the present Corollary 14 proves that if relative advantages of the
litigants are sufficiently balanced, then more negative relational emotions (ξ decreases)
increase litigation expenditure. A litigant must have very poor prospects of success
to reduce equilibrium effort — which further harms her prospects of success — in
order to save costs. In cases characterized by sufficiently balanced relative advantages,
no litigant has very poor prospects of success. Hence, in these cases, a decreased ξ
incentivizes the litigants collectively to exert more equilibrium efforts, leading to a greater
litigation expenditure. The function σ defines what is required for relative advantages
to be "sufficiently balanced" in this sense; it marks the upper and lower bounds within
which the relative-advantages parameter µ is sufficiently balanced. Moreover, part 3 of
Corollary 14 proves that if the cost function is sufficiently convex (k ≥ 2), then a decreased
ξ increases litigation expenditure. This holds even in extreme cases falling outside the
scope of part 1 or 2.
Corollary 14 thus provides general sufficient conditions for concluding that more
negative relational emotions lead to a greater litigation expenditure (in equilibrium). To
fall outside the scope of any one of these sufficient conditions, a case needs tomeet all of the
following requirements: the American rule does not apply, λ˘ > 0; the relative advantages
of the litigants are sufficiently extreme in the sense of µ < 0.5 − σ or µ > 0.5 + σ; and
the cost function is insufficiently convex in the sense of k < 2.74
Corollary 15 reveals how changes in the joy of winning affect (individual) monetary
payoffs and (collective) litigation expenditure. To facilitate presentation, let u∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) and
u∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘) respectively denote Plaintiff andDefendant’s equilibriummonetary payoffs (see
equations (22), (23)).
Corollary 15. Consider the equilibrium of the Emotional Litigation Games G(ξ, υ, λ˘).
1. A greater joy of winning υ decreases each litigant’s monetary payoff. Formally,
d
dυu
∗
P(ξ, υ, λ˘) < 0 and ddυu∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘) < 0.
74See chapter 2 of this thesis for extreme examples that fall outside the scope of Corollary 14.
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2. A greater υ leads to a greater litigation expenditure. Formally, ddυC
∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) > 0.
Compared to Corollary 14, Corollary 15 establishes a more general result regarding
the monetary implications of changes in the joy of winning υ: a greater υ increases
(collective) litigation expenditure in equilibrium, even in exceptional cases falling outside
the scope of Corollary 14.75 A greater υ increases the marginal benefits of exerting costly
efforts to win without affecting the equilibrium probabilities of success (see Corollary 13).
However, unlike relational emotions (ξ), υ does not interact with the cost-shifting rule (see
Corollary 11); no variable in this model offsets the heightened incentives to exert costly
efforts arising from a greater υ. Hence a lower individual monetary payoff and a greater
litigation expenditure follow.
Remark 12. Corollary 11 implies that changes in the proportion of costs recoverable
λ˘, Plaintiff’s relative advantages µ or the cost function C have the same equilibrium
implications in the Emotional Litigation Game and in its transformed Monetary Litigation
Game. Chapter 2 of this thesis offered a detailed analysis of these equilibrium implications
in a Monetary Litigation Game. A brief summary of the relevant corollaries is as follows:
1. In cases where one litigant is relatively more advantageous (µ , 0.5), an increase
in λ˘ increases that litigant’s equilibrium relative effort and probability of success.
However, there is no such equilibrium effect if the relative advantages are equal
(µ = 0.5).
2. In cases where the cost-shifting rule allows for recovery (λ˘ > 0), an increase in µ
increases Plaintiff’s equilibrium relative effort and probability of success. However,
if the American rule applies (λ˘ = 0), then an increase in µ does not affect Plaintiff’s
equilibrium relative effort, but it increases her equilibrium probability of success.
3. In cases where one litigant is relatively more advantageous (µ , 0.5) and the cost-
shifting rule allows recovery (λ˘ > 0), an increase in k decreases that litigant’s
equilibrium relative effort and probability of success. In the other cases (µ = 0.5
or λ˘ = 0), an increase in k has no such equilibrium effect.
Moreover, more cost shifting (λ˘ increases) generally leads to a more predictable
outcome, in the sense of driving the equilibrium probability of success θ(s∗; µ) closer
to 1 (respectively, 0) if Plaintiff (Defendant) is relatively more advantageous, µ > 0.5
75Corollary 15 reinforces an existing finding of Baumann and Friehe (2012b) (at pp. 196, 203-04) that
the equilibrium implications of introducing outcome-dependent emotions is similar to raising the stakes.
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(< 0.5). However, a greater λ˘ typically increases litigation expenditure. Depending on
the properties of the success function and cost function, a greater λ˘ also may increase or
decrease accuracy in outcome, which is measured by the difference between the prior and
equilibrium probabilities of success, |θ(s∗; µ) − µ|.
3.5 Discussion
Focusing on issues pertaining to civil litigation,76 this section discusses some normative
implications of the Emotional Litigation Game and future research directions.
3.5.1 Cost Shifting
There is a debate about the positive implications and normative merits of cost-shifting
rules. For instance, using a generalized contest model with purely self-interested litigants,
chapter 2 of this thesis extended the result — first observed by Braeutigam et al. (1984),
Katz (1987) and Plott (1987) — that more cost shifting tends to increase costs in litigated
cases and distort litigation outcomes in favor of the litigant with stronger prior advantages.
Moreover, models based on purely self-interested litigants with non-common priors (for
example, Shavell 1982) or information asymmetry (see footnote 84) reveal that decisions
to file suit or settle also depend on cost shifting rules. However, the divergence of private
and social incentives to litigate or settle implies that cost shifting itself is unlikely to be
sufficient to induce the socially optimally number of suits (see Shavell 1997, Spier 1997).
Most relevant to the debate about cost-shifting rules is the following result. Suppose
negative relational emotions — meaning a litigant derives value from harming her adver-
sary — are presence. Corollary 11 in section 3.3 reveals the result that these negative
relational emotions amplify the effects of cost shifting. This result reveals that models
based on purely self-interested litigants typically underestimate the full effects of cost
shifting. The presence of preferences to harm an adversary is intuitively plausible in many
litigated cases and frequently observed in contest experiments (see section 3.1). Thus
a nominally low-powered cost-shifting rule tends to have the practical implications of a
higher-powered cost-shifting rule. If the lawmaker (or the judge, when she has discre-
tion over cost shifting) aims to effectuate a particular extent of cost shifting, then in the
presence of significant negative relational emotions she should stipulate a nominally weak
76See, for example, Quiggin (1993) for an analysis of the implications of incorporating social preferences
into welfare analysis.
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cost-shifting rule.77 As a real-world example, while many common law jurisdictions apply
high-powered cost-shifting rules by default, judges often exercise their discretion to effec-
tuate low-powered cost-shifting rules in cases involving emotionally-charged litigants with
intertwined and conflicted interests, such as succession disputes.78 Our analysis reveals
the behavioral-economic foundations of that judicial practice, and supports it. Moreover,
a lawmaker or judge who aims to minimize the impact of negative relational emotions
should implement the American rule — that each litigant bears her own costs. This
is because negative relational emotions amplify the effects of cost shifting, but there is
“nothing” to amplify if cost shifting is zero.79
On the other hand, our analysis does not support adjusting the cost-shifting rule in
response to a strong non-monetary joy of winning, which a litigant obtains upon winning
the lawsuit rather than upon harming her adversary. A real-life example concerns disputes
over properties that have non-monetary value to the litigants.80 Unlike relational emotions,
such outcome-dependent value does not modify the effects of cost shifting (see Corollary
11 in section 3.3). Moreover, if the judge can observe whether emotions are present
in individual cases while the lawmaker cannot, then the present analysis also reveals an
advantage of conferral of judicial discretion over cost shifting: it enables the judge to
adjust the cost-shifting rule to account for the presence or absence of different types of
emotions.
3.5.2 Mediation
Mediation has arisen as a popular alternative to formal adjudication by a court of law.
Mediation typically involves an independent specialist who facilitates discussions between
the disputants and helps them reach an agreement regarding their dispute. Although
participation in mediation is typically voluntary, some jurisdictions make it a mandatory
prerequisite to obtaining a formal court hearing. For example, in Australia and California,
mediation is usually compulsory for disputes concerning parenting arrangements after
77More precisely, in the presence of negative relational emotions ξ < 0, to effectuate the effects of a
cost-shifting rule characterized by the loser bearing 0 < λ ≤ 1 proportion of the winner’s costs requires
stipulating a weaker cost-shifting rule characterized by λ˘ = λ/(1 − ξ).
78For example, see the opinion of Justice Gaudron in the Australian case of Singer v Berghouse (1993)
114 ALR 521, [6].
79More precisely, following on from footnote 77, if λ = 0, then λ˘ = 0 regardless of ξ.
80For example, according to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 360, comment e (American
Law Institute, 1981), in American common law jurisdictions "land has long been regarded as unique and
impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money". Restatements are authoritative statements
of American law.
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a divorce.81 In New South Wales and Ontario, mediation is compulsory for common
succession disputes.82 Aside from adopting less formal procedures to reduce legal costs,
mediation is typically designed to reduce acrimony between the disputants.83
The present analysis provides behavioral-economic justifications for usingmediation to
resolve disputes involving emotionally-charged litigants, such as divorce and succession
disputes. Mediation can be modeled as a contest in which the disputants exert costly
efforts to increase their respective shares of the surplus arising from not proceeding to
formal adjudication. To the extent that mediation achieves its stated goal of reducing
acrimony, the present analysis reveals a corresponding reduction in the disputants’ costs;
Corollary 14 reveals that more positive relational emotions typically reduce costs, so does a
reduced (non-monetary) joy of winning according to Corollary 15. These results together
suggest that, ceteris paribus, mediation by reducing emotional motivations typically leads
to positive monetary consequences for the disputants.
3.5.3 Unresolved Questions: Filing, Settlement, and Causes of Emotional Consid-
erations
An important qualification of the present analysis is that decisions to file suit or settle
are beyond the scope of the Emotional Litigation Game. Katz and Sanchirico (2012)
(at pp. 278-87) and Spier (2007) surveyed the vast economic literature on filing and
settlement decisions. Shavell (1982) and others employed non-common-prior models to
analyze these decisions under extreme cost-shifting rules that shift either all or none of
the winner’s costs to the loser. An alternative approach uses contract-theoretic models
to explain settlement outcomes when the litigants have asymmetric information.84 These
models typically assume the litigants are purely self-interested. Moreover, the empirical
work of Farmer and Tiefenthaler (2001) and others (see the survey in Baumann and Friehe
2012b at pp. 197-99) employ bargaining models to explore how emotions affect settlement
outcomes. To account for emotional preferences in a general, contest-theoretic framework,
future research may modify the present Emotional Litigation Game to an extensive-form
game that models pre-litigation filing or settlement decisions. The litigants’ emotional
81See subsection 60I(7) of the (Australian) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and section 3170 of the California
Family Code (2005).
82See Supreme Court of New South Wales Practice Note No. SC EQ 7, 7 and Ontario Rules of Civil
Procedure rule 75.1.
83 See, for example, subsection 3161(a) of the California Family Code (2005).
84For example, Bebchuk (1984), Bebchuk and Chang (1996), Klement and Neeman (2005), Polinsky and
Rubinfeld (1998), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Spier (1994) and Talley (1995)).
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payoffs in the equilibrium of the Emotional Litigation Game are their outside payoffs
for failing to settle in the pre-litigation stages of such an extensive-form game. Through
changing these outside payoffs, variations in emotional variables in litigation (see section
3.4) may have filing or settlement implications.
The present analysis also does not consider the causes of emotional motivations. The
present Emotional Litigation Game directly includes emotional variables in individual
payoffs, and offers experimental findings as evidence (see section 3.1). This exogenous
approach reveals the profound implications of these variables, but is silent on their causes.
There are strong evolutionary foundations for the prevalence of social behaviors that
appear inconsistent with pure self interest (see, for example, Bergstrom and Stark 1993).85
Postlewaite (1998) discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to
incorporating social variables. In particular, while there is a strong evolutionary argument
for the exogenous approach, the alternative approach of endogenously deriving individual
concerns for social variables is better at explaining how standard economic variables give
rise to social concerns. For instance, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) constructed
a matching model in which non-market decisions endogenously generate concerns for
relative outcomes, and applied that model to explain cross-country differences in economic
growth rates. Charness and Rabin (2002) (in appendix 1) and Rabin (1993) offered models
that endogenously generate intentions-based reciprocity. Sano (2014) applied Rabin’s
(1993) approach to study a symmetric Tullock contest with a linear cost function. Future
research may generate intentions-based reciprocity in the present contest model in order
to capture whole classes of success functions, cost functions and asymmetric relative
advantages.
85Bergstrom (2002) surveyed a variety of game-theoretic tools used to model the evolution of social
behaviors.
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4 ContestswithNon-SpecifiedSuccessFunctions andNon-
linear Spillovers
4.1 Introduction
A contest is a game in which each player incurs expenses to increase her probability
of winning a prize. Real-world scenarios answering that description are ubiquitous. A
presidential candidate spends on political campaigns to increase her chance of winning the
election. A litigant incurs legal expenses to increase her chance of winning the lawsuit.
Firms make costly R&D expenses to be the first to obtain a patent and launch an innovative
product. Armies employ soldiers and buy weapons to win the war. Contest models have
facilitated economic analysis of these and many other scenarios.
A critical component of a contest model is a success function that maps the players’
strategies into their respective probabilities of winning and losing. The existing contest
models typically assume the success function takes a specific functional form (see Serena
and Corchón’s 2017 survey). While the chosen functional form may appropriately capture
some types of contests in the real world, it may poorly capture other contests. It can be hard
to ascertain which of the existing functional forms is “ideal”. Moreover, while specifying a
“nice” functional form can simplify the solution process, the resulting positive predictions
and policy recommendations may not be robust to alternative functional forms. To ensure
that the implications of the contest model do not depend on the modeler’s idiosyncrasies,
the theoretical foundations of the contest model should be sufficiently robust.
We therefore propose a general theory of contests. Instead of assuming a particular
functional form for the success function, we build a robust theory that allows for a large
class of success functions. Imposing only general and reasonable assumptions on the
success function without specifying its functional form expands the descriptive scope of
the model to cover a whole class of contests. Economic analysis premised on a success
function that satisfies general assumptions has broader implications than those premised
on a success function that takes a specific functional form. The proposed model captures a
large class of success functions, including functions frequently used in the existing contest
literature, and their convex combinations. Ensuring that the proposed assumptions are
closed under finite convex combinations enables the present model to capture uncertainty
regarding the success functions themselves. Consider a scenario in which the players do
not know which one of a finite collection of success functions will operate to determine
73
their respective probabilities of winning and losing. Suppose the probabilities that each
player assigns to these success functions are common knowledge. Subsection 4.6.1 reveals
this scenario falls within the proposed model.
The existing contest models also typically assume that the players have homogeneous
success functions (see Serena andCorchón’s 2017 survey). While this assumption captures
the standard case in which the players believe their probabilities of success sum to 1 and
that fact is common knowledge, this assumption does not cover some well-documented
behavioral traits. In particular, a body of empirical literature finds that judgments of
probabilities commonly exhibit optimism or pessimism (see, for example, Kahneman and
Tversky 1977, Radcliffe and Klein 2002). Contest models that assume homogeneous
success functions can fail to cover common and important real-world phenomena, and
thus give rise to insufficiently robust conclusions.
We introduce and axiomatize a model that allows the players to have heterogeneous
success functions. Our formulation covers the standard case in which the probabilities
of success functions sum to 1 and that fact is common knowledge. As section 4.4
will illustrate, the present formulation also captures the non-standard case of players
collectively showing optimism (they believe their probabilities of success sum to more
than 1) or pessimism (they believe their probabilities of success sum to less than 1). In the
non-standard case, each player thinks that she holds correct beliefs and that her opponent
is the only optimistic or pessimistic player.
Many real-world contests, such as R&D and litigation, have players whose strategies
generate spillovers (or externalities) to each other. The existing literature often assumes
that spillovers are linear functions of the players’ strategies (see, for example, Baye,
Kovenock, and De Vries 2012, Chowdhury and Sheremeta 2011a). While assuming linear
spillovers has simplification benefits, this assumption can result in poor approximations
of spillover functions with high curvatures. Relaxing the linearity assumption, the present
model allows spillovers to be homogeneous functions of the players’ strategies. In fact,
the present model goes further to allow a player to generate spillovers that have different
degrees of homogeneity in affecting herself and in affecting her opponent (see section
4.2). The degrees of homogeneity characterize the returns to scale in generating spillovers.
Thus, by permitting non-linear spillovers and cross-player differences in returns to scale,
the present formulation advances the realism and robustness of contest theory.
In the Contest Game set up in section 4.2, two risk-neutral players simultaneously
choose expenses to compete for a prize. Their expenses are inputs in their potentially
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different success functions, which do not take a functional form. Their expenses also
may generate potentially different spillovers to the winner or the loser of the contest. We
propose general and reasonable assumptions that roughly require: the players’ expenses to
be similarly effective in affecting probabilities and in generating spillovers; each player’s
success function to be increasing with her expenses and sufficiently concave; the spillovers
to be sufficiently small so that they alone do not incentivize a player to spend. The players
may have different beliefs regarding the success functions, but the parameters and payoff
functions are in common knowledge. Section 4.3 proves the existence of a nontrivial Nash
equilibrium comprising positive expenses by both players.
The present assumptions capture well-documented behavioral traits that, to our best
knowledge, fall outside the scope of existing contest models. For example, the Conquest
Game set up in section 4.4 specializes the Contest Game to capture optimism and pes-
simism in military decisionmaking. In the Conquest Game, the winner takes the resources
of both players less the dissipation arising from their military expenses and any additional
destruction. The players believe that their respective probabilities of success may not sum
to 1. In the unique equilibrium, the relatively more optimistic player spends relatively
less, but she believes that she is more likely to win. As the players become collectively
more optimistic, their total equilibrium expenses decrease.
The present assumptions subsume oft-used success functions, in particular, the ratio-
form Tullock success function that expresses a player’s probability of winning as her
share of total expenses. Adopting an asymmetric Tullock success function and assuming
the players believe their respective probabilities of success sum to 1, the R&D Game
set up in section 4.5 specializes the Contest Game to capture asymmetric advantages in
R&D contests. Total equilibrium expenses decrease if the loser receives more spillovers.
Moreover, changes in spillovers have a greater impact on total equilibrium expenses if
the players’ relative advantages become more balanced. This result suggests that legal
mechanisms that change R&D spillovers — such as intellectual property law — are
more effective in scenarios involving similarly competitive R&D firms than in scenarios
involving a dominant firm.
These applications of the Contest Game confirm the benefits of generalizing contest
models. Adopting an asymmetric Tullock success function, the R&D Game suggests that
the effectiveness of legal mechanism to alter R&D spillovers depends on the balancedness
or extremity of the R&D contest. This novel result illustrates that a general contest
model, such as the present one, can give rise to novel positive predictions and normative
75
recommendations that the existing, more specialized models cannot obtain (see subsection
4.5.2). Moreover, the generality of the present model can facilitate verification of whether
the positive predictions and normative recommendations obtained in the existing literature
remain valid under weaker assumptions. Illustrating this point is a modification of the
R&D Game that reveals, for some non-Tullock success function, the conventional wisdom
that a more balanced contest leads to greater incentives to spend does not hold (see
subsection 4.5.3).
Contest theory traces back to Tullock’s (1967, 1980) and Krueger’s (1974) analyses of
rent-seeking behaviors. Cornes and Hartley (2005), (2012) and others refined Tullock’s
model to introduce risk aversion and general technologies. Menezes and Quiggin (2010)
proved that the standard Tullock contest is strategically equivalent to an oligopsonistic
market in which expenditure is the strategic variable. Baye and Hoppe (2003) established
that many innovation tournaments and patent-race games are strategically equivalent to
rent-seeking contests, including the standard Tullock contest. Building on Katz (1987) and
others, chapter 2 of this thesis constructed a contest model of civil litigation that captures
whole classes of success functions and cost-shifting rules that shift a proportion of the
winner’s legal costs to the loser. Serena and Corchón (2017) offered a recent survey of
the contest-theory literature, while Konrad (2009) and Vojnović (2016) provided textbook
treatments. Moreover, an extensive experimental literature has developed to document
loss aversion and social preferences in contests (recently, Chowdhury et al. 2018), as well
as a variety of other non-standard behavioral traits (see Dechenaux et al.’s 2015 survey).
Taking an axiomatic approach to capture both standard and non-standard behavioral
traits, this paper builds upon efforts to microfound success functions, especially those
originating from Tullock’s ratio-form success function.86 Among the seminal work are
Skaperdas’s (1996) axiomatization of ratio-form success functions and Clark and Riis’s
(1998) extension to allow for asymmetric players. Critical to the ratio form is an assumption
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which, in a two-player model, requires a
player to win almost surely if she is the only player who incurs positive expenses. That
assumption is not imposed on the present Contest Game (see section 4.4 and subsection
4.6.3). The present axiomatization thus offers microfoundations for more flexible success
functions, allowing the theory to match a wide range of contests. Indeed, the present
86Serena and Corchón (2017) contains a survey of alternative approaches tomicrofound success functions,
such as deriving them as the optimal choice of a contest designer (for example, Corchón and Dahm 2010,
Polishchuk and Tonis 2013), exposing their stochastic components (for example, Dixit 1987, Jia 2008), and
laying their Bayesian foundations (Skaperdas and Vaidya 2012).
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axiomatization captures success functions that violate IIA, such as those proposed by
Plott (1987) and Beviá and Corchón (2015). However, the present assumptions do not
capture difference-form success functions that map differences in the players’ strategies
into probabilities (for example, Hirshleifer 1989a, Che and Gale 2000).87 Moreover, the
present assumptions do not allow a player’s strategy to be a n-tuple vector of non-negative
real numbers, while Rai and Sarin’s (2009) axiomatization effort does.88
Parallel to the Tullock tradition of contest models — in which no player wins a prize
almost surely (in equilibrium) no matter howmuch she spends— are all-pay or rank-order
contests (or auctions)— inwhich the highest spending player wins the highest prize almost
surely. Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1996) first characterized equilibria for this class
of games, and Konrad (2009) and Serena and Corchón (2017) provided recent surveys.
Applications of all-pay contests include political lobbying (for example, Hillman and Riley
1989, Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries 1993, Che and Gale 1998), R&D (for example, Che
and Gale 2003), litigation (for example, Klemperer 2003, Baye et al. 2005), and school
tracking (for example, Xiao 2016). Studyingmoral-hazard problems faced byfirms, Lazear
andRosen (1981) comparedworkers’ incentives under rank-based compensation and under
output-based compensation, and Akerlof and Holden (2012) characterized the optimal
rank-based compensation structure. To advance their goals, all-pay contest designers can
optimally determine the number and distribution of prizes (Moldovanu and Sela 2001),
exploit the contestants’ concerns for relative ranking (Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi 2007), or
introduce insurance to reimburse the losers (Minchuk and Sela 2017). While the present
effort clearly does not attempt to develop all-pay contests, we nonetheless share the same
ambition as authors who generalize all-pay contests. In particular, Baye et al. (2012) offer
equilibrium characterization of a simultaneous-move, two-player rank-order contests with
complete information, in which each player generates affine spillovers that depend on her
rank. Siegel (2009, 2010) generalizes all-pay contests to allow for arbitrary cost functions,
while Xiao’s (2016) model permits convex prize sequences. Moreover, Olszewski and
Siegel (2016) approximate the equilibrium outcomes of all-pay contests with a large
number of asymmetric players who may have complete or incomplete information. Xiao
(2017) recently builds upon Siegel (2009, 2010) to introduce performance spillovers in
87Corchón’s (2007) survey revealed the extent to which difference-form success functions admit a Nash
equilibrium in common scenarios.
88A contest model in which a player’s strategy is a vector of two variables can capture her spending of
resources to increase her probability of success and to sabotage her opponent. For a survey of sabotage in
contests, see Chowdhury and Gürtler (2015).
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the sense of a player’s strategy entering into the other players’ cost functions. Sacco and
Schmutzler (2008), Bos and Ranger (2014) and Chowdhury (2017) also model all-pay
auctions with spillovers in the sense of the winner’s bid size affecting her prize of winning.
Section 4.2 constructs the Contest Game. Section 4.3 finds and characterizes an
equilibrium with positive expenses by both players. Section 4.4 applies the Contest Game
to model optimism and pessimism in military decisionmaking, assuming the players
believe their respective probabilities of success may not sum to 1. Section 4.5 applies the
Contest Game tomodel asymmetric advantages inR&Dcontests, inwhich the probabilities
of success sum to 1 but the players are asymmetrically productive. Section 4.6 reveals the
extent to which the Contest Game captures: uncertainty regarding the success functions;
homogeneous expenses and spillovers; and Tullock contest models. Section 4.7 explores
future research directions. Appendix A.4 contains all proofs.
4.2 The Contest Game
The Contest Game is a simultaneous-move game of complete information characterized
by two risk-neutral players 1 and 2, their common action space R+, and their payoff
functions U1,U2. The payoff functions and parameters are common knowledge.
Let i ∈ {1, 2} represent a generic player and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} her opponent. Players
i, j simultaneously choose ei, e j ≥ 0 levels of expenses. Player i values the prize at
vi > 0. A twice-continuously-differentiable success function θi : R2+ → [0, 1] that
satisfies additional assumptions to be set out below gives θi(ei, e j) as player i’s probability
of winning a prize according to her own belief; she believes that her opponent j wins the
prize with complementary probability 1 − θi. Thus player i believes her and the opponent
j’s respective probabilities of winning sum to 1.
Remark 13. It is possible to have θ1 + θ2 , 1. We interpret the scenario of θ1 + θ2 , 1
as capturing non-common beliefs regarding a "true" success function. Suppose there is a
collection of success functions containing θ1, θ2. Before the players choose their expenses,
Nature chooses one of these success functions to determine the outcome of the contest. At
the time of choosing their respective expenses, both players know the collection of success
functions, but they do not observe Nature’s choice. Player 1 assigns probability 1 to the
event of Nature choosing θ1, while player 2 assigns probability 1 to Nature choosing θ2.
See subsection 4.6.1 for an alternative scenario.
Both the winner and the loser may experience spillovers. Exogenous scalars wii, lii ∈ R
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respectively characterize the winner’s spillovers and loser’s spillovers that player i’s
expenses ei generates to herself. Player i receives (self-generated) winner’s spillovers
wiiei if she wins, and loser’s spillovers liiei if she loses.
Player i also may receive winner’s and loser’s spillovers generated by her opponent j’s
expenses e j . Exogenous scalars wi j, li j ∈ R and ki > 0, i , j, characterize these spillovers.
Player i receives winner’s spillovers wi jekij if she wins, and loser’s spillovers li je
ki
j if she
loses. The exponent ki characterizes the returns of e j in generating spillovers to player i.89
Example 1 contains a case where ki , 1. Call ekij player j’s effective expenses affecting
player i, and ei player i’s effective expenses affecting herself. Thus player i receives
self-generated, intra-player spillovers (wiiei and liiei) and opponent-generated, inter-player
spillovers (wi jekij and li je
ki
j ).90
Player i’s payoff is Ui : R2+ → R given by
Ui(ei, e j) = θi(ei, e j)
[
vi + wiiei + wi je
ki
j
]
+
[
1 − θi(ei, e j)
] [
liiei + li je
ki
j
]
− ei, (31)
which is her expected outcome measured in monetary terms. She believes that if she
wins, then she receives the sum of her prize value and her winner’s spillovers, vi + wiiei +
wi je
ki
j . She believes that if she loses, then she receives the sum of her loser’s spillovers,
liiei + li je
ki
j . Weights θi(ei, e j), 1 − θi(ei, e j) are respectively her probabilities of winning
and losing according to her belief. Because she incurs expenses ei whether she wins or
loses, the probability weights do not scale ei. This specification for the payoff function
assumes additive separability of expenses, spillovers and prizes. This means that expenses,
spillovers and prizes are perfect substitutes and the players are risk neutral.
We now state and impose the following Assumptions 18-23 to guarantee equilibrium
existence.
Assumption 18. Player i’s success function satisfies θi(ei, e j) = θi
(
xkiei, xe j
)
for any
scalar x > 0.
Assumption 18 requires player i to believe that the same ratio of effective expenses
— ei/ekij and xkiei/(xe j)ki for x > 0 — leads to the same probabilities of winning.91
Intuitively, Assumption 18 requires ei and e j to be similarly effective in affecting prob-
89As subsection 4.6.2 will reveal, the present specification that each player’s expenses linearly produce
spillovers to herself captures the more general case of these spillovers being homogeneous functions.
90Sections 4.4 and 4.5 will utilize the distinction between these two notions of spillovers to capture
real-world scenarios.
91Section 4.3 will offer diagrammatic representations of Assumption 18.
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abilities of winning and in producing spillovers. Because scalars 1 and ki respectively
characterize the returns of ei and e j in generating spillovers to player i, Assumption 18
ensures that 1 and ki also respectively characterize the returns of ei and e j in affecting her
belief regarding her probability of winning; player i’s belief regarding how expenses affect
her spillovers and probability of winning is thus consistent in this sense. Moreover, we
aim to define a class of success functions that includes Tullock success functions, because
they are the standard in contest theory (see section 4.1 and subsection 4.6.3). In the special
case of ki = 1, Assumption 18 reduces to the homogeneity of degree zero property, which
is satisfied by Tullock success functions.
Assumption 19. Player i’s success function θi satisfies the following properties:
1. Her marginal probability of success with respect to her own expenses ei is positive
and non-increasing, and is bounded above. Formally, for a positive upper bound b¯
which may depend on her opponent’s expenses e j ,
0 <
∂θi
∂ei
≤ b¯, ∂
2θi
∂e2i
≤ 0.
2. Hermarginal probability of success with respect to her opponent’s effective expenses
ekij is non-decreasing, and is bounded below. Formally, for a lower bound b which
may depend on ei,
∂θi
∂ekij
≥ b, ∂
2θi(
∂ekij
)2 ≥ 0.
Together with Assumption 22 below, the upper and lower bounds that Assumption 19
impose prevent player i from have incentives to make unbounded expenses.
Define spillover differentials δii, δi j ∈ R by δii = wii−lii and δi j = wi j−li j respectively.
The value δiiei (respectively, δi jekij ) is the difference between the winner’s and loser’s
spillovers of player i arising from her own expenses ei (her opponent’s expenses e j).
Rearrange player i’s payoff Ui defined by (31) to obtain
Ui(ei, e j) = θi(ei, e j)
[
vi + δiiei + δi je
ki
j
]
− (1 − lii)ei + li jekij . (32)
Equation (32) expresses player i’s payoff as her expected benefits of winning — the
weighted sum of her prize value and spillover differentials, θi(ei, e j)
[
vi + δiiei + δi je
ki
j
]
—
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less her unweighted expenses (1 − lii)ei, and plus a term li jekij that does not vary with her
own expenses ei. The loser’s spillovers liiei reduce her unweighted expenses because δiiei
gives the additional spillovers of winning that her own expenses produce.
Assumption 20. Player i believes her spillovers are sufficiently small, in the following
sense:
δiiθi(ei, e j) +
[
δiiei + δi je
ki
j
] ∂θi
∂ei
< 1 − lii, (33)
where the inequality holds strictly in the limit when ei → 0+.
Assumption 20 ensures that player iwould have no incentives tomake positive expenses
if the (non-spillover) prize of winning had zero value to her (vi = 0). Inequality (33) comes
from taking the partial derivative of her payoffUi in equation (32) with respect to her own
expenses ei, and assuming vi = 0. The left-hand side of inequality (33) sums her marginal
(expected) benefits of making positive expenses, while the right-hand side her marginal
unweighted expenses. Inequality (33) ensures her marginal unweighted expenses to be
greater than her marginal benefits if vi = 0.
Assumption 21. Player i’s success function θi is sufficiently concave in the following
sense:
∂2
∂e2i
[
θi(ei,ej )
1−lii−δiiθi(ei,ej )
]
∂
∂ei
[
θi(ei,ej )
1−lii−δiiθi(ei,ej )
] < 0.
Assumption 21 is a technical assumption that ensures player i’s payoff is strictly
quasiconcave in her own expenses.
Assumption 22. Player i believes that her success function and self-generated spillovers
satisfy the following properties:
1. Her self-generated spillovers do not exceed her expenses. Formally, 1 ≥ max{wii, lii}.
2. In the special case of her self-generated winner’s (respectively, loser’s) spillovers
covering her expenses, she does not win (lose) almost surely by making infinitely
more (less) effective expenses than her opponent j does. Formally,
1 = wii ⇒ lim
ei/ekij →+∞
θi(ei, e j) < 1,
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1 = lii ⇒ lim
ei/ekij →0+
θi(ei, e j) > 0.
Assumption 22 prevents player i from recouping all expenses by generating spillovers
alone. Part 1 bounds her marginal benefit of generating spillovers above by 1, her marginal
cost of spending. In the special case where her spillovers cover her expenses if she wins
(respectively, loses), part 2 prevents her from recovering all expenses almost surely by
making infinitely more (less) effective expenses than her opponent does. Assumption 22
is trivially satisfied if her expenses strictly exceed her spillovers, 1 > max{wii, lii}.
Assumption 23. The players’ expenses are insufficiently effective in affecting each other,
in the sense of k1k2 ≤ 2.
Assumption 23 restricts the effectiveness of the players’ expenses in affecting each
other. Assumption 23 is trivially satisfied in the special case where each player’s expenses
linearly affect her opponent, k1 = k2 = 1. In general, the product of k1 and k2 must
be sufficiently small (in the sense of k1k2 ≤ 2) to satisfy Assumption 23. Intuitively,
Assumption 23 facilitates equilibrium existence by ruling out significant divergence in
relative effective expenses. In all that follows, the previous assumptions hold.
The solution concept adopted is a Nash equilibrium that is nontrivial in the sense of
comprising positive expenses by both players.
4.3 Equilibrium
This section proves the existence of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium, and provides a charac-
terization of it.
Lemmas 6 and 7 together allow each player’s best response to be characterized by her
FOC. Appendix A.4 contains all proofs.
Lemma 6. Player i’s payoff function Ui is strictly quasiconcave in her own expenses, ei.
Lemma 7. Suppose some e′i > 0 satisfies the FOC for player i’s payoff function Ui
restricted to a function of one variable, her expenses ei. Then e′i is a global maximum for
the same restriction of Ui.
Lemma 6 implies a player’s locally-optimal strategy is globally-optimal, holding her
opponent’s strategy fixed. Lemma 7 then allows a player’s FOC to characterize her optimal
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strategy. Thus Lemmas 6 and 7 together imply that a pair of positive strategies constitutes
a nontrivial Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the following system of FOCs:

∂U1
∂e1
=
∂θ1
∂e1
[
v1 + δ11e1 + δ12e
k1
2
]
+ δ11θ1(e1, e2) − (1 − l11) = 0
∂U2
∂e2
=
∂θ2
∂e2
[
v2 + δ21e
k2
1 + δ22e2
]
+ δ22θ2(e2, e1) − (1 − l22) = 0.
(34)
where the first two terms in each player’s FOC are her marginal benefits (weighted by her
probability of winning), and the last term her marginal expenses (unweighted).
We now use Assumption 18 to obtain and characterize the relative effective expenses
in any potential equilibrium. Assumption 18 implies that, given a positive constant rii,
player i believes she has the same probability of success θi(ei, e j) under any pair of positive
expenses (ei, e j) satisfying ei/ekij = rii; some algebra using Assumption 18 reveals
θi(ei, e j) = θi(rii, 1) = θi
(
1, r−1/kiii
)
. (35)
If ei, e j > 0, then rii = ei/ekij captures player i’s effective expenses ratio affecting
her, while ri j = 1/rii captures her opponent j’s effective expenses ratio affecting player
i. A pair of positive constants (rii, ki) thus characterizes a class of positive expenses pairs
inducing the same probability of success according to player i’s belief. Slightly abusing
notation, we utitlize equation (35) to denote
θi(rii) = θi(rii, 1), θ(i)i (rii) =
∂
∂rii
θi(rii).
Example 1. Illustrating Assumption 18 is the following modification of the Tullock success
function:
θ1(e1, e2) =

e1
e1+e
k1
2
if e1 + e2 > 0,
1
2 otherwise,
(36)
where k1 also captures the effectiveness of player 2’s expenses in producing spillovers to
player 1 (see player 1’s payoff as defined by equation (31)).
Figure 6 depicts three classes of positive expenses pairs, where each class induces the
same effective expenses ratio and probabilities according to player 1’s success function
defined by (36). The black solid curve captures the class inducing r11 = 1 and θ1 = 12 when
k1 = 2; this is the case of player 1 believing that, given the returns to her expenses are
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Figure 6: Positive expenses pairs that induce the same probabilities according to success
function (36).
half of player 2’s, her effective relative expenses ratio is 1 and her probability of success
1
2 . The blue dotted curve represents the class of positive expenses pairs inducing r11 = 1
and θ1 = 12 when k1 = 1, while the red dashed curve the class inducing r11 = 3 and θ1 =
3
4
when k1 = 2.
Lemma 8 will find a pair of positive effective expenses ratios which will be used to
characterize a nontrival Nash equilibrium. For each i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {1}, define
a function φi j : R++ → R++ by92
φi j(rii) =
viθ
(i)
i (rii)
1 − lii − δiiθi(rii) −
(
δiirii + δi j
)
θ
(i)
i (rii)
. (37)
Lemma 8. There exists a pair of positive constants
(
r∗11, r
∗
22
)
that satisfies the following
properties:
1. If k1k2 = 1, then
r∗11r
∗k1
22 = 1,
[
r∗11φ12(r∗11)
] k2
= φ21(r∗22).
2. If k1k2 , 1, then
r∗k1k211 r
∗k1
22 =
[
φ12(r∗11)
]1−k1k2, r∗k1k222 r∗k211 = [φ21(r∗22)]1−k1k2 .
Proposition 8 will reveal that the constant r∗11 (respectively, r
∗
22) that Lemma 8 charac-
92Lemma 12 in Appendix A.4 proves that function φi j is strictly positive.
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terizes is player 1’s (player 2’s) relative expenses ratio affecting her in a nontrivial Nash
equilibrium.93
Proposition 8. The Contest Game has a nontrival Nash equilibrium
(
e∗1, e
∗
2
) ∈ R2++
characterized by
e∗1 = r
∗
11φ12(r∗11) e∗2 = r∗22φ21(r∗22)
where Lemma 8 defines
(
r∗11, r
∗
22
) ∈ R2++.
Proposition 8 finds and characterizes a nontrivial Nash equilibrium
(
e∗1, e
∗
2
)
, which is
a function of the pair of positive expenses ratios
(
r∗11, r
∗
22
)
that Lemma 8 characterizes.
Upon specifying the functional forms of the success functions, an application of Lemma 8
and Proposition 8 will give close-form expressions for the equilibrium expenses; sections
4.4 and 4.5 will specify the functional forms of the success functions to study military
conflicts and R&D.
Corollary 16. If Lemma 8 defines a unique pair of positive constants, then Proposition 8
characterizes the unique nontrival Nash equilibrium of the Contest Game.
Corollary 16 proves that a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a nontrival Nash
equilibrium is Lemma 8 finding a unique pair
(
r∗11, r
∗
22
)
. Hence adding assumptions to
restrict the success functions and spillover functions to ensure a unique
(
r∗11, r
∗
22
)
will
guarantee equilibrium uniqueness.94
Example 2. To illustrate closed-form expressions for an equilibrium of the Contest Game,
consider a special case with the following features:
1. Player 1 values the (non-spillover) prize at v1 = 1, while player 2 values it at v2.95
2. Both players’ expenses e1, e2 generate no spillovers, wii = lii = wi j = li j = 0.
3. If e1 + e2 > 0, then players 1 and 2’s respective success functions θ1, θ2 have the
following functional forms
θ1(e1, e2) = e1e1 + e2 , θ2(e2, e1) =
e2
e21 + e2
.
93The proof of Proposition 8 reveals that φ12(r∗11) (respectively, φ21(r∗22)) is player 2’s (player 1’s) relative
expenses ratio affecting player 1 (player 2) in equilibrium.
94For an example of a generally-formulated contest model of civil litigation that has a unique nontrivial
Nash equilibrium, see chapter 2 of this thesis. For conditions under which multiple equilibrium exist in
Tullock contests, see Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011b).
95Assumption v1 = 1 is not a mere normalization assumption. This is due to the non-linearity of beliefs.
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If e1 + e2 = 0, then θ1(e1, e2) = θ2(e2, e1) = 12 .
4. Players 1 and 2’s payoff functions U1, U2 are respectively
U1(e1, e2) = θ1(e1, e2) − e1, U2(e2, e1) = θ2(e2, e1)v2 − e2.
To find a nontrivial Nash equilibrium directly would require solving the following
system (38) of equations that has a three-degree polynomial:

e31 − 2(1 +
√
v2)e21 +
(
2 + v2 + 2
√
v2
)
e1 − √v2 = 0
e2 =
(√
v2 − e1
)
e1.
(38)
Alternatively, applying Lemma 8 and Proposition 8 finds a nontrivial Nash equilibrium
indirectly. To see this, first apply Lemma 8 to find a unique pair of positive constants
(r∗11, r∗22) satisfying96

√
v2r∗311 + 2(
√
v2 − 1)r∗211 + (
√
v2 − 2)r∗11 − 1 = 0
r∗22 =
(
1 + r∗−111
)2
.
(39)
An application of Proposition 8 then finds the corresponding nontrivial Nash equilib-
rium:
e∗1 =
r∗11(
1 + r∗11
)2 , e∗2 = v2©­­«
r∗11
(
1 + r∗11
)
r∗211 +
(
1 + r∗11
)2 ª®®¬
2
.
Figure 7 depicts the equilibrium expenses under different values of v2. The red dotted
and purple solid curves respectively indicate players 1 and 2’s equilibrium expenses. For
instance, if v2 = 25/16, then r∗11 = 1, r∗22 = 4, and e∗1 = e∗2 = 1/4.
4.4 Application: Optimism and Pessimism in Military Conflicts
This section applies the Contest Game to study optimism and pessimism in military
conflicts, in particular, the scenario of two warring states spending resources in order
to conquer each other. In this scenario, each state makes costly military expenses with
96The coefficients in the three-degree polynomial in system (39) change sign exactly once, because it is
impossible to have √v2 − 1 < 0 and √v2 − 2 > 0. Then Descarte’s sign rule implies that this polynomial has
a unique real root.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium expenses in Example 2.
its own resources, and the winner keeps its own remaining resources and takes over
the loser’s remaining resources. Dissipating the resources that the winner obtains, the
loser’s expenses create negative (cross-player) spillovers. Hirshleifer (1989b) studied
these military conflicts with Tullock contest models, and Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000)
used a two-period Tullock model to reveal that a player may make military expenses in
order to weaken her opponent in the future. Introducing private information regarding
the valuation of the resources at stake, Corchón and Yıldızparlak (2013) considered the
equilibrium properties of a two-period Tullockmodel in which the declaration of war in the
first period signals information. This subsection introduces a (one-period) contest model
that captures optimism and pessimism, which are well-documented behavioral traits (see,
for example, Kahneman and Tversky 1977; Weinstein 1980; Radcliffe and Klein 2002;
Puri and Robinson 2007). Military texts and history have long recognized the importance
of accounting for optimism and pessimism in military decisionmaking.97
4.4.1 Setup
Construct theConquest Game by specializing the following features of the Contest Game:
1. The players value the (non-spillover) prize of winning equally; v1 = v2 = v for a
constant v > 0. The prize is interpreted as the sum of the players’ individual pre-war
resources, 0.5v. The winner will obtain v by conquest.
97For example, The Art of War by Sun Tzu, dating back to the fifth century BC, recommends “[i]f your
opponent is temperamental, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.” Joachim
Peiper, a famous World War II military commander, was also famously optimistic.
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2. Player i’s success function θi has the following functional form:98
θi(ei, e j) =

ηµi + (1 − η) eie1+e2 if e1 + e2 > 0,
µi otherwise,
(40)
where constants µi, η ∈ (0, 1) respectively capture player i’s belief regarding her
relative advantages in winning the war, and the weight she assigns to µi rather than
her share of total expenses, ei/(e1 + e2).
3. A constant λ ≥ 1 sums themarginal costs of player i’s expenses and of any additional
destruction of the pre-war resources; the marginal cost of such destruction is λ − 1.
Formally, ki = 1, wii = 1 − λ, wi j = −λ, lii = 1 and li j = 0.
4. Player i’s payoff function Ui is given by
Ui(ei, e j) = θi(ei, e j)
[
v − λei − λe j
]
.
In the Conquest Game, the players simultaneously spend e1, e2 to determine who will
obtain their combined pre-war resources less the dissipation arising from their military
expenses and any additional destruction: v − λe1 − λe2. Being conquered by the winner,
the loser obtains no resources and loses all her remaining resources.99
The specifications in part 3 serves the following functions. First, the specification ki =
1 ensures the players’ military expenses ei, e j to be equally effective in producing spillovers
to themselves and to each other; this specification removes cross-player asymmetries in
producing spillovers. Secondly, the specifications wii = 1−λ and lii = 1 together simplify
calculation and presentation by letting one parameter — λ — to capture how ei affects
player i’s prize of conquest in the event of her victory. Similarly, the specifications
wi j = −λ and li j = 0 together simplify calculation and presentation by letting λ also to
capture how e j affects player i’s prize of conquest in the event of her victory.
98In the special case of µ1 = µ2, the success function defined by (40) takes the relative-difference form
that Beviá and Corchón (2015) proposed to combine the desirable properties of ratio-form and difference-
form success functions. Assuming µ1 = µ2, function (40) is also similar to Nitzan’s (1991) sharing rule
in collective contests and the success function that Balart, Chowdhury, and Troumpounis (2017) proposed
to use in individual contests. Moreover, assuming µ1 = µ2 = 0.5, function (40) specializes to the one that
Plott (1987) applied to study cost-shifting rules in civil litigation. However, while function (40) is confined
to two players, the sharing rule in Nitzan (1991) and the success function in Beviá and Corchón (2015) and
Balart et al. (2017) can be extended to more than two players.
99For example, this specification captures the Norman conquest of England in 1066, as well as theMongol
conquests in the thirteenth century.
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4.4.2 Equilibrium
Corollary 17 characterizes the unique nontrivial equilibrium of the Conquest Game.
Corollary 17. The Conquest Game has a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium
(
e∗1, e
∗
2
)
,
which is characterized by
e∗1 =
v(1 − η)(1 − η + ηµ2)
λ[2(1 − η) + η(µ1 + µ2)]2
, e∗2 =
v(1 − η)(1 − η + ηµ1)
λ[2(1 − η) + η(µ1 + µ2)]2
.
In equilibrium, players 1 and 2 respectively believe that their probabilities of winning
are θ∗1, θ
∗
2 given by
θ∗1 = ηµ1 +
(1 − η)(1 − η + ηµ2)
2(1 − η) + η(µ1 + µ2), θ
∗
2 = ηµ2 +
(1 − η)(1 − η + ηµ1)
2(1 − η) + η(µ1 + µ2) .
Corollary 17 reveals that the equilibrium expenses differ to the extent of the relative
advantages parameters µ1, µ2 in the numerator. In the special case of µ1 = µ2, the
players’ equilibrium expenses are equal. The remainder of this subsection will analyze the
equilibrium implications of changes in µ1, µ2.
Intuitively, the parameter µi measures player i’s individual tastes for probabilities.
When µi increases while the pair of expenses (not necessarily the equilibrium pair) is
fixed, player i believes that her probability of winning increases. For this reason, call
player i relatively more optimistic ex ante if µi > µ j . Conversely, call player i relatively
more pessimistic ex ante if µi < µ j .
Corollary 18. Consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the Conquest Game.
1. The playerwho is relativelymore optimistic (respectively, pessimistic) ex ante spends
relatively less (more). Formally, e∗i > e
∗
j if and only if µi < µ j .
2. The player who is relatively more optimistic (respectively, pessimistic) ex ante
believes in a relatively greater (smaller) probability of winning. Formally, θ∗i < θ
∗
j
if and only if µi < µ j .
Part 1 of Corollary 18 reveals that the player who is relatively more pessimistic ex ante
incurs relativelymore expenses in equilibrium. Intuitively, she does so to offset her relative
disadvantages. Part 2 reveals that her relatively more expenses only partially offsets her
relative disadvantages; she still believes in a smaller probability of winning compared to
her opponent. The converse is true for the player who is relatively more optimistic ex ante.
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Corollary 18 adds to the existing analyses of asymmetries in military spending. In
particular, using a Tullock success function, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) constructed
a two-player model in which each player allocates her resources between military spending
and useful production (see Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007 for a simplified version). One
of their equilibrium results is that the player who is relatively less effective in useful
production tends to spend relatively more on her military; she is thus more likely to win
(Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997 pp. 105-106, Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007 pp. 665-
667). Unlike their model, the present Conquest Game does not account for differences
in productiveness, but captures differences in individual tastes for probabilities with a
different success function (see (40)). Without allowing for differences in productiveness,
Corollary 18 nonetheless reveals optimism and pessimism ex ante as a source of asymmetry
in military spending.
To measure the players’ collective tastes for probabilities, define the degree of collec-
tive optimism as σ = µ1 + µ2 − 1. Some algebra using equation (40) obtains
θ1(e1, e2) + θ2(e2, e1) − 1 = ησ, (41)
for all pairs of positive expenses, not just the equilibrium pair. The value of θ1(e1, e2) +
θ2(e2, e1) sums the players’ respective probabilities of winning according to their own
beliefs; θ1(e1, e2) + θ2(e2, e1) = 1 if and only if these beliefs coincide.
A non-zero degree of optimism captures collective optimism or pessimism. Whenσ >
0, equation (41) reveals that the probabilities of winning sum to θ1 + θ2 > 1; this captures
the scenario of the players being collectively optimistic. When σ < 0, the probabilities
of winning sum to θ1 + θ2 < 1; this captures the scenario of the players being collectively
pessimistic. Because the sum of the players’ probabilities of winning is increasing
with σ, the players become collectively more optimistic (respectively, collectively more
pessimistic) if σ increases (decreases).
Corollary 19. In the nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the Conquest Game, the players
collectively makemore (respectively, less) expenses if their degree of optimismσ decreases
(increases). Formally,
d
dσ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
< 0.
A surprising result, Corollary 19 reveals that more collective optimism (respectively,
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pessimism) decreases (increases) total expenses in equilibrium. Intuitively, as the players
become collectively more optimistic, they believe that they can incur less expenses to
offset the influence of their relative advantages. The converse is true if the players become
collectively more pessimistic.
The result that total equilibrium expenses change in response to optimism or pessimism
affects the players’ total equilibrium payoffs ex ante, denoted U∗, where100
U∗ = U1
(
e∗1, e
∗
2
)
+U2
(
e∗2, e
∗
1
)
=
(
θ∗1 + θ
∗
2
) [
v − λ (e∗1 + e∗2) ] . (42)
Corollary 20. In the nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the Conquest Game, as the players’
degree of optimism increases, the sum of their ex-ante payoffs increases. Formally,
dU∗
dσ
> 0.
Corollary 20 reflects the direct and indirect effects that collective optimism σ has
on total ex-ante payoffs U∗. Directly, a greater σ increases U∗ by raising the players’
total probabilities of success in equilibrium, θ∗1 + θ
∗
2, according to their own beliefs (see
equation (41)). Indirectly, a greater σ decreases the players’ total expenses in equilibrium
(see Corollary 19); indicating a smaller dissipation of resources arising from military
expenses, this indirect effect increases U∗. Thus both the direct and indirect effects of an
increase in σ increase U∗.
4.5 Application: R&D Spillovers with Asymmetric Advantages
Returning to the standard case of probabilities of success summing to 1, this section applies
the Contest Game to model spillovers in R&D. For reasons including information sharing
and imperfect protection of intellectual property, firmsmay benefit from each other’s R&D
expenses. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992), and
Hartwick (1984) were among the first to offer economic analysis of these positive spillovers
(or externalities). Using a Tullock contest model with multiple symmetric players, Chung
(1996) captured R&D spillovers with a concave prize function that is increasing with
total expenses. More recently, Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) constructed a Tullock
100The valueU∗ is an ex-ante notion because it sums the players’ equilibrium payoffs in expectation, before
the winner of the war is determined. After the winner is determined, her ex post payoff is v − λ (e∗1 + e∗2)
while the loser’s is 0. The sum of payoffs ex-post is thus v − λ (e∗1 + e∗2) , which is smaller than (respectively,
equal to, greater than) U∗ if and only if the degree of optimism σ > 0 (= 0, < 0).
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contest model with two symmetric players and a prize function that is linearly separable in
each player’s expenses; their model captured R&D spillovers by specifying that the prize
is increasing with each player’s expenses. Building upon their effort, the following will
reveal the implications of R&D spillovers when the players have asymmetric advantages.
4.5.1 Setup
Construct the R&D Game by specializing the following features of the Contest Game:
1. The players value the (non-spillover) prize of winning equally; v1 = v2 = v for a
constant v > 0.
2. Player 1’s success function θ1 has the following Tullock form:
θ1(e1, e2) =

µe1
µe1+(1−µ)e2 if e1 + e2 > 0,
µ otherwise,
(43)
where the constant µ ∈ (0, 1) captures player 1’s relative advantages in R&D.101
3. Player 2’s success function is θ2 = 1 − θ1. The value 1 − µ captures her relative
advantages.
4. Player i’s own expenses give rise to no spillovers to herself; wii = lii = 0.
5. The players linearly generate the same non-negative spillovers to each other, where
these spillovers satisfy Assumption 20. Formally, ki = 1, wi j = w and li j = l for
constants w, l ≥ 0 satisfying w − l < min{µ−1(1 − µ), (1 − µ)−1µ}.
6. Player i’s payoff function Ui is
Ui(ei, e j) = θi(ei, e j)
[
v + we j
]
+
[
1 − θi(ei, e j)
]
le j − ei . (44)
In the R&D Game, the players simultaneously make R&D expenses e1, e2 to compete
for the prize v. For instance, the prize may be a successful patent. The players’ expenses
generate non-negative spillovers w, l to each other; the winner and loser receive different
spillovers if w , l. The players are symmetric except in respect of their relative advantages
in R&D, measured by µ. Player 1’s (respectively, player 2’s) probability of winning
increases (decreases) with µ.
101The special case of µ = 0.5 captures the success function in the two-player Tullock model with positive
spillovers that Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) (at p. 418) constructed.
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The specifications in part 5 serves the following functions. First, the specification
ki = 1 ensures the players’ R&D expenses ei, e j to be equally effective in producing R&D
spillovers to each other; this specification removes cross-player asymmetries in producing
spillovers to each other. Secondly, the specifications wi j = w and li j = l together simplify
presentation by removing the subscript i j, which, in more general settings, captures cross-
player differences in producing spillovers to each other (see section 4.2). Thirdly, as an
implication of Assumption 20, the specification w − l < min{µ−1(1 − µ), (1 − µ)−1µ}
ensures that equilibrium expenses are positive and bounded above (see Corollary 21 in
subsection 4.5.2). This specification requires that the winner’s spillovers w be not too
much greater than the loser’s spillovers l, in order to prevent differences in spillovers to
incentivize explosive R&D expenses.
4.5.2 Equilibrium
Corollary 21 provides a closed-form expression for the unique nontrivial equilibrium of
the R&DGame. The rest of this subsection will analyze the properties of this equilibrium.
Corollary 21. The R&D Game has a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium
(
e∗1, e
∗
2
)
, which
is characterized by
e∗1 = e
∗
2 =
vµ(1 − µ)
1 − (w − l)µ(1 − µ) .
In equilibrium, players 1 and 2’s probabilities of winning are respectively θ∗1 = µ,
θ∗2 = 1 − µ.
Let δ = w− l denote the (cross-player) spillover differential. Our specification ensures
that δ is bounded above by min{µ−1(1 − µ), (1 − µ)−1µ}, and does not impose a lower
bound; δ potentially may be negative. To player i, δ interacts with her opponent’s effort e j .
Suppose e j increases by one unit. Then δ is the spillover premium that player i receives
fromwinning rather than losing. In other words, δ is the per-unit spillover gain of winning.
Thus δ is a part of the stakes of the contest.
Let τ = µ(1 − µ) measure the balancedness of the players’ relative advantages; τ
increases (respectively, decreases) if their relative advantages become more balanced
(extreme), that is, |µ − 0.5| decreases (increases).
Corollary 22 considers how changes in δ and τ affect equilibrium expenses in the R&D
Game.
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Corollary 22. In the R&D Game, a greater spillover differential increases total expenses
in equilibrium. Formally,
d
dδ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
> 0. (45)
Moreover, when the relative advantages of the players become more extreme (that is, τ
decreases), the magnitude of the resulting increase in total equilibrium expenses becomes
smaller, and diminishes in the limit. Formally,
d
dτ
(
d
dδ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
) )
> 0, (46)
lim
τ→0+
(
d
dδ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
) )
= 0. (47)
Inequality (45) in Corollary 22 first reveals that a greater spillover differential δ —
for instance, due to a player receiving smaller loser’s spillovers (l decreases) or greater
winner’s spillovers (w increases) from her opponent — heightens the players’ collective
incentives to spend on R&D. Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) (at p. 418) found such
a result in a symmetric Tullock contest, and the present Corollary 22 confirms the result
continues to hold in the presence of asymmetric advantages.
To see the intuition underlying inequality (45), rewrite player i’s payoff function in
equation (44) as
Ui(ei, e j) = θi(ei, e j)
[
v + δe j
] − ei + le j, (48)
where the component v+δe j sums player i’s total marginal benefits of winning rather than
losing the R&D contest; δ is a part of that component. Suppose δ increases. In response
to the resulting increase in the stakes of the contest, player i has incentives to increase her
R&D expenses, ei. A greater δ and a greater ei then increase the stake of the contest from
player j’s perspective, heightening her incentives to spend as well. As inequality (45)
confirms, this chain reaction continues until the players reach an equilibrium with greater
collective expenses than before the increase in δ.
Now consider the case of asymmetric advantages (µ , 0.5). Inequality (46) in
Corollary 22 reveals that when the players’ relative advantages become more extreme (τ
decreases), changes in the spillover differential δ have a smaller impact on incentives to
spend onR&D.Measuring how δ affects total equilibrium expenses at themargin, the value
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of the derivative ddδ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
decreases when τ decreases, according to inequality (46).
Thus inequality (46) reveals that changes in δ have a smaller impact on R&D expenses
as τ decreases. Indeed, equation (47) further reveals that in the limit when τ approaches
0 — indicating an extreme contest in which one player has absolute advantages over her
opponent — the value of ddδ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
approaches zero. In other words, as the contest
becomes very imbalanced, changes in δ have a very small impact on incentives to spend
on R&D.
Corollary 22 has policy implications. Suppose a social planner wishes to increase
R&D spending. Intellectual property law is among the legal mechanisms that she may
use to alter the extent of R&D spillovers. For example, a race to invent a new product
is a R&D contest, and strengthening patent protection can reduce the extent to which the
loser can profit from the winner’s invention. In the language of the present R&D Game,
smaller loser’s spillovers (l decreases) reflect strengthened protection of patents (or other
intellectual properties). Ceteris paribus, a smaller l leads to a greater spillover differential
δ. This results in greater R&D expenses in equilibrium, as inequality (45) in Corollary 22
reveals and the above discussion explains. Corollary 22 thus offers guidance on how to
affect incentives to spend on R&D.
Moreover, Corollary 22 suggests the effectiveness of policy interventions to affect
R&D spending depends on the relative advantages of the players involved. As inequality
(46) reveals and the above discussion explains, when the relative advantages of the players
become more balanced (τ increases), changes in the spillover differential δ have a greater
impact on incentives to spend. Changes in δ capture policy interventions to alter R&D
spillovers, for example, strengthening intellectual property protection to decrease the
loser’s spillovers l. Thus, in terms of affecting incentives to spend on R&D, policy
interventions that change R&D spillovers are more effective in scenarios involving R&D
firms that are similarly competitive than in scenarios involving a dominant firm.
LetU∗i denote player i’s payoff in equilibrium. Corollary 23 considers how changes in
parameters affect the players’ total payoffs in equilibrium,U∗1 +U
∗
2 . Their total payoffs do
not account for the public benefits of R&D.
Corollary 23. Consider the equilibrium of the R&D Game.
1. If the winner’s spillovers increase, then total payoffs increase. Formally,
d
dw
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
> 0.
95
2. Suppose the winner’s spillovers are sufficiently small (respectively, large). Then as
the loser’s spillovers increase, total payoffs increase. Formally,
w <
1 + 2µ(1 − µ)
2µ(1 − µ) ⇒
d
dl
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
> 0
w =
1 + 2µ(1 − µ)
2µ(1 − µ) ⇒
d
dl
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
= 0
w >
1 + 2µ(1 − µ)
2µ(1 − µ) ⇒
d
dl
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
< 0.
3. Suppose total spillovers are sufficiently small (respectively, large). Then as the
relative advantages of the players become more balanced, total payoffs decrease
(increase). Formally,
w + l < 2 ⇒ d
dτ
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
< 0
w + l = 2 ⇒ d
dτ
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
= 0
w + l > 2 ⇒ d
dτ
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
> 0.
Part 1 of Corollary 23 reveals that more (cross-player) winner’s spillovers (w) lead
to greater total payoffs in equilibrium, while part 2 reveals that how changes in (cross-
player) loser’s spillovers (l) affect total equilibrium payoffs depend on w; if w is small
(respectively, large) in the sense described in part 2, then total payoffs in equilibrium
increase (decrease) with l.
Part 3 of Corollary 23 reveals that how changes in the players’ relative advantages
affect their total payoffs in equilibrium depend on total (cross-player) spillovers, w + l.
If w + l is sufficiently small (respectively, large) in the sense described in part 3, then
total payoffs in equilibrium decrease (increase) as the relative advantages become more
balanced, that is, τ increases.
4.5.3 Robustness of the Tullock Success Function
A conventional wisdom in the literature on Tullock contest models is that as the relative
advantages of the players become more balanced, their total expenses increase.102 To
highlight the importance of robust formulation of success functions, this subsection reveals
102For such a result in a Tullock contest with asymmetric technologies, see Cornes and Hartley (2005) (pp.
940-41). For such a result in a model of litigation, see Carbonara et al. (2015) (pp. 6-7). For a recent paper
that shows this result may not hold in a general model of litigation, see chapter 2 of this thesis.
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that the conventional wisdom has limitations.
First, Corollary 24 confirms that the conventional wisdom holds in the R&D Game,
which adopts the Tullock success function.
Corollary 24. In the R&D Game, as the relative advantages of the players become more
balanced, their total expenses in equilibrium increase. Formally,
d
dτ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
> 0.
Corollary 24 reveals that the players have heightened incentives to spend on R&D as
their relative advantages, measured by τ, become more balanced.
Now construct an Alternative R&D Game by modifying the R&D Game only in
respect of the success functions. In the Alternative R&D Game, let players 1 and 2’s
respective success functions θ1, θ2 take the following forms:
θ1(e1, e2) =

ηµ + (1 − η) e1e1+e2 if e1 + e2 > 0,
µ otherwise,
(49)
θ2(e2, e1) = 1 − θ1(e1, e2),
where constants µ, η ∈ (0, 1) are respectively player 1’s relative advantages in R&D, and
the weight that she assigns to µ rather than to her share of total expenses, e1/(e1 + e2). As
some algebra will reveal, the value 1 − µ captures player 2’s relative advantages, and η is
the weight that she assigns to 1− µ rather than to her share of total expenses, e2/(e1 + e2).
In the Alternative R&DGame, player i believes that her probability of winning is what
her opponent j believes to be her probability of losing; formally, θi = 1− θ j . Thus, unlike
the Conquest Game (see section 4.4), the players in the Alternative R&DGame are neither
collectively optimistic nor collectively pessimistic. Instead, the success function adopted
in the Alternative R&D Game captures the intuition that a player’s probability of winning
the R&D contest can be the weighted average of her relative advantages and her share of
total expenses.
Corollary 25 finds and characterizes the unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the
Alternative R&D Game.
Corollary 25. The Alternative R&D Game has a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium
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(
e∗1, e
∗
2
)
, which is characterized by
e∗1 = e
∗
2 =
(1 − η)v
4 − (1 − η)δ .
In equilibrium, players 1 and 2’s probabilities of winning are respectively θ∗1 = (µ −
0.5)η + 0.5, θ∗2 = (0.5 − µ)η + 0.5.
Using the close-form expression for the nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the Alternative
R&DGame, Corollary 26 ascertains how total expenses in equilibrium respond to changes
in the relative advantages of the players, and in the spillovers.
Corollary 26. Consider the equilibrium of the Alternative R&D Game.
1. As the relative advantages of the players change, their total expenses remain the
same. Formally,
d
dτ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
= 0.
2. As the spillover differential increases, total expenses increase. Formally,
d
dδ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
> 0. (50)
A comparison of Corollary 24 (for the original R&D Game) and the present Corollary
26 first reveals that, due to the adoption in the Alternative R&DGame of the success func-
tion (49), changes in the players’ relative advantages no longer affect their total expenses
in equilibrium. Thus the conventional wisdom regarding Tullock success functions does
not apply to the Alternative R&D Game; in this Game, when the contest becomes more
balanced (τ increases), total expenses do not change. This result identifies a limitation of
Tullock success functions, and highlights the importance of inquiries into the robustness
of contest models.
Moreover, a comparison of inequality (45) in Corollary 22 (for the original R&D
Game) and inequality (50) in Corollary 26 (for the Alternative R&D Game) suggests that
comparative statics regarding the spillover differential δ are robust. Under the Tullock
success function adopted in the original R&D Game and under the success function (49)
adopted in the Alternative R&D Game, a greater δ heightens incentives to spend on R&D.
This result suggests that equilibrium predictions and policy recommendations regarding δ
are robust to different formulations of success functions.
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4.6 Remarks on Generality
4.6.1 Uncertain Success Functions
This subsection will illustrate that the Contest Game captures uncertainty regarding the
success functions. The approach taken is to establish equivalence conditions, which
approach is in the same spirit as Baye and Hoppe (2003) and Chowdhury and Sheremeta
(2015).
Construct the Uncertain Contest Game by making the following modifications to the
Contest Game:
1. At the time of making expenses, player i is uncertain as to which one of a finite col-
lection of N ≥ 1 success functions {θi(1), θi(2), ...θi(N)}will determine her probability
of winning. Each θi(z), z ∈ {1, ..., N}, satisfies Assumptions 18-23.
2. It is common knowledge that player i assigns the prior probability pi(z) ≥ 0 to θi(z)
being operative, where
∑n
z=1 pi(z) = 1.
3. Player i’s payoff function is U˜i : R+ → R given by
U˜i(ei, e j)=
n∑
z=1
pi(z)
(
θi(z)(ei, e j)
[
vi + wiiei + wi je
ki
j
]
+
[
1−θi(z)(ei, e j)
][
liiei + li je
ki
j
]
−ei
)
.
(51)
Player i’s payoff in the present Uncertain Contest Game is the weighted average of
her expected monetary outcome in the original Contest Game; the weights are her prior
probabilities regarding the operative success function. She assigns the prior probability
pi(z) to the event that the success function θi(z) will operate to determine her probability of
winning. In that event, she obtains her expected monetary outcome in the Contest Game
given the success function θi(z).
The remainder of this subsection will reveal that the present Uncertain Contest Game
is strategically equivalent to the original Contest Game. To see this, construct a success
function θi by
θi(ei, e j) =
n∑
z=1
pi(z)θi(z)(ei, e j). (52)
Some algebra comparing player i’s payoffUi (defined by (31)) in the Contest Game and
her payoff U˜i (defined by (51)) in the Uncertain Contest Game reveals that these payoffs
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are equal:
U˜i(ei, e j)=
n∑
z=1
pi(z)θi(z)(ei, e j)
[
vi + wiiei + wi je
ki
j
]
+
(
1−
n∑
z=1
pi(z)θi(z)(ei, e j)
)[
liiei + li je
ki
j
]
−ei
U˜i(ei, e j)=θi(ei, e j)
[
vi + wiiei + wi je
ki
j
]
+
[
1 − θi(ei, e j)
][
liiei + li je
ki
j
]
− ei = Ui . (53)
Proposition 9 will establish that the success function θi defined by (52) satisfies
Assumptions 18-23.
Proposition 9. Consider a finite collection of success functions {θi(1), θi(2), ...θi(N)}. If
each one of them satisfies Assumptions 18-23, then their convex combination also satisfies
Assumptions 18-23.
An application of Proposition 9 reveals that adopting for the original Contest Game
the success function θi defined by (52) satisfies Assumptions 18-23. Hence Proposition
8 finds and characterizes a nontrivial Nash equilibrium in the Contest Game given the
success function θi defined by (52). This equilibrium is also a nontrivial Nash equilibrium
in the Uncertain Contest Game, due to the equality of payoffs established in (53).
Proposition 9 thus reveals that the original Contest Game captures not only a large
class of success functions that appear in the contest theory literature, but also captures
the class of convex combinations of these success functions as well. This attests to the
generality and robustness of the original Contest Game and of its equilibrium predictions
and normative implications.
4.6.2 Homogeneous Expenses and Spillovers
This subsection will illustrate that the Contest Game captures expenses and spillovers that
are homogeneous functions.
Construct the Homogeneous Contest Game by modifying the Contest Game as fol-
lows:
1. Let yi ≥ 0 be player i’s choice variable, which is interpreted as her effort. A strictly
increasing homogeneous function Ei : R+ → R+ of degree kii > 0 gives Ei(yi)
as her costs of exerting effort.103 Let θi(yi, y j) denote what she believes to be her
probability of winning when she and her opponent j respectively exert yi, y j levels
of efforts.
103We assume the fixed cost of exerting effort is zero. For a discussion of the relevance of fixed costs, see
Remark 1 in chapter 2 of this thesis.
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2. Homogeneous functions Wii, Lii : R+ → R of degree kii respectively give the
winner’s and loser’s spillovers of player i arising from her own effort yi;Wii, Lii have
the same degree of homogeneity as Ei. Let the function ∆ii = Wii − Lii capture the
spillover differential arising from yi and affecting player i.
3. Homogeneous functions Wi j, Li j : R+ → R of degree ki j > 0 respectively give
the winner’s spillovers and loser’s spillovers of player i arising from her opponent
j’s effort y j ; these functions may not have the the same degree of homogeneity as
player i’s cost function Ei or her opponent j’s cost function E j . Let the function
∆i j = Wi j − Li j capture the spillover differential arising from y j and affecting player
i.
4. Player i’s payoff is Ûi : R2+ → R given by
Ûi(yi, y j)=θi(yi, y j)
[
vi +Wii(yi) +Wi j(y j)
]
+
[
1−θi(yi, y j)
][
Lii(yi) + Li j(y j)
]−Ei(yi).
(54)
Proposition 10 proves that a change of variables reveals the present Homogeneous
Contest Game is strategically equivalent to the original Contest Game.104
Proposition 10. Suppose the spillover parameters in the original Contest Game are
wii =
Wii(1)
Ei(1) , lii =
Lii(1)
Ei(1) , wi j =
Wi j(1)
E j(1)
ki j
kj j
, li j =
Li j(1)
E j(1)
ki j
kj j
, ki =
ki j
k j j
. (55)
Then a pair of positive efforts (y∗1, y∗2) is a nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the Homo-
geneous Contest Game if and only if it relates to a nontrivial Nash equilibrium (e∗1, e∗2) of
the original Contest Game via the following transformation:
(
y∗1, y
∗
2
)
=
((
e∗1
E1(1)
) 1
k11
,
(
e∗2
E2(1)
) 1
k22
)
. (56)
Equation (56) in Proposition 10 characterizes a bijection between a nontrivial Nash
equilibrium of the Homogeneous Contest Game ((y∗1, y∗2)) and a nontrivial Nash equilib-
rium of the original Contest Game ((e∗1, e∗2)). Intuitively, player i faces the same incentives
104Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2015) offered strategic equivalence conditions and results among two-
player symmetric Tullock contests with linear cost and spillover functions. Building upon their efforts,
the present section 4.6.2 presents equivalence conditions and results that allow for non-specified success
functions, homogeneous cost and spillover functions, and asymmetries therein.
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for choosing expenses ei in the original Contest Game and choosing effort y∗i in the Ho-
mogeneous Contest Game; equation (56) implies e∗i = Ei(y∗i ). The original Contest Game
thus captures the players’ incentives when their cost functions and spillover functions are
homogeneous as well. This result further attests to the generality and robustness of the
original Contest Game and of its equilibrium properties.
4.6.3 Relationship with Tullock Contests
This subsection considers the extent to which the Contest Game generalizes contest models
based on the Tullock success function.
Consider a success function ρi : Rn+ → [0, 1] that gives ρi(e) as the probability of
success of player i ∈ {1, ..., n}, n > 1, where e = (e1, ..., en) is the vector of strategies. The
following Assumption 24 restricts ρ.
Assumption 24. The success function ρ satisfies the following properties:
1. 1 > ρi(e) ≥ 0 and ∑i ρi(e) = 1; if ei > 0 then ρi(e) > 0.
2. ρi(e) is strictly increasing in ei and nonincreasing in e j , j , i.
3. (Independence of irrelevant alternatives.) ρi(e1, ..., ek−1, 0, ek+1, ..., en) = ρi(e)1−ρk (e) for
every i , k.
4. (Homogeneity of degree zero.) ρi(e) = ρi(xe) for every i, every x > 0 where
xe = (xe1, ..., xei, ..., xen).
Building on the seminal work of Skaperdas (1996), Clark and Riis (1998) proved that
Assumption 24 holds if and only if ρ takes the following asymmetric Tullock form:
ρi(e) =
zie
γ
i∑n
j=1 z je
γ
j
,
where constants γ, zi, z j > 0.
Because the present Contest Game is a two-player model, it does not generalize n-
player contest models based onAssumption 24. By comparison, the Contest Game permits
individualized success functions (see section 4.4) and differences in returns to expenses
(see Assumption 18), while these behavioral traits respectively violate properties 1 and 4
of Assumption 24.
Confined to the scenario of two players sharing the same success function, having
equal returns to expenses and generating zero spillovers, Assumption 24 is a special case
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of Assumptions 18-23 of the Contest Game. The opposite is not true. To see this, consider
the success function of the Conquest Game (see equation (40) in section 4.4), which falls
within the scope of Assumptions 18-23. If µ1 = µ2, e1 > 0 and e2 = 0, then player 1’s
probability of winning is
θ1(e1, 0) = 1 − (1 − µ1)η,
which violates property 3 of Assumption 24, because θ1(e1, 0) < 1 = θ1(e1, e2)/[1 −
θ2(e2, e1)] for any e2 > 0.
4.7 Discussion
Extending the descriptive scope of contest theory, the present Contest Game allows for
general and individualized success functions and spillovers. Future research may proceed
in several directions.
First, the Contest Game is a two-playermodel; future researchmay introducemore than
two players. Although two-player contests are common, many real-life contests — such
as the U.S. presidential primaries and multi-state wars — have more than two contestants.
Group contests such as team sports also have more than two players (see Serena and
Corchón’s 2017 survey, pp. 25-27). It may be fruitful to explore the implications of
general and individualized success functions and spillovers in multi-player contests.
Secondly, extending the Contest Game to multiple periods may capture intertemporal
incentives and information revelation over time. These factors have implications inmilitary
contests (see Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2000 and Corchón and Yıldızparlak 2013). Many
other real-life scenarios also answer the description of dynamic contests (see Serena and
Corchón’s 2017 survey, pp. 20-23); elimination tournaments and sports leagues are among
the prominent examples. Giving a dynamic structure to the Contest Game may reveal how
intertemporal incentives and information revelation over time may affect the differences
in the players’ beliefs regarding the success functions.
Thirdly, future research may modify the Contest Game to incorporate private informa-
tion. The players in the present Contest Gamemay have non-common beliefs regarding the
success functions, but their common knowledge includes their payoff functions and the pa-
rameters characterizing their spillovers. It may be fruitful to explore the role of spillovers
by building upon models that assume common priors but permit private information.
For example, Einy et al. (2015) proved the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash
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equilibrium in Tullock contests with private information.
Fourthly, future research may consider modifying the Contest Game to account for
the possibility of a draw. Generalizing Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998),
Blavatskyy (2010) axiomatized a Tullock contest that permits a draw. Chowdhury (2017)
characterized equilibria for an all-pay auction in which the highest bid may fail to win
the prize, and the prize value may depend on the bid level. Many real-life contests,
such as individual matches in the group stage of the FIFA World Cup, can result in no
winner. Modifying the Contest Game to permit a draw may capture these contests without
specifying the functional form of the success function.
Finally, future research may build upon the present efforts to develop contest models
that capture well-documented behavioral traits. Optimism and pessimism are prominent
behavioral traits that fall within the scope of the present Contest Game (see section
4.4). However, the present assumptions do not aim to capture some behavioral traits that
consistently appear in contest experiments, such as preferences for relative outcomes (see
Dechenaux et al.’s 2015 survey at pp. 614-616). Future research may modify the Contest
Game to incorporate these behavioral traits.
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5 Restitution for Wrongs: A Theory of Externalities Op-
timization
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Intuition and Contributions
Actions that generate private gain to the actor but impose social harm on someone else
are ubiquitous. Coase’s (1960) analysis of these problems of externalities gave birth to
modern law and economics. ConsiderCoase’s hypothetical of a cattle-raiserwhose herding
activities generate profits to herself but damage a neighboring farmer’s crops. Absent
reputational concerns or other-regarding preferences, socially suboptimal outcomes may
arise because the cattle-raiser has perverse incentives to over-herd without regard to the
farmer’s harm. When insurmountable obstacles prohibit a contract between the cattle-
raiser and the farmer, the standard legal solution to achieving social optimality is to
internalize externalities completely: Holding the cattle-raiser legally liable for all of the
harm that she imposes on the farmer removes the incentives to over-herd. Example 3
offers a numerical illustration of the problem of externalities and its standard solution.
Example 3. Suppose the cattle-raiser in Coase’s hypothetical is deciding whether to add
one extra cattle to her herd. Doing so would cost her $1 and would allow her to gain
$2. However, adding the extra cattle would impose an additional harm valued at $h to
the farmer’s crops; the externalities here sum to −$h at the margin. Assume both parties
value money equally. Adding the extra cattle is socially optimal if the cattle-raiser’s
marginal net gain ($2− $1 = $1) exceeds the farmer’s marginal harm ($h), but is socially
suboptimal otherwise. Formally, adding the extra cattle is socially optimal if and only if
$1 ≥ $h.
The problem of externalities is, in the absence of some legal duty, the cattle-raiser
has incentives to add the extra cattle regardless of the farmer’s harm. The standard,
non-contractual solution to this problem is to internalize externalities. For instance,
in the absence of administrative costs, a strict liability rule that holds the cattle-raiser
liable for $h would incentivize her to add the extra cattle if and only if $1 ≥ $h. The
externalities-internalization theory thus generates socially optimal incentives on the part
of the cattle-raiser.
The problem that animates this paper is: When insurmountable obstacles prevent
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complete internalization of externalities, there is no well-established theory to generate
socially optimal incentives. Using a modification of the standard tort model, this paper
proposes a more general theory to generate optimal incentives: The optimization of
externalities. The proposed theory generalizes the externalities-internalization theory,
and achieves social optimality even when complete internalization of externalities fails.
Example 4 offers a preview of the proposed theory.
Example 4. Consider Example 3 again but now assume that insurmountable obstacles
prevent: A contract between the cattle-raiser; and a money judgment from compensating
more than one quarter of the farmer’s harm ($0.25h at the margin). Complete inter-
nalization of externalities is unattainable because three quarters of the farmer’s harm
($0.75h at the margin) would always enter into the calculation of externalities. For in-
stance, a strict liability rule that holds the cattle-raiser liable for $0.25h would not give
her socially-optimal incentives, because she has incentives to add the extra cattle when
$h > $1 ≥ $0.25h.
There nonetheless remain many legal solutions to the problem of externalities.105 As
the literature has recognized,106 one simple solution is to impose on the cattle-raiser both
a liability to pay $0.25h and a liability to transfer three quarters of her net gain — $0.75
at the margin — to the farmer. Under these liabilities, the cattle-raiser’s marginal utility
is $0.25 − $0.25h; she has incentives to add the extra cattle if $1 ≥ $h, and she has no
incentives to do so otherwise. These liabilities thus generate socially optimal incentives
on the part of the cattle-raiser, even though there often remain non-zero externalities
netting to $0.75 − $0.75h at the margin. In fact, the cattle-raiser’s choice optimizes net
externalities; she has incentives to add the extra cattle if and only if $0.75 ≥ $0.75h.
There also exist legal solutions that generate socially optimal incentives without im-
posing any liability for the farmer’s harm. One such solution imposes on the cattle-
raiser a liability to transfer 0.5h proportion of her gross gain ($2 if she adds the ex-
tra cattle) to the farmer.107 Under this liability, the cattle-raiser’s marginal utility is
$2× (1− 0.5h) − $1 = $1− $h, and she has incentives to add the extra cattle if and only if
$1 ≥ $h. Because marginal net externalities sum to $2 × 0.5h − $h = 0, her choice also
105Section 5.3 will reveal that the proposed externalities-optimization theory usually describes uncountably
many legal solutions to the problem of externalities.
106See, for example, Huang (2016) at pp. 1611-12. See generally subsection 5.1.2 for a discussion of
the existing literature. See Corollary 27 in subsection 5.3.1 for a formal description of optimal liability to
transfer net gain.
107Such a liability arises in the law of restitution. See generally section 5.4. See Corollary 28 in subsection
5.3.1 for a formal description of optimal liability to transfer gross gain.
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optimizes net externalities.
The intuition underlying the proposed externalities-optimization theory is most ap-
parent when a tiny change in the externalities-generating action results in a tiny change
in the actor’s utility.108 As the sum of individual utilities, social welfare is also the sum
of externalities and non-externalities; the actor’s own utility comprises non-externalities.
When the actor marginally changes her action, the corresponding marginal change in
social welfare equals the sum of the marginal change in externalities and the marginal
change in non-externalities. The actor has incentives to take an action that leads to zero
marginal non-externalities; that action maximizes her utility by equating her ownmarginal
benefits with her own marginal costs. Thus that action equates marginal social welfare
with marginal externalities. This implies that the actor’s utility-maximizing action leads
to zero marginal social welfare if it leads to zero marginal externalities. In other words,
that action optimizes social welfare if it optimizes externalities.
Thus the lawmay generate socially optimal incentives by altering the respective sizes of
externalities and non-externalities. The law may reduce negative externalities by holding
the actor liable for some or all of the social harm arising from her action. The law also
may create positive externalities by shifting some or all of the actor’s (gross or net) gain
to others. In other words, the law may “divide” the social welfare “pie” into one “slice”
of externalities and one “slice” of non-externalities, and the law may arbitrarily set the
respective “slice sizes”. Thus the law may achieve an optimal “division”, so that when the
actor optimizes the “slice size” of non-externalities, her action simultaneously optimizes
the “slice size” of externalities. Complete internalization of externalities is just one such
optimal “division”; it sets the “slice size” of externalities to zero for all actions, so the
actor’s utility-maximizing action trivially optimizes that “slice size”.
To capture this intuition, section 5.2 makes a modification to the standard tort model:
The lawmay impose on the actor a restutionary liability to disgorge some proportion of her
(gross or net) gain and a liability to compensate for some proportion of the social harm.
Section 5.3 proves that there usually are uncountably many combinations of restitutionary
and compensatory liabilities that optimize externalities. Section 5.3 also proves that,
regardless of whether social optimality requires zero or positive action, liabilities that
optimize externalities incentivize the actor to take the socially optimal action. Moreover, if
social optimality demands positive action, then optimization of externalities is a necessary
108More precisely, suppose the actor’s utility function is differentiable. The externalities-optimization
theory does not depend that assumption. See appendix A.5.5.
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condition for social optimality.
The proposed externalities-optimization theory achieves social optimality in cases
where complete internalization of externalities is unattainable. Section 5.3 proves that, in
these cases, if some positive action is socially optimal, then the law must leave the actor
with some, but not all, of her private gain. The intuition underlying this result is most
apparent in a scenario where the law cannot hold the actor liable for any of the social
harm. In this scenario, if the law leaves the actor with no gain, then she has no incentives
to take any positive action. In contrast, if the law allows the actor to keep all of her gain,
then she has perverse incentives to over-act without regarding to the resulting social harm.
It follows that the law must allow the actor to keep an intermediate amount of her gain
in order to give her incentives to take a positive action that is socially optimal. However,
in an alternative scenario where the law holds the actor liable for all social harm, the law
must allow her to keep all of her private gain in order to incentivize a positive, socially
optimal action. Thus social optimality requires the imposition of restitutionary liability
only in cases of incomplete compensation of the social harm.
Not all liabilities that optimize externalities generate the same administrative costs, in
particular, information costs. Subsection 5.3.3 reveals the exact information that a judge
(or social planner) would need to have in order to implement different types of externalities-
optimizing liabilities. A liability that completely internalizes externalities generates the
information costs of ascertaining the level of the social harm. In contrast, any other
liability that optimizes externalities requires information on the level of the private gain
and, potentially, how the underlying gain function changes at the margin. Thus a liability
that completely internalizes externalities often generates smaller information costs than
any other liability that optimizes externalities. Moreover, if social optimality obviously
requires zero action, then there is no need to incur the information costs of externalities
optimization because it is a sufficient condition, but not a necessary condition, for social
optimality. For example, maximum deterrence via complete restitution is also socially
optimal, and generates smaller information costs than intermediate restitution does.
Section 5.4 applies the theory of externalities optimization to explain the cardinal
principles of the American law of restitution and unjust enrichment, focusing on its
application to wrongful actions. Wrongful actions typically expose the actor to liability
in the law of torts to compensate the victim for some or all of the resulting harm. Some
wrongful actions, such as a breach of fiduciary duty, expose the actor to liability in
restitution to transfer some or all of her wrongful gain to the victim; her liability in
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restitution may be exclusive of, or an alternative to, her liability to compensate. As section
5.4 will elaborate, standards resembling “equity” and “conscience” underly the law of
restitution and limit the extent of restitutionary liability or remedy. The law of restitution
also employs peculiar defenses and limiting principles that lack obvious counterparts in
the law of torts. Moreover, there is a tendency to allow restitution of the wrongful gain
only if complete compensation of the wrongful harm is unattainable.
The theory of externalities optimization explains a great extent of these cardinal prin-
ciples of the law governing restitution for wrongs. First, subsection 5.3.3 reveals that it
is usually less informationally demanding to achieve social optimality by completely in-
ternalizing externalities rather than by optimizing externalities. This observation explains
the law’s tendency to limit restitution of the wrongful gain to cases of incomplete compen-
sation of the wrongful harm; these are cases of incomplete internalization of externalities.
Second, Corollary 28 in section 5.3 reveals that, in cases where the socially optimal action
is positive but complete compensation is unattainable, it is socially optimal to disgorge an
intermediate amount of the actor’s gain. Equitable standards and peculiar defenses and
limiting principles may effecutate such intermediate restitution. However, in cases where
it is obviously socially optimal to take no action, there is no need to incur the information
costs of optimizing externalities. In these cases, the law of restitution should disgorge all
wrongful gain, and should not let standards and limiting principles to dilute its ex-ante
deterrence effect.
The remainder of this section connects the proposed externalities-optimization theory
to the existing literature. Using the model that section 5.2 constructs, section 5.3 estab-
lishes the theory of externalities optimization as a general approach to generating socially
optimal incentives. Section 5.4 applies this theory to explain the cardinal principles of the
law governing restitution for wrongs in the United States. Section 5.5 concludes with a dis-
cussion of future research directions. The appendices reveal the externalities-optimization
theory remains valid under various model modifications.
5.1.2 Relationship with Existing Literature
This paper builds upon the vast literature on the divergence of private and social inter-
ests in the presence of externalities. The problem of externalities has been well-known
to economists since Pigou’s (1920) analysis of optimal taxation, and to lawyers since
Coase’s (1960) analysis of assignment of property rights under different specifications re-
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garding transaction costs (broadly defined). Assuming transaction costs are negligible and
information is symmetric, the Coase Theorem holds that any initial assignment of prop-
erty rights leads to a contract that internalizes externalities to generate socially optimal
incentives (Stigler 1966 pp. 112-113). Thereafter, scholars have applied the externalities-
internalization theory to explain and evaluate the cardinal principles of contract law (for
example, Birmingham 1970, Goetz and Scott 1977, Shavell 1980a), tort law (for exam-
ple, Brown 1973, Calabresi 1970, Shavell 1980b),109 criminal law (for example, Becker
1968), and many other areas of law (for example, Posner 1972). This paper generalizes the
externalities-internalization theory. The proposed externalities-optimization theory solves
the problem of externalities in cases where complete internalization is unattainable, and
subsumes the externalities-internalization theory in cases where complete internalization
is attainable.
The externalities-optimization theory also explains several apparently-unrelated legal
rules that generate socially optimal incentives without completely internalizing exter-
nalities. Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) proposed a sharing rule to address a lawyer’s
suboptimal incentives to act for her client when their contingency fee agreement only
gives the lawyer a proportion of her client’s judgment sum in the event of winning the
case. Their proposed rule incentivizes the lawyer to act optimally by shifting away some
of her cost of acting so that the remaining proportion of her cost matches her proportion
of the judgment sum. Focusing on cases where the plaintiff’s entitlement is uncertain
and she may seek a preliminary injunction to enjoin a potential breach by the defendant,
Brooks and Schwartz (2005) revealed that the plaintiff’s incentives to seek the injunction
are optimal if, in the event that she loses (at the conclusion of the case), she is liable for
the defendant’s costs of complying with any injunction sought. Considering scenarios in
which the total social harm produced by multiple injurers is verifiable but the individual
social harm is not verifiable, Marco, Van Woerden, and Woodward (2009) proposed a
cost-sharing rule under which each injurer bears the same proportion of the total private
cost (of all injurers’ actions) and of the total social harm.110 Aiming to retain optimal
109See also Dari-Mattiacci (2004), who revealed that traditional tort liability may generate suboptimal
incentives in cases where an injurer produces a negative externality to a victim and a positive externality to
a gainer. He further used the externalities-internalization theory to argue that these three parties’ respective
liabilities should be decoupled so that each party bears the positive and negative externalities produced by
her activity. By comparison, the present paper demonstrates how to generate optimal incentives when the
externalities-internalization theory fails.
110Marco et al. (2009) reacted to Cooter and Porat (2007). Considering similar scenarios, Cooter and
Porat (2007) proposed a modified negligence rule to hold each injurer individually liable for any total
social harm in excess of its socially optimal level. Their proposal generates optimal incentives in a Nash
equilibrium because, when other injurers act optimally, an injurer’s marginal liability for over-actingmatches
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incentives when social harm is hard to internalize completely, Huang (2016) proposed to
utilize an observation that an injurer has the same incentives under (i) an optimal harm-
based liability that is imposed on her almost surely; and (ii) a probabilistic mixture of that
liability and a restitutionary liability that disgorges her net gain from acting.
The rules that these authors have proposed achieve social optimality by aligning pri-
vate and social incentives at the margin: At the time of choosing her action, the actor
expects that her marginal liability equals the marginal (net) externalities arising from her
action. From an ex-ante perspective, these proposals do not completely internalize exter-
nalities because the actor is not liable for all externalities arising from her action. Instead,
these proposals optimize externalities: The actor’s utility function and the net external-
ities function are proportionate to the social welfare function, so her utility-maximizing
action simultaneously maximizes net externalities and social welfare.111 The externalities-
optimization theory thus connects these proposals, and offers a unifying explanation ofwhy
they generate socially optimal incentives without completely internalizing externalities.
The law-and-economics literature on restitution is thin relative to that on other tradi-
tional areas of law. Levmore (1990) (especially at pp. 710-12) informally argued that a
restitutionary liability that completely disgorges an injurer’s gross gain from failing to take
precautions overdeters her, while disgorgement of her net gain results in underdeterrence.
Polinsky and Shavell (1994) further established the social suboptimality of a complete
restitutionary liability in a one-player tort model that accounts for errors in observing the
wrongful gain and harm. Using a two-player model where each player makes decisions
affecting her own utility and the probability and consequences of their interaction, Bar-Gill
and Porat (2014) showed that a complete restitutionary liability gives the injurer socially
suboptimal incentives. Using a one-player model, Cooter and Porat (2015) proposed
a negligence rule with limited disgorgement damages to incentivize the socially optimal
level of care. These limited damages are designed to offset the negligent injurer’s expected
gain from taking suboptimal care. Cooter and Porat (2015) built upon their previous idea
in more specific contexts (see Cooter and Porat 2006, Cooter and Porat 2014, ch. 10, pp.
179-180), and rebutted the alternative argument that applying a multiplier to restitutionary
liability is generally impractical (for example, Levmore 1990 at p. 713).
The model that section 5.2 constructs (and its modifications in the appendices) builds
the marginal increase in the total social harm.
111See Corollary 27 in subsection 5.3.1 for a formal statement. The mathematical foundation is that
if a function has a maximizer, then a strictly increasing transformation of the function — for example,
multiplying the function with a positive constant — has the same maximizer.
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upon the existing models of restitution, especially Cooter and Porat’s (2015) and Huang’s
(2016). With some exceptions (for example, Huang 2016), the existing models focus on
pure restitution or pure compensation, that is, a wrongful action attracts either a liability in
restitution or a liability to compensate, but not both. Using a modification of the standard
tort model, the present model captures a mixture or combination of both restitution and
compensation. Thus the present model allows for great flexibility in adjusting positive
externalities (by arbitrarily specifying the extent of restutition) and negative externalities
(by arbitrarily specifying the extent of compensation). That flexibility also enables the
present model to capture a prominent characteristic of the American law of restitution:
That standards and judicial discretion give rise to ex-ante uncertainty regarding whether
a wrongful action attracts restitution or compensation ex post (see subsection 5.4.1).
Appendix A.5.2 further reveals that the externalities-optimization theory continues to hold
when the victim has a choice between restitution and compensation; existingmodels do not
capture that choice. Moreover, although the optimal restitutionary liabilities that section
5.3 proposes are different from what Cooter and Porat (2015) proposed,112 the present
proposal reinforces their idea that some intermediate restitutionary liability is socially
optimal. The externalities-optimization theory also offers an alternative interpretation for
the rule they proposed.113
In common law jurisdictions, private law often imposes tortious liability to discourage
actions that generate negative externalities, but it rarely imposes restitutionary liability to
encourage actions that generate positive externalities.114 As a result, an actor may have
insufficient incentives to take socially beneficial actions when insurmountable obstacles
(such as prohibitive transaction costs) prevent her from contracting with the recipient(s) of
these benefits. To remedy this deficiency, Porat (2009) proposed a limited expansion of the
112More precisely, in section 5.3, optimal intermediate restitutionary liabilities induce the actor to take
an action that satisfies the first order condition of her differentiable utility function (see condition (60) in
section 5.2). By comparison, optimal disgorgement damages according to Cooter and Porat (2015) (at p.
260) give the injurer a utility function that is not differentiable at her chosen action.
113 More precisely, in Cooter and Porat’s (2015) model and under their proposed rule, net externalities
sum to B(x0) − B(x) − p(x)L, where x is a negligent injurer’s chosen level of care, B(x) is her cost of taking
care, p(x) is the probability of an accident, L is the fixed loss that the accident causes, and x0 is the socially
optimal level of care (that minimizes the sum of the cost of taking care and the social harm, B(x) + p(x)L).
Functions B and p satisfy B′ > 0, B′′ = 0, p′ < 0 and p′′ < 0. The injurer has incentives to choose the
socially optimal level of care under their proposed rule (see Cooter and Porat 2015 p. 260), and her choice
also optimizes net externalities.
The same reasoning also reveals that the externalities-optimization theory explains those situations in
which traditional negligence rules induce socially optimal outcomes (see, for example, Brown 1973, Shavell
1980b).
114See generally Levmore (1985), discussing various positive explainations of private law’s asymmetric
imposition of tortious and restitutionary liabilities.
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law of restitution to incentivize the creation of public goods. More recently, Porat and Scott
(2018) proposed a limited right in restitution as a background rule for benefits-and-costs
sharing among the members of a fragile business network. While this paper focuses on
negative externalities (see section 5.2) and takes a largely positive approach, its normative
implication is largely consistent with the view of Porat (2009) and Porat and Scott (2018):
A limited right in restitution is often socially optimality. Moreover, the present focus on
negative externalities is without loss of generality; appendix A.5.1 modifies the model set
up in section 5.2 to capture actions that generate positive externalities. Thus this paper
also provides a formal framework to support the informal analyses of Porat (2009) and
Porat and Scott (2018).
However, this paper assumes the absence of a contract between the actor and the
victim; high transaction costs (Coase 1960) or asymmetric information (Myerson and
Satterthwaite 1983) may justify this assumption. Thus neither the present model(s) nor
the externalities-optimization theory adds to the literature on a contractual party’s liability
in restitution. For instance, Levmore (1993) explored the merits of imposing restitutionary
liability on a contractual party who fails to take cost-benefit-justified actions. In a contract-
theoretic framework, Brooks and Stremitzer (2012) proved that allowing rescission and
restitution as a remedy for (some) breach of contract solves the hold-up problem arising
from non-contractible investments that are relationship-specific and cooperative.115
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Setup
The presentModel modifies the standard model for intentional torts. There is one utility-
maximizing decisionmaker, called the actor, who chooses an action level x ∈ R+. The
actor believes that a real-valued function G satisfying G′ > 0 and G′′ ≤ 0 gives G(x) as
her gain arising from choosing x. She believes that her cost of choosing x is to C(x),
where C is a real-valued function satisfying C′ > 0 and C′′ ≥ 0. She also believes that
her choice x generates harm H(x) to some victim, where H is a real-valued function
115Brooks and Stremitzer (2012) used the incomplete contracts/property rights theory — a Nobel prize-
winning theory that Grossman andHart (1986) andHart andMoore (1988) have developed for understanding
the boundary of the firm and a broad range of economic phenomena. For an introduction to the incomplete
contracts/property rights theory, see, for example, Aghion and Holden (2011) and Holden (2017). See
Holden and Malani (2014) for a discussion of real-world contracts and legal doctrines that implement
theoretical solutions to the hold-up problem arising from non-contractible investments that are relationship-
specific and selfish.
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satisfying H′ > 0 and H′′ ≥ 0.116
A triple of proportions (δ, γ, λ) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1]×[0, 1] describes what the actor believes
to be the operation of the law in allocating, between her and the victim, the gain, harm and
cost arising from the chosen action. Call δ, γ, λ the gain-allocation rule, cost-allocation
rule and harm-allocation rule respectively. The law allocates to the actor 1−δ proportion
of the gain G(x), 1 − γ proportion of the cost C(x), and λ proportion of the harm H(x).
The law allocates to the victim the remaining δ proportion of the gain, γ proportion of
the cost, and 1 − λ proportion of the harm. Describing legal consequences by a triple of
allocation rules is the sole modification of the standard tort model.
Under an arbitrary triple of allocation rules (δ, γ, λ), the actor’s utility is
A(x) = (1 − δ)G(x) − (1 − γ)C(x) − λH(x), (57)
which is the portion of gain that she expects to keep (1 − δ)G(x), less the portions of cost
and harm that she expects to bear, (1 − γ)C(x) and λH(x).
The actor’s utility function A may not match the social welfare function, denoted S.
The social welfare arising from an action x is the value S(x), which deducts from the
resulting gain all the resulting private cost and social:
S(x) = G(x) − C(x) − H(x). (58)
To ensure the social welfare function S has an unique optimizer, assume that as the
action x becomes very large, the marginal gain eventually falls below the sum of the
marginal cost and the marginal social harm.117 To ensure that the actor’s utility function
A has an optimizer, confine attention to triples of allocation rules under which she does
not have incentivizes to take explosively large actions.118
Representing the operation of the law, the gain-, cost- and harm-allocation rules may
leave room for externalities.119 Positive externalities arise if the gain-allocation rule shifts
116The Model set up in section 5.2 captures negative externalities. Appendix A.5.1 will modify the Model
to capture positive externalities.
117Formally, assume: G′′ < 0, C ′′ > 0, or H ′′ > 0; and there exists some action x¯ > 0 such that
G′(x¯) ≤ C ′(x¯) + H ′(x¯). Appendix A.5.5 will demonstrate that this assumption is without loss of generality.
Moreover, the assumption that the socially optimal action is unique is made to facilitate proofs of the welfare
results. These results do not depend on the uniqueness assumption.
118Formally, confine attention to triples of allocation rules in {(δ, γ, λ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0, 1] | ∃x¯ >
0 s.t. A′(x¯) ≤ 0}.
119Section 5.4 will consider the extent to which the gain-, cost- and harm-allocation rules capture legal
doctrine.
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some or all of the actor’s gain to the victim, formally, δ > 1. Negative externalities arise
if the harm-allocation rule fails to shift to the actor all of the victim’s harm, that is, λ < 1.
Negative externalities also arise if the cost-allocation rule shifts to the victim some or all
of the actor’s cost, formally, γ > 1. Thus the harm-allocation rule generates negative
externalities by passively failing to transfer some of the victim’s harm to the actor, while
the cost-allocation rule generates negative externalities by actively transferring some of
the actor’s cost to the victim. Let a function V capture the net externalities:
V(x) = δG(x) − γC(x) − (1 − λ)H(x), (59)
where V is also the victim’s utility.
5.2.2 Solution
The actor has an utility-maximizing action,120 denoted x, that solves her first order
condition:
A′(x) ≤ 0. (60)
There is a unique socially optimal action, denoted x∗, that satisfies the first order
condition for the social welfare function S:
S′(x∗) ≤ 0. (61)
Section 5.3 will reveal the conditions under which the actor’s chosen action is socially
optimal.
5.2.3 Remarks on Assumptions
To facilitate presentation and focus on analyzing the different roles of restitution and com-
pensation, the Model adopts several assumptions that are often without loss of generality.
First, there is an assumption that none of the gain-allocation rule (δ), cost-allocation
rule (γ) and harm-allocation rule (λ) varies with the action (x). Appendix A.5.3 will reveal
that the welfare results in section 5.3 remain valid without that assumption. Moreover, the
120The actor has a unique utility-maximizing action if we add assumptions to ensure that her utility function
is strictly concave. The present Model does not add such assumptions because, in reality, the law may give
her a utility function that is zero everywhere; formally, (δ, γ, λ) = (1, 1, 0) implies A(x) = 0. See section 5.4
and Huang (2016).
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welfare results in section 5.3 do not depend on the assumption λ ≤ 1; these results continue
to hold if λ > 1, that is, a liability to pay punitive damages as a multiple of the wrongful
harm. Similarly, appendix A.5.2 reveals that the welfare results in section 5.3 continue to
hold in cases where the victim has a choice between restitution and compensation.
Second, the Model suppresses the role of the victim in acting to modify the conse-
quences of the actor’s actions. This approach reflects the reality that the types of wrongs
giving rise to restitution in American law usually involve an inactive victim. For example,
the actor may be a trustee who commits a breach of the duty of loyalty against a beneficiary
— the victim — who is unable to monitor the trustee (see Sitkoff 2011). However, sup-
pressing the victim’s actions excludes cases in which she has an active role (for example,
Shavell 1980b, Bar-Gill and Porat 2014). Appendix A.5.4 will reveal that the welfare
results in section 5.3 continue to hold when the victim actively affects the gain and harm
arising from the actor’s actions.
Third, the present formulation of functions G, C and H accounts for uncertainty
regarding, respectively, the gain, cost and harm arising from the action x. For instance,
let these functions take the following probabilistic forms:
G(x) = p(x)g H(x) = q(x)h C(x) = r(x)c
where g, h, c > 0 are constants, and p(x), q(x), r(x) ∈ (0, 1) are respectively the probabili-
ties that the gain g, the harm h and the cost c realize according to the actor’s belief at the
time of choosing her action x. Imposing the appropriate assumptions on the derivatives
of p, q and r will bring these probabilistic gain, harm and costs functions within the scope
of the Model.121 Thus the Model also captures liability for accidents.122 However, the
Model does not captures laws that transfer realized values — g, h and c in this example
— without regard to their probabilities of realization — p, q, r here.
Fourth, the present Model assumes that the actor generates social harm, rather than
social benefit. Appendix A.5.1 will reveal the main welfare results in section 5.3 continue
to hold under the alternative specification that the actor generates social benefit.
Fifth, there is an assumption that the actor’s utility function and the social welfare
function are concave and differentiable in her action. As section 5.3 will make apparent,
121More precisely, assume p′, q′, r ′ > 0; p′′ ≤ 0, q′′ ≥ 0, r ′′ ≥ 0, with at least one holding strictly; and
p′(x¯)g ≤ q′(x¯)h + r ′(x¯)c for some x¯ > 0.
122For a survey of economic models of liability for accidents, see Shavell (2007b).
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these technical assumptions are made to simplify the proofs of the welfare results.123
Appendix A.5.5 will show that the underlying intuition of the proposed externalities-
optimization theory does not depend on these assumptions.
However, there is a loss of generality in excluding administrative costs and the pos-
sibility of contracting to vary or avoid the law. Administrative costs are assumed to be
independent or sunk costs that do not affect the actor’s incentives at the time of choosing
her action. Such an assumption also rules out cases where litigation costs vary with the
allocation rules.124 Subsection 5.3.3 will consider information costs. The possibility of
contracting is left for future research.
Moreover, neither the Model nor its modifications in the appendices accounts for the
law’s expressiveness.
5.3 Welfare Analysis
The welfare results to be stated in this section follow from expressing the social welfare
function S as the sum of the actor’s utility A and net externalities V :
S(x) = (1 − δ)G(x) − (1 − γ)C(x) − λH(x)︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
The actor’s utility A(x)
+ δG(x) − γC(x) − (1 − λ)H(x)︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Net externalities V(x)
S(x) = A(x) + V(x), (62)
which implies
S′(x) = A′(x) + V ′(x). (63)
Equation (63) captures the intuition underlying all subsequent welfare results. The
gain-allocation rule (δ), cost-allocation rule (γ) and harm-allocation rule (λ) partition
social welfare (S) into the actor’s utility (A) and net externalities (V). The actor’s choice
(x) necessarily optimizes her utility according to her first order condition (60). If her
choice further optimizes net externalities, then optimization of social welfare follows.
In other words, a positive action that maximizes the actor’s individual utility leads to
alignment ofmarginal social welfare withmarginal net externalities; formally, if A′(x) =
123In particular, these technical assumptions allow first order conditions to characterize the actor’s utility-
maximizing action and the socially optimal action.
124For models of endogenous litigation costs, see the surveys in Spier (2007) and Katz and Sanchirico
(2012), and, more recently, chapter 2 of this thesis.
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0, then equation (63) implies S′(x) = V ′(x). Similarly, optimization of net externalities
leads to alignment of marginal social welfare with the actor’s marginal utility; formally, if
V ′(x) = 0, then equation (63) implies S′(x) = A′(x).
The remainder of this section will consider separately cases in which the socially
optimal action is positive, x∗ > 0; and cases in which x∗ = 0.
5.3.1 When Social Optimality Requires Positive Action
Proposition 11 formally states the main result.
Proposition 11. Suppose the socially optimal action is positive, x∗ > 0. Then the actor’s
chosen action x is socially optimal if and only if the law optimizes net externalities.
Formally, suppose x∗ > 0. Then x = x∗ if and only if x defined by condition (60)
satisfies
δG′(x) = γC′(x) + (1 − λ)H′(x). (64)
Proof
Assume x∗ > 0. Then S′(x∗) = 0 follows from the first order condition (61) for social
welfare.
For one direction, assume x = x∗. This implies A′(x) = 0 and S′(x) = 0 (due
to first order conditions (60), (61) respectively). Equation (63) then implies V ′(x) = 0.
Condition (64) immediately follows from the definition of V in equation (59).
For the other direction, assume x satisfies condition (64). The actor’s first order
condition (60) implies A′(x) ≤ 0. There are two possibilities:
1. Suppose A′(x) = 0. Then equation (63) and condition (64) imply S′(x) = A′(x)+
V ′(x) = 0. The first order condition (61) for social welfare is satisfied. The strict
concavity of S thus implies the uniqueness of its optimizer, x = x∗.
2. Suppose, for a contradiction, A′(x) < 0. Then x = 0, and equation (63) and
condition (64) imply S′(0) = A′(0) +V ′(0) < 0. But x∗ > 0 and 0 = S′(x∗) > S′(0),
a contradiction to S′′ < 0 (the strict concavity of S). 
The left-hand side of condition (64) sums the marginal positive externalities that
the actor generates, while the right-hand side sums the marginal negative externalities.
Proposition 11 proves that the actor has socially optimal incentives if positive and negative
externalities are aligned at the margin— that is, net externalities are optimized. Moreover,
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assuming the socially optimal action is positive, Proposition 11 proves that optimization
of net externalities is also a necessary condition for social optimality. Thus, in this Model,
condition (64) captures all allocation rules that generate socially optimal incentives.
Proposition 11 generalizes the externalities-internalization approach to inducing social
optimality in the presence of externalities. In the present Model, complete internalization
of externalities occurs under the triple (δ, γ, λ) = (0, 0, 1); in other words, the gain- and
cost-allocation rules allow the actor to keep all of her gain and cost, while the harm-
allocation rule shifts to her all the harm that she imposes on the victim. As it is well
understood (see section 5.1), this triple of allocation rules equates the actor’s utility with
social welfare (I = S), leading to social optimality in her choice of action (x = x∗).
Proposition 11 explains this triple of allocation rules as a special case of a significantly
more general condition of (net) externalities optimization: Because this triple induces zero
net externalities (V = 0), the actor’s chosen action trivially optimizes net externalities.
Proposition 11 usually reveals uncountably many triples of gain-, cost- and harm-
allocation rules that induce the socially optimal action. Many such triples do not com-
pletely internalize externalities. The remainder of this subsection will describe some of
these optimal triples.
Corollary 27 (Optimal restitution of net gain). Suppose the socially optimal action is
positive (x∗ > 0). The actor’s chosen action x is socially optimal if the law shares some
proportion of the actor’s net gain with the victim and shares the complementary proportion
of the victim’s harm with the actor.
Formally, x = x∗ > 0 if
δ = γ = 1 − λ < 1. (65)
Proof
Assume x∗ > 0. The triple described by condition (65) gives the actor the following
utility:
A(x) = λG(x) − λC(x) − λH(x) = λS(x),
which implies she chooses x defined by A′(x) = λS′(x) = 0. Then λ > 0 implies
S′(x) = 0, which satisfies the first order condition (61) for social welfare. The strict
concavity of S implies the uniqueness of its optimizer, x = x∗. 
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Corollary 27 reveals that restitution of (a proportion of) net gain — the law shifts
to the victim the same proportion of the actor’s private gain and cost, δ = γ < 1 —
may induce social optimality without complete internalization of externalities.125 Social
optimality arises if the actor also bears the complementary proportion of the victim’s
harm, λ = 1− δ. Intuitively, the law gives the actor a utility function that is proportionate
to the social welfare function, A = λS; the law also gives rise to a net externalities function
that is proportionate to the social welfare function, V = (1 − λ)S. Then the actor acts
to induce zero marginal utility if and only her action also induces zero marginal social
welfare and zero marginal (net) externalities:
A′(x) = 0 ⇔ S′(x) = 0 ⇔ V ′(x) = 0.
In other words, the law shares social welfare between the actor and the victim in a
proportionate way, and any such sharing incentivizes the actor to take the socially optimal
action.
Moreover, even restitution of gross gainmay induce social optimality. Before Corollary
28 states the general result, Example 5 illustrates the conditions under which restitution
of gross gain may be socially optimal.
Example 5. Suppose the wrongful action x generates gainG(x) = 4√x and costC(x) = x
to the actor and harm H(x) = x to the victim. A substitution exercise using the first order
condition (61) for social welfare reveals that the socially optimal action is x∗ = 1.126
Let the actor bear all of her private cost (γ = 0).127 The pair of gain- and harm-
allocation rules (δ, λ) = (0.25, 0.5) is one of the many pairs that induce the actor to
choose x = x∗ = 1. Under this pair, the choice x = 1 satisfies her first order condition
(60), that is, A′(1) = 0.75G′(1) − 0.5H′(1) − C′(1) = 0.75 × 2 × 1−0.5 − 0.5 × 1 − 1 = 0.
Notice that the pair (δ, λ) = (0.25, 0.5) does not internalize all externalities; when x = 1,
net externalities sum to V(1) = 0.25G(1) − 0.5H(1) = 0.5. This is the optimized value of
V because V ′(1) = 0.25G′(1) − 0.5′H(1) = 0.25 × 2 × 1−0.5 − 0.5 = 0.
Figure 8 depicts the social welfare function S (the black dotted line), the actor’s utility
function A (the green solid line) and the net externalities function V (the red solid line)
under the pair (δ, λ) = (0.25, 0.5). As Figure 8 reveals, the actor’s choice x = 1 satisfies
125Corollary 27 follows the same intuition as those underlying the socially optimal rules that Polinsky and
Rubinfeld (2003) and Huang (2016) proposed. See subsection 5.1.2 for a discussion of their proposals.
126More precisely, S′(x) = G′(x) − C ′(x) − H ′(x) = 2x−0.5 − 1 − 1, and S′(x∗) = 0 implies x∗ = 1.
127See footnote 141 for a U.S. case recognizing that a securities law violator typically cannot offset her
restitutionary liability with her private cost.
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Figure 8: The implications of two pairs of gain- and harm-allocation rules in Example 5,
where the actor bears all of her private cost (γ = 0).
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Figure 9: Optimal pairs of gain- and harm-allocation rules for Example 5, where the actor
bears her private cost (γ = 0).
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the first order conditions of S, A and V .
Pairs of gain- and harm-allocation rules that fail to optimize net externalities leads
to a suboptimal action. One such suboptimal pair is (δ, λ) = (0.25, 0). Under this pair,
the actor’s first order condition (60) leads to the choice x = 2.25,128 which well exceeds
the socially optimal action x∗ = 1. The action x = 2.25 also fails to optimize net
externalities. Under the pair (δ, λ) = (0.25, 0), the net-externalities function is V(x) =
0.25G(x) − H(x) = √x − x, the optimizer of which is 0.25 rather than 2.25.
Figure 8 also depicts the actor’s utility function A (the green dashed line) and the net
externalities functionV (the red dashed line) under the pair (δ, λ) = (0.25, 0). In this case,
the actor’s choice x = 2.25 optimizes A, but it does not optimize S or V .
The blue solid line in Figure 9 depicts the set of pairs of gain- and harm-allocation
rules that induce the socially optimal action.129 This set contains the externalities-
internalization pair (δ, λ) = (0, 1), the pair (δ, λ) = (0.25, 0.5) and uncountably many
other pairs.
Figure 8 also suggests that, when the actor fails to bear all private cost and all social
harm (λ < 1 or γ > 0), it is socially optimality to have an intermediate gain-allocation
rule, δ ∈ (0, 1). Under such an intermediate gain-allocation rule, both the actor and the
victim receive a positive proportion of the wrongful gain. Corollary 28 formalizes this
observation.130
Corollary 28 (Optimal restitution). Suppose the actor’s chosen action is positive and
socially optimal (x = x∗ > 0). Then:
1. The gain-allocation rule takes an intermediate form (δ ∈ (0, 1)) if and only if the
cost- and harm-allocation rules fail to hold the actor liable for all of her private
cost and all of the social harm (γ > 0 or λ < 1).
In particular, if the actor bears all of her private cost and none of the social harm
(γ = λ = 0), then the gain-allocation rule takes the following intermediate form:
δ =
H′(x)
G′(x) = 1 −
C′(x)
G′(x) =
H′(x)
H′(x) + C′(x) . (66)
128More precisely, A′(x) = 0.75G′(x) − C ′(x) = 1.5x−0.5 − 1 = 0, and A′(x) = 0 implies x = 2.25.
129Formally, this optimal set is {(δ, λ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]|λ = 1 − 2δ}.
130Subsection 5.3.3 will consider the critical role of information costs.
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2. The gain-allocation rule allows the actor to keep all of her private gain (δ = 0) if
and only if the cost- and harm-allocation rules hold her liable for all of her private
cost and all of the social harm (γ = 0 and λ = 1).
Proof
Assume x = x∗ > 0. Then S′(x) = 0 due to condition (61), and Proposition 11
implies x is induced by a triple of rules (δ, γ, λ) that satisfies condition (64). These imply
δG′(x) − γC′(x) − (1 − λ)H′(x) = 0 = G′(x) − H′(x) − C′(x),
a rearrangement of which gives gives
δ =
G′(x) − (1 − γ)C′(x) − λH′(x)
G′(x) .
For one direction, consider two cases:
1. Suppose λ < 1 or γ > 0. Then S′(x) = 0, C′ > 0, H′ > 0, λ ≥ 0 and γ ≤ 1 imply
0 = G′(x) − C′(x) − H′(x) < G′(x) − (1 − γ)C′(x) − λH′(x) < G′(x). Then
δ ∈ (0, 1).
Condition (66) follows from assuming λ = γ = 0 and using S′(x) = 0.
2. Suppose λ = 1 and γ = 0. Then condition (64) implies δ = 0.
For the other direction, suppose δ ∈ (0, 1) (respectively, δ = 0) and, for a contradiction,
λ = 1 and γ = 0 (respectively, λ < 1 or γ > 0). Then case 2 (respectively, case 1) above
leads to a contradiction. 
The intuition underlying part 1 of Corollary 28 is most apparent in a simple scenario
in which the actor retains all of her private cost (γ = 0) and does not bear any of the
social harm (λ = 0). If the gain-allocation rule allows her to keep all of her gain (δ = 0),
then she has perverse incentives to over-act without regard to the resulting harm. By
comparison, if the gain-allocation rule disgorges all of her gain (δ = 1), then she has no
incentives to take positive action. Thus, to incentivize her to take a positive action that is
socially optimal (x = x∗ > 0), the gain-allocation rule has to give her an expectation of
receiving some, but not all, of the wrongful gain. The same intuition explains the social
optimality of intermediate restitution when the actor bears some, but not all, of the social
harm (λ ∈ (0, 1)).
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However, if the cost- and harm-allocation rules hold the actor liable for all of her private
cost (γ = 0) and social harm (λ = 1), then part 2 of Corollary 28 reveals that the gain-
allocation rule must allow her to keep all of her private gain (δ = 0) in order to incentivize
a positive, socially optimal action. This result is the externalities-internalization theory;
the triple (δ, γ, λ) = (0, 0, 1) removes all externalities. Thus social optimality requires the
imposition of restitutionary liability only in cases where complete compensation of the
social harm is unattainable; as soon as the law can shift all wrongful harm to the actor,
social optimality stops requiring any disgorgement of her private gain.
Corollary 28 does not cover cases in which the socially optimal action is zero, x∗ = 0.
In these cases, any onerous liability that disincentivizes the actor from acting positively
would be socially optimal. As subsection 5.3.2 will elaborate, this intuition explains the
scope and limitations of externalities optimization more generally.
5.3.2 When Social Optimality Requires No Action
Suppose the socially optimal action is zero, x∗ = 0. Optimization of net externalities
remains a sufficient condition for social optimality, but is no longer a necessary condition.
Proposition 12 formally states this result.
Proposition 12. Suppose the socially optimal action is zero, x∗ = 0. Then the actor’s
chosen action x is socially optimal if the gain-, cost- and harm-allocation rules optimize
net externalities.
Formally, suppose x∗ = 0. Then x = x∗ if x defined by condition (60) satisfies
δG′(x) ≤ γC′(x) + (1 − λ)H′(x). (67)
Proof
Assume x∗ = 0 and condition (67) holds. Suppose, for a contradiction, that the actor’s
choice x > 0. Then her first order condition (60) holds with equality, A′(x) = 0, implying
S′(x) = V ′(x) ≤ 0,
where the (first) equality follows from equation (63), and the (last) weak inequality follows
from condition (67). Hence x optimizes the social welfare function S due to the satisfac-
tion of its first order condition (61). But the strict concavity of S implies the uniqueness
of its optimizer 0 = x∗ = x, a contradiction. 
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In cases where the socially optimal action is zero, Proposition 12 confirms that the
actor continues to have socially optimal incentives when net externalities are optimized.
However, in these cases, optimization of net externalities is not the only approach to achieve
social optimality; any triple of gain-, cost- and harm-allocation rules that discourages the
actor from taking positive action is socially optimal. Example 6 illustrates this point.
Example 6. Suppose the wrongful action x generates gain G(x) = ln (x + 1) and cost
C(x) = x to the actor, and harm H(x) = x to the victim. Consider a triple of gain-,
cost- and harm-allocation rules (δ, γ, λ) = (1, 0, 0.5). Under this triple, the social welfare
function S, actor’s utility function A, the net externalities function V and their respective
derivatives are
S(x) = ln (x + 1) − 2x, A(x) = −1.5x, V(x) = ln (x + 1) − 0.5x,
S′(x) = (x + 1)−1 − 2, A′(x) = −1.5, V ′(x) = (x + 1)−1 − 0.5.
An application of the first order conditions (60), (61) reveals the actor chooses the
socially optimal action, x∗ = x = 0. However, x = 0 violates the first order condition
(67) for V(x).
From now on, refer to conditions (64) and (67) (in Propositions 11, 12 respectively)
collectively as the Externalities-Optimization Principle. This choice of terminology
reflects the finding that, regardless of whether the socially optimal action is positive
or zero, optimizing net externalities is sufficient for social optimality. Section 5.4 will
explore the extent to which the Externalities-Optimization Principle explains or supports
the American law of restitution for wrongs.
5.3.3 Information Costs
The preceding analysis does not consider administrative costs, in particular, information
costs to the court, the litigants and their lawyers. Consideration of information costs
offers guidance regarding which one of the triples of gain-, cost- and harm-allocation
rules should be implemented in a given class of cases.131 This subsection offers an
131Consideration of administrative costs other than information costs also may shed light on which triple(s)
of allocation rules should be implemented in a given class of cases. For instance, Kaplow and Shavell (1996),
Dari-Mattiacci (2005), and Shavell (2007a) (at pp. 79-83, 115-18, 131-32) have explored how error costs in
respect of the determination of tort liability or the assessment of compensatory damages affect incentives to
take precautions. To focus on analyzing information costs, this subsection ignores the other administrative
costs; hence the present arguments rise no higher than suggesting that differences in information costs affect,
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intuitive analysis to reveal that, even though many triples of allocation rules satisfy the
Externalities-Optimization Principle, they typically do not generate the same information
costs. The objective is to ascertain the different kinds of information that may be required
to implement various triples of allocation rules; how such information is obtained is
beyond the present scope. To this end, assume that any required information is available
at a cost, which cost may be prohibitively high. However, if such cost is incurred, then the
required information is obtained with certainty.
To consider the interesting cases first, assume the socially optimal activity level is
positive (x∗ > 0). This subsection will conclude with dropping that assumption.
Let a function L(δ, γ, λ) describe the actor’s liability under an arbitrary triple of gain-,
cost- and harm-allocation rules (δ, γ, λ):
L(δ, γ, λ) = δG(x) − γC(x) + λH(x), (68)
where the actor’s choice x depends on (δ, γ, λ) via her first order condition (60).
Equation (68) reveals what a judge (or a social planner) would need to know if she
were to set the actor’s liability L(δ, γ, λ) in order to generate socially optimal incentives.
Choosing a triple of allocation rules in accordance with the Externalities-Optimization
Principle is sufficient and necessary for social optimality (see Proposition 11) when x∗ > 0.
For instance, equation (68) reveals that, to implement the externalities-internalization triple
(δ, γ, λ) = (0, 0, 1), the judge would set L(0, 0, 1) = H(x). Hence, she would need to know
enough about the value H(x); thus the information costs of ascertaining H(x) arise.
The judge would need different information if she were to implement an optimal
gain-allocation rule without shifting any of the victim’s harm to the actor and any of
the actor’s cost to the victim. Formally, the judge chooses a triple of allocation rules
(δ, γ, λ) = (δ∗, 0, 0) such that δ∗ satisfies condition (66) in Corollary 28, which is a special
case of the Externalities-Optimization Principle. Equation (68) reveals the judge would
set the actor’s liability to L(δ∗, 0, 0) = δ∗G(x). The actor’s utility-maximizing choice x
depends on δ∗, which is an intermediate value (see Corollary 28) that potentially depends
on how functions G, H or C change at the margin when her action changes; how C, C or
H changes at the margin may be relevant because it may affect x through the actor’s first
rather than conclusively determine, which triple(s) of allocation rules should be applied to a given class of
cases. Alternatively, consideration of information costs would be paramount if one were to interpret the
present arguments as premised on an assumption that, when applied to the relevant class of cases, one triple
of allocation rules (δ1, γ1, λ1) generates greater information costs than another triple (δ2, γ2, λ2) does if and
only if the other administrative costs are no smaller under (δ1, γ1, λ1) than under (δ2, γ2, λ2).
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Allocation rules The actor’s liability Information required
(0, 0, 1) H(x) H(x)
(δ∗, 0, 0) δ∗G(x) G(x),
given δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) maybe G′(x), C′(x), H′(x)
(δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗) δ∗∗G(x) − γ∗∗C(x) H(x), C(x), G(x),
given δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) +λ∗∗H(x) maybe G′(x), C′(x), H′(x)
Table 1: The information costs of implementing three different triples of gain-, cost- and
harm-allocation rules that satisfy the Externalities-Optimization Principle.
order condition (60). In other words, the judge would need to know enough about G(x),
and she might need to know enough about G′(x), C′(x) or H′(x). Thus the information
costs of ascertaining these values arise.
Moreover, different information costs may arise if the judge were to choose a triple of
intermediate allocation rules, (δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗) with δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1), in accordance with
the Externalities-Optimization Principle. In this case, the judge would need to know the
values G(x), C(x) and H(x), and she might need to know how functions G, H or C
change at the margin.132 Thus implementing (δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗) gives rise to the information
costs of ascertaining these values.
As Table 1 summarizes, the externalities-internalization triple (0, 0, 1) typically im-
poses smaller information costs than the triple of intermediate allocation rules, (δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗);
both triples generate the information costs of ascertaining the valueH(x), but (δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗)
also generates the information costs of ascertaining G(x) and C(x), and potentially
G′(x), H′(x), C′(x). For similar reasons, the triple (δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗) may generate greater
information costs than the triple (δ∗, 0, 0) does. Moreover, whether information costs are
greater under (0, 0, 1) or (δ∗, 0, 0) depends on whether it is more costly to ascertain H(x);
orG(x) and, potentially,G′(x),C′(x) orH′(x).133 Thus themain advantage of choosing
the externalites-internalizing triple (0, 0, 1) over the other externalities-optimizing triples
is the avoidance of the information costs of ascertaining marginal changes in the gain,
harm or cost functions.
To conclude the present discussion of information costs, consider the possibility that it
is socially optimal to take zero action (x∗ = 0). Proposition 12 reveals that the court would
not need to induce social optimality by optimizing net externalities, if it already knew the
132To see that implementing (δ∗∗, γ∗∗, λ∗∗) may not require knowledge of G′(x), C ′(x) and H ′(x),
suppose the judge effectuates socially-optimal restitution of net gain in accordance with Corollary 27.
Condition (65) in Corollary 27 does not depend on these derivatives, and any triple of allocation rules that
satisfies this condition only generates the information costs of ascertaining G(x), C(x) and H(x).
133Notice that ascertaining the level of function H evaluated at x — that is, H(x) — is not the same
task as ascertaining the rate of change of H at x— that is, H ′(x).
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socially optimal action is zero. With that knowledge, the court to deter a positive action
could apply to the actor any triple of onerous allocation rules that typically generates small
information costs. For example, the court could apply δ = 1, γ = 0, and an arbitrary
λ. However, unless the case is obvious or complete internalization of externalities is
attainable (λ = 1), the court would need to consider marginal changes in the gain, cost and
harm functions in order to determine whether social optimality requires zero or positive
action in the first place (see equation (58) and condition 61). In other words, unless
the case is obvious or complete internalization is attainable, the court to ascertain what
social optimality requires would have already generated information costs that are similar
to those arising from implementing optimal intermediate liabilities. Thus the preceding
analysis of information costs continues to apply to cases where it is not obvious whether
social optimality requires zero or positive action.
5.4 Doctrinal Application: Restitution for Wrongs
This section offers an economic theory of restitution for wrongs in American law. At
the highest level of abstraction, the American law of restitution aims to reverse unjust
enrichment in accordance with the dictates of “equity and good conscience”.134 Judicial
discretion guided by these equitable standards typifies this area of law. To the extent of
their application to profitablewrongs, equitable standards inform and shape the finer rules
and standards governing restitutionary liability and remedy.135 The archetypal class of
wrongs attracting restitutionary liability consists of breaches of fiduciary duties or similar
duties arising in a relationship of trust and confidence. Liability for these wrongs typically
arises without regard to notice or fault on the part of the breaching actor.136 The victims
of these wrongs are often vulnerable persons (such as minors) or persons who are unable
to monitor the actor (see Sitkoff 2011). Conscious interference with rights to property is
another wrong that attracts restitutionary liability.137 Equitable standards further shape the
rules and standards governing defenses to restitutionary liability as well as the availability
and form of restitutionary remedy (see subsection 5.4.2). Remedies in restitution may take
the form of money judgment or rights in property. Depending on equitable considerations,
the actor may be liable to disgorge some or all of her wrongful gain, or compensate some
134Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §1 comments a, b (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
135Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §3 (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
136Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §§43, 51(4) (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
137Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §§40-42 (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
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or all of the victim’s harm.138
This section will argue that the Externalities-Optimization Principle explains three
distinguishing characteristics of the law governing restitution for wrongs: Equitable stan-
dards; comparison of inequitable conducts; and the gap-filling role of restitution. I will
also argue in favor of a strong restitutionary liability in cases where social optimality
obviously requires no action.
Two preliminary observations must bemade. First, claims for restitution typically arise
in cases where compensatory damages do not (or cannot) remedy all wrongful harm.139
The Model captures these cases by the specification that the harm-allocation rule fails
to shift all wrongful harm to the actor, λ < 1. The remainder of this section, except
subsection 5.4.3, will adopt this specification.
Second, the present economic theory relies upon an ex-ante notion of social welfare:
The social welfare arising from the wrongful action according to the actor’s expectation
at the time of so acting (see function S defined by equation (58)). This social welfare
criterion may appear incompatible with the dictates of “equity” and “conscience” — the
standards that underlie the law of restitution. However, such apparent incompatibility
does not devalue the present economic theory as a functional theory of the law. Moreover,
subsection 5.4.1 will argue the social welfare criterion is largely consistent with equitable
standards.
5.4.1 Equitable Standards and Discretion
Standards in terms of “equity” and “conscience” guide the operation of the law governing
restitution for wrongs, in particular, the exercise of judicial discretion to award, modify
or withhold remedies. These equitable standards impose little restriction on the facts and
circumstances that the court may consider.140 This subsection argues in favor of interpret-
ing and applying equitable standards in accordance with the Externalities-Optimization
Principle.
First, the plain meaning of equitable standards describes other-regarding behaviors,
especially those exhibiting inequality aversion and preferences for reciprocity fairness.
138Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §§51, 61 (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
139Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §4 comment e (Am. Law Inst. 2011). See
also Huang (2016) (at pp. 1624-28), proposing to disgorge a proportion of the wrongful gain when imperfect
public or private enforcement leads to incomplete compensation of the harm; Cooter and Porat (2015) (at p.
254), proposing to impose a negligence rule with limited disgorgement damages (described in footnote 113
of this paper) when these damages are easier to measure than, and greater than, traditional compensatory
damages.
140See, for example, Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 NYS 2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
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Other-regarding behaviors are well-documented in psychology and in behavioral eco-
nomics. Experiments consistently reveal behaviors that lead to much fairer outcomes than
the equilibrium predictions of models premised on pure self interest (see, for example, the
recent survey in Dhami 2016, ch. 5). Inequality aversion is one of the explanations for
these experimental results (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Fershtman, Hvide,
and Weiss 2003 and Chowdhury et al. 2018). Preferences for reciprocity fairness also
explain these results (see, for example, Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002). For the
reasons that follow, interpreting equitable standards as describing other-regarding behav-
iors connects these standards to the social welfare criterion.
Intuitively, the actions of an other-regarding actor are approximately socially optimal
because these actions account for some or all of the harm (or benefit) that she imposes on
others. To formalize this intuition using the notations of the Model, fix a positive constant
ψ > 0 and let a function O represent the preferences of an other-regarding actor:
O(x) = A(x) + ψV(x),
where, as in the Model, A is the utility of a purely self-regarding actor (see equation
(57)) and V(x) the victim’s utility (see equation (59)). The coefficient ψ captures the
extent to which the other-regarding actor values the victim’s outcome. As ψ approaches
1, the utility function O approaches the social welfare function S (see equation (62)); the
other-regarding actor’s choice of action thus approaches the socially optimal action, x∗
defined by condition (61). She chooses x∗ if ψ = 1, which means the actor values her own
outcome as much as the victim’s.
Thus, to the extent that equitable standards describe the behaviors of an other-regarding
actor, these standards demand a self-regarding actor to take other-regarding actions. Be-
cause these actions are approximately socially optimal, the social welfare criterion is a
good proxy for equitable standards. Conversely, equitable standards are a good proxy for
the social welfare criterion. The coefficient ψ reflects the judicial application of equitable
standards, as constrained by established doctrine and precedent; ψ is therefore a measure
of the extent to which equitable standards approximate the social welfare criterion. Then
the Externalities-Optimization Principle — which induces social optimalty according to
Propositions 11 and 12 — reflects and formalizes the demands of equitable standards.
Second, even if equitable standards do not describe the behaviors of an other-regarding
actor, their application ex postmay give rise to an expectation of intermediate restitutionary
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liability ex ante. To see this, suppose the discretionary application by judges of equitable
standards sometimes achieves complete restitution and sometimes results in no restitution.
Suppose further that the actor bears her private cost (γ = 0).141 Then, at the time choosing
her action, the actor expects intermediate restitution. In other words, the gain-allocation
rule (δ) in the Model may be interpreted as the probability of complete restitution. For
instance, under this interpretation, the triple (δ, 0, 0) where δ ∈ (0, 1) gives the actor an
expected restitutionary liability of L(δ, 0, 0) = δG(x); this triple captures the actor’s ex-
ante expectation regarding the ex-post exercise of judicial discretion to impose a complete
restitutionary liability or no liability. Similarly, under the triple (δ, 0, λ) where δ ∈ (0, 1)
and δ = 1 − λ, the actor expects a mixture of liabilities to disgorge and to compensate,
L(δ, 0, λ) = δG(x)+λH(x); this triple captures the actor’s ex-ante expectation regarding
the ex-post exercise of judicial discretion to award a complete restitutionary remedy or a
complete compensatory remedy. In the same vein, the triple (δ, 0, λ) where 0 < δ + λ < 1
captures the actor’s ex-ante expectation regarding the ex-post exercise of judicial discretion
to award a complete restitutionary remedy, a complete compensatory remedy, or no
remedy.
Moreover, as Huang (2016) (at pp. 1626-27) has discussed and Example 7 will
consider, there is Supreme Court authority for applying equitable standards to grant both
an intermediate restitutionary remedy and an intermediate compensatory remedy. An ex-
post imposition of such combined remedies clearly gives the actor an ex-ante expectation
of a similar combination.
Example 7. In Kansas v. Nebraska,142 Nebraska profited from a knowing breach of
Kansas’s water rights under a settlement agreement between them. Finding sufficient
flexibility in equitable standards, the Supreme Court upheld the simultaneous imposition
on Nebraska of an intermediate restitutionary liability to disgorge a small amount of
its wrongful gain, and an intermediate compensatory liability to pay damages for an
agreed amount of Kansas’s loss.143 As Huang (2016) has observed (at p. 1627), the
compensatory liability in this case is intermediate because it is referable to a conceded
amount of Kansas’s loss.
Because this case concerns a profitable breach of contract, I do not read it as holding
141 See, for example, S.E.C. v. Brown, 658 F.3d 858, 860-61 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing “the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority hold[s] that securities law violators may not offset their disgorgement liability with
business expenses.”) (internal citations omitted).
142135 S.Ct. 1042 (2015).
143Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S.Ct. 1042, 1051, 1053, 1058 (2015).
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that profitable wrongs may attract combined restitutionary and compensatory remedies.
This paper concerns profitable wrongs only (see section 5.1). There is nonetheless enough
obiter to suggest that equitable standards — whether applied to remedy breaches of
tortious or contractual duties — are sufficiently flexible to permit judicial imposition of
combined, intermediate restitutionary and compensatory remedies.
However, it is unrealistic to expect courts or legislatures to state rules with the math-
ematical precision of the Externalties-Optimization Principle (see especially condition
(64)). In cases where the socially optimal action is positive (x∗ > 0) and the actor does not
bear all of her private cost or social harm (γ > 0 or λ < 1), Corollary 28 reveals that to be
socially optimal, the gain-allocation rule must take an intermediate form. Subsection 5.3.3
reveals that even in the stylized Model, consideration of information costs complicates the
task of achieving optimal intermediate restitution.144 That task only becomes more in-
formationally demanding (and analytically difficult) in reality. Thus the high information
costs of promulgating rules ex ante may explain the adoption of equitable standards to gov-
ern liability in restitution.145 These standards incentivize approximately socially optimal
actions to the extent that their ex-post application gives the actor an ex-ante expectation
that her liability approximately reflects what the Externalties-Optimization Principle re-
quires. Hence the present arguments do not suggest that every application of equitable
standards ex post generates socially optimal incentives ex ante; I only argue that, in cases
where γ > 0 or λ < 1, incentives may be better optimized by equitable standards that
lead to an intermediate restitutionary remedy than by rules that only lead to an incomplete
compensatory remedy.
The preceding arguments on the basis of information costs also apply when it is not ob-
vious that social optimality requires zero action. Although the Externalities-Optimization
Principle only supplies a sufficient condition for social optimalty (see Proposition 12),
the information costs of ascertaining whether social optimality requires zero or positive
action still arise (see subsection 5.3.3). However, in cases where it is obviously socially
optimal to take zero action (x∗ = 0), there is no need to incur the information costs of
achieving intermediate restitution according to the Externalities-Optimization Principle.
144Considerations of information costs are critical to the present arguments. Otherwise, in a hypothetical
world where administrative costs (including information costs) are nil and the actor is risk neutral, Corollary
27 implies that the judge to achieve social optimality can just flip a coin to decide between allowing restitution
of net gain and allowing complete compensation; that is, δ = γ = 1− λ, where each multiplier is interpreted
as a probability.
145The disadvantages of adopting these standards instead of rules include high costs of compliance and of
adjudication. See Kaplow (1992).
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In these case, maximum deterrence via complete restitution of (gross) gain (δ = 1 and
γ = 0) is among the socially optimal liabilities; it deters the actor from acting positively.
Consideration of information costs thus suggests that there is no need to apply standards
to dilute the extent of restitution in expectation.
5.4.2 Competing Equities
The law governing restitution for wrongs has peculiar defenses and limiting principles. In
particular, the victim’s own inequitable conduct (“unconscionability” or “unclean hands”)
limits her restitutionary remedy or removes the actor’s restitutionary liability.146 Thus a
claim in restitution is subject to an analysis of competing equities: A comparison of the
actor’s inequitable conduct and the victim’s. Example 8 illustrates the competing-equities
analysis.147
Example 8. In Salomon Smith Barney Inc. v. Vockel,148 a brokerage firm (the victim)
sued a former employee (the actor) for acting upon a solicitation by her new employer to
pass on some confidential information of the victim-firm. In the past, the victim-firm had
obtained confidential information by soliciting employees of other firms. The court denied
the victim-firm’s present claim for equitable relief on the basis of “unclean hands”. It the
court’s own words, “[the victim-firm] has not shown that it has come into this court with
clean hands. In fact, the opposite has been established. Accordingly, as a court sitting in
equity, we will not aid a wrongdoer.”149
TheExternalties-Optimization Principle explains and partially supports the competing-
equities analysis. Appendix A.5.4 reveals that the Principle continues to hold when the
victim takes actions that are similar to those that the actor takes in the present Model
(see section 5.2). Thus, in cases where social optimality may require positive action,
limiting restitution on the basis of competing equities allows for approximation of optimal
intermediate restitution (see Corollary 28). However, in cases where taking no action is
obviously socially optimal, there is no need to incur the information costs of achieving
optimal intermediate restitution. In these cases, maximum deterrence is socially optimal,
and consideration of information costs suggests that the extent of the actor’s liability in
restitution should not be limited on the basis of competing equities.
146Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §§63, 70 (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
147For more examples, see Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §63 illustrations
(Am. Law Inst. 2011).
148137 F. Supp.2d 599 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
149Salomon Smith Barney Inc. v. Vockel, 137 F. Supp.2d 599, 604 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
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5.4.3 The Gap-Filling Role of Restitution
This subsection concludes the present doctrinal analysis by addressing a controversy in the
law of restitution: Whether restitution should be available only if compensatory damages
do not or cannot remedy the wrongful harm. If this restriction applies, then restitution
is unavailable in cases where complete compensation is attainable, and may become
available only in cases of incomplete compensation. This restriction thus limits restitution
to a gap-filling role. American courts disagree on whether to impose this restriction.150
The Restatements generally take the position that, if the case permits both restitution and
compensation, then the claimant should be afforded great latitude to choose between these
remedies.151
The present economic theory generally contradicts the Restatements’ position. Ap-
pendix A.5.2 reveals that the Externalities-Optimization Principle continues to hold when
the victim has a choice between restitution and compensation. Thus the analysis of infor-
mation costs in subsection 5.3.3 continues to apply. Subsection 5.3.3 reveals that, within
the set of liabilities that satisfy the Externalities-Optimization Principle, the liability that
completely compensates the victim often imposes the least information costs. Because the
interests of a private claimant imperfectly align with the society’s interests (see Shavell
1997), her choice between disgorgement and compensation may not minimize informa-
tion costs for the society. Hence consideration of information costs suggests that complete
compensation should be preferred if it is attainable.
5.5 Conclusion
To achieve social optimality in the presence of externalities, this paper proposes a theory
of externalities optimization. The proposed theory generalizes the well-established theory
of externalities internalization in cases where complete internalization is attainable. The
proposed theory further achieves social optimality in cases where complete internalization
is unattainable. A modification of the standard tort model captures the law’s ability to
optimize externalities; instead of assuming either a liability to compensate for the wrongful
harm or a liability to disgorge the wrongful gain, section 5.2 constructs a model that
permits a mixture or combination of both liabilities. The model thus allows for flexibility
150See the survey in In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation, 851 F.Supp.2d 867, 914-918 (E.D.
Pa. 2012). See also Laycock (1990).
151Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §4 comment e (Am. Law Inst. 2011);
Restatement (Third) of Trusts §95 comment e (Am. Law Inst. 2012).
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in imposing different liabilities simultaneously to create positive externalities and reduce
negative externalities. As section 5.3 reveals, that flexibility permits the law to achieve
social optimality by optimizing (net) externalities. The appendices show that the theory
of externalities optimization continues to hold under various model modifications.
Section 5.4 applies the proposed externalities-optimization theory to explain the car-
dinal principles of the American law of restitution, focusing on its application to wrongful
actions that generate social harm. In particular, the underlying standards of “equity” and
“conscience” tend to limit the actor’s restitutionary liability to disgorge her wrongful gain.
Such a limited form of restitutionary liability may approximately meet the demands of
the externalities-optimization theory. Moreover, many courts tend to confine restitution to
cases where complete compensation is unattainable. This tendency reflects an intuitive ob-
servation that a liability that completely internalizes externalities often generates smaller
information costs than any other liability that optimizes externalities (see subsections
5.3.3, 5.4.3).
A limitation of this paper arises from the assumption that the actor and the victim do not
enter into a contract that governs the wrongful action. High transaction costs (Coase 1960)
or asymmetric information (Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983) may prevent such a contract.
Thus neither the present model nor its modifications in the appendices captures restitution
as a consequence of contract disaffirmance (see Brooks and Stremitzer 2011, 2012). Future
research may relax the no-contract assumption, and consider whether the externalities-
optimization theory extends to contractual scenarios. Relaxing that assumption also
may enable an economic analysis of the mechanisms for modifying fiduciary duties and
authorizing their breaches (see Conaglen 2011). Moreover, the present, ex-ante notion of
social welfare reflects the actor’s belief regarding the value of the victim’s harm at the
time of acting (see section 5.2); there is no opportunity for updating her belief. Contract
negotiation may reveal information regarding the victim’s own valuation of harm, and
introducing the opportunity to contract may enable an analysis of an ex-post notion of
social welfare that incorporates such new information.
Future research also may modify the present model to introduce multiple victims
with competing interests. This modification will capture bankruptcy cases, in which the
bankrupt actor’s limited-liability constraint forces the law to allocate among her victims
(as her creditors) the wrongful gain and harm arising from her actions.152 In these cases,
152To some extent, the model in section 5.2 captures the doctrine of equitable subordination in U.S.
bankruptcy law. That doctrine allows a court to subordinate the claims of a senior creditor (the actor) whose
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bankruptcy law may apply a priority rule to rank the victims’ respective claims, while the
law of restitution may limit the claims in restitution.153
actions harm a junior creditor (the victim). Breaches of fiduciary duties, or gross and egregious misconduct,
may lead to equitable subordination. See, for example, In Re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 436 B.R.
598 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010).
153Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §§56, 60, 61 (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
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A Appendices
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 2
This appendix contains all proofs for chapter 2.
Lemma 9 is a technical lemmawhich will be used to prove other Lemmas, Propositions
and Corollaries.
Lemma 9. On the subdomain R2++, the success function θ(·) satisfies the following prop-
erties:
1. µ > 0.5 (respectively, = 0.5, < 0.5) and eP = eD imply θ > 0.5 (= 0.5, < 0.5).
2. ∂∂eD (1 − θ) > 0, ∂
2
∂e2D
(1 − θ) ≤ 0.
3.
∂2
∂e2D
(
1−θ
1−λ(1−θ)
)
∂
∂eD
(
1−θ
1−λ(1−θ)
) < C′′(eD)
C′(eD) . (69)
4. k = λ = 1⇒ lims→+∞ 1 − θ < 1.
5.
∂s
∂eP
= − s
eP
,
∂s
∂eD
=
s
eD
,
∂θ
∂eP
= − sθs
eP
,
∂
∂eD
(1 − θ) = − sθs
eD
,
∂2θ
∂e2P
=
s2θss
e2P
+
2sθs
e2P
,
∂2
∂e2D
(1 − θ) = − s
2θss
e2D
,
∂2θ
∂eP∂eD
= − s(θs + sθss)
ePeD
.
6. θs < 0, θss ≥ 0.
7. sθss < −(k + 1)θs − 2λsθ
2
s
(1−λθ) .
8. sθss > (k − 1)θs + 2λsθ
2
s
[1−λ(1−θ)] .
9. −λ(2 − λ)sθs < k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)].
Proof of Lemma 9
Part 1
Let eP = eD = e1 for some arbitrary e1 > 0. First suppose µ = 0.5. Then use
Assumption 1 to obtain
θ(e1, e1; 0.5) = 1 − θ(e1, e1; 1 − 0.5) = 1 − θ(e1, e1; 0.5)
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which implies θ(e1, e1, µ) = 0.5. The results for µ > 0.5 and µ < 0.5 follow from
Assumption 3.
Parts 2-4
Fix µ and eP = e1 for some arbitrary e1 > 0. Then Assumption 1 implies 1 −
θ(e1, eD, µ) = θ(eD, e1; 1 − µ). Hence
∂
∂eD
(1 − θ(e1, eD; µ)) = ∂
∂eD
θ(eD, e1; 1 − µ) > 0
where the inequality follows from Assumption 4.
A similar approach establishes ∂2
∂e2D
(1 − θ(eP, eD; µ)) ≤ 0, condition (69), and part 4.
Part 5
The chain rule and some algebra will give
∂s
∂eP
=
∂
∂eP
(
eD
eP
)
= −eD
e2P
= − s
eP
∂s
∂eD
=
∂
∂eD
(
eD
eP
)
=
1
eP
=
s
eD
∂θ
∂eP
=
∂θ
∂s
∂s
∂eP
= −∂θ
∂s
s
eP
∂(1 − θ)
∂eD
= −∂θ
∂s
∂s
∂eD
= −∂θ
∂s
s
eD
∂2θ
∂e2P
=
∂
∂eP
(
∂θ
∂s
∂s
∂eP
)
=
∂2θ
∂s2
(
∂s
∂eP
)2
+
∂θ
∂s
∂2s
∂e2P
=
s2
e2P
∂2θ
∂s2
+
2s
e2P
∂θ
∂s
∂2(1 − θ)
∂e2D
= −∂
2θ
∂s2
1
e2P
= −∂
2θ
∂s2
s2
e2D
∂2θ
∂eP∂eD
=
∂
∂eD
(
−∂θ
∂s
eD
e2P
)
= −∂
2θ
∂s2
1
eP
eD
e2P
− ∂θ
∂s
1
e2P
= − s(θs + sθss)
ePeD
=
∂2θ
∂eD∂eP
,
where the last equality uses Young’s Theorem.
Part 6
The chain rule and the properties ∂θ/∂eP > 0, s/eP > 0 imply θs < 0. The expression
of ∂2
∂e2D
(1 − θ) in part 5 and the property ∂2
∂e2D
(1 − θ) ≤ 0 from part 2 imply θss ≥ 0.
Part 7
Apply Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions to obtain
C(eP) = ekPC(1), C′(eP) =
k
eP
C(eP) = kek−1P C(1), C′′(eP) = k(k − 1)ek−2P C(1).
Some algebra will reveal that condition (1) holds if and only if
(1 − λθ)∂2θ/∂e2P + 2λ(∂θ/∂eP)2
∂θ/∂eP <
(1 − λθ)(k − 1)
eP
.
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Then use part 5 to obtain
(1 − λθ)sθss + 2θs(1 − λθ) + 2λsθ2s
−θs < (1 − λθ)(k − 1)
⇔ sθss < −(k + 1)θs − 2λsθ
2
s
(1 − λθ) .
Part 8
Some algebra will reveal that condition (69) holds if and only if
−[1 − λ(1 − θ)]∂2θ/∂e2D + 2λ(∂θ/∂eD)2
−∂θ/∂eD <
[1 − λ(1 − θ)](k − 1)
eD
.
Then use part 5 to obtain
−[1 − λ(1 − θ)]sθss + 2λsθ2s
−θs < [1 − λ(1 − θ)](k − 1)
⇔ (k − 1)θs + 2λsθ
2
s
[1 − λ(1 − θ)] < sθss .
Part 9
Using θs < 0, some algebra will derive the result from parts 7 and 8. 
Proof of Lemma 1
This proof establishes the result for Plaintiff. Defendant’s result follows symmetric
steps. This proof takes the following steps: (i) establish that if Plaintiff’s FOC holds at a
pair of efforts, then her SOC is negative at that pair; (ii) using the results established in
step (i), a theorem by Diewert et al. (1981) proves that Plaintiff’s payoff function is strictly
quasiconcave in her own effort.
Step (i)
Take the partial derivatives of Plaintiff’s payoff function in (2) with respect to her effort
eP to obtain
∂uP
∂eP
=
∂θ
∂eP
[1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD)] − (1 − λθ)C′(eP) (70)
∂2uP
∂e2P
=
∂2θ
∂e2P
[1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD)] + 2λ ∂θ
∂eP
C′(eP) − (1 − λθ)C′′(eP). (71)
Suppose Plaintiff’s FOC holds, then some algebra using equation (70) reveals
1 + λC(eP) + λC(eD) = (1 − λθ)C
′(eP)
∂θ/∂eP .
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A substitution exercise using equation (71) gives
∂2uP
∂e2P
=
∂2θ
∂e2P
[ (1 − λθ)C′(eP)
∂θ/∂eP
]
+ 2λ
∂θ
∂eP
C′(eP) − (1 − λθ)C′′(eP)
= C′(eP)(1 − λθ)

(1 − λθ) ∂2θ
∂e2P
+ 2λ
(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθ) ∂θ∂eP
− C
′′(eP)
C′(eP)
 < 0
where the last inequality uses condition (1) in Assumption (5).
Step (ii)
Corollary 9.3 of Diewert et al. (1981) holds that a twice continuously differentiable
function f defined on an open S is strictly quasiconcave if and only if x0 ∈ S, vTv = 1 and
vT∇ f (x0)v = 0 implies vT∇2 f (x0)v < 0; or vT∇2 f (x0)v = 0 and g(t) ≡ f (x0 + tv) does
not attain a local minimum at t = 0. We apply their result.
Fix Defendant’s effort eD = e1 for some arbitrary e1 > 0, and consider Plaintiff’s
payoff function uP(·). Suppose eP > 0, vTv = 1 and
0 = vT∇uP(eP, e1; µ, λ, k)v = vT ∂
∂eP
uP(eP, e1; µ, λ, k)v.
That vTv = 1 implies v , 0. Hence
∂
∂eP
uP(eP, e1; µ, λ, k) = 0.
Then step (i) proves:
∂2
∂e2P
uP(eP, e1; µ, λ, k) < 0
where
∂2
∂e2P
uP(eP, e1; µ, λ, k) = ∇2uP(eP, e1; µ, λ, k).
That v , 0 implies vT∇2uP(eP, e1; µ, λ, k)v < 0. Hence an application of Corollary
9.3 of Diewert et al. (1981) proves Plaintiff’s payoff function is strictly quasiconcave in
her own effort. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Define a function h : R++ → R by:
h(s) = 1 − λθ − sk[1 − λ(1 − θ)]. (72)
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The first two steps of this proof establishes the existence of an s∗ such that h(s∗) = 0,
and its value relative to 0.5, in the following two cases: (i) µ = 0.5 or λ = 0; and (ii)
µ > 0.5 and λ > 0. (The case of µ < 0.5 and λ > 0 follows similar steps as case (ii).) The
third step establishes uniqueness.
Step (i)
Suppose µ = 0.5. Then part 1 of Lemma 9 implies that choosing s∗ = 1 induces
θ = 0.5 = 1 − θ. Hence h(1) = 0.
Now suppose λ = 0. Then choosing s∗ = 1 induces h(s∗) = 0.
Step (ii)
Suppose µ > 0.5 and λ > 0. Define a new function h1(s) by:
h1(s) = h(s)/sk = 1 − λθsk − [1 − λ(1 − θ)]. (73)
Part 1 of Lemma 9 implies that s = 1 induces θ(1; µ) > 0.5 > 1 − θ(1; µ). Some
algebra and the property λ > 0 give:
1 − λθ(1; µ) < 1 − λ(1 − θ(1; µ)) ⇔ h1(1) < 0.
Now, consider the limit of h1(s) as s approaches 0
lim
s→0
h1(s) = lim
s→0
(
1 − λθ
sk
− [1 − λ(1 − θ)]
)
= lim
s→0
(
1 − λθ
sk
)
− 1 + lim
s→0
[λ(1 − θ)].
Consider two scenarios:
1. Suppose lims→0(λθ) < 1. This implies lims→0 h1(s) = +∞ > 0.
2. Suppose lims→0(λθ) = 1. Then Assumption 6 implies k > 1. An application of the
L’Hospital’s Rule obtains:
lim
s→0
(
1 − λθ
sk
)
= lim
s→0
(
∂
∂s (1 − λθ)
∂
∂s (sk)
)
= lim
s→0
( −λθs
ksk−1
)
= +∞
where the last equality uses the properties k > 1, θs < 0 and θss ≥ 0. These results
imply lims→0 h1(s) = +∞ > 0.
Using the results h1(1) < 0 and lims→0 h1(s) > 0, the intermediate value theorem
implies that there exists some 0 < s∗ < 1 such that h1(s∗) = 0. Then use the definition of
h1(·) in equation (73) to obtain h(s∗) = 0.
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Step (iii)
The function h(·) is continuously differentiable. Differentiate it to obtain:
h′(s) = −λ(1 + sk)θs − ksk−1[1 − λ(1 − θ)] = − ks
k[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(1 + sk)sθs
s
.
Steps (i)-(ii) prove the existence of some s∗ > 0 that satisfies h(s∗) = 0. Choose one
such s∗ and consider s = s∗. Then some algebra gives
sk =
1 − λθ
1 − λ(1 − θ) (1 + s
k) = 2 − λ
1 − λ(1 − θ)
and a substitution exercise reveals
h′(s) = − k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs
s[1 − λ(1 − θ)] < 0
where the last inequality uses part 9 of Lemma 9. Hence h′(s) < 0 whenever h(s) = 0.
Now suppose, for a contradiction, that there exist two different s∗′ > s∗ > 0 satisfying:
h(s∗′) = h(s∗) = 0; and h(s′) , 0 for all s∗ < s′ < s∗′. Then that h′(s∗), h′(s∗) < 0 implies
for some very small  > 0, we have h(s∗+) < 0 and h(s∗′−) > 0. Then the intermediate
value theorem implies there exists some s′′ > 0 satisfying s∗ < s′′ < s∗′ and h(s′′) = 0, a
contradiction. Hence there exists at most one s∗ satisfying h(s∗) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1
This proof will first establish that the pair (e∗P, e∗D) satisfies both Plaintiff and Defen-
dants’ FOCs in system (4), thereby characterizing a Nash equilibrium. It will then prove
the other direction and uniqueness. An application of Lemma 2 gives the relative levels
of e∗P, e
∗
D, and an application of Corollary 3 the size of θ(e∗P, e∗D; µ) relative to 0.5.
Step (i)
Let s = s∗ and obtain, from the expression for e∗P:
e∗kP =
−θs
C(1)[ksk−1[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(1 + sk)θs] = −sθsC(1)[k(1 − λθ) + λs(1 + sk)θs]
where the last equality multiplies both the numerator and the denominator by s and uses
Lemma 2. Then more algebra reveals
−sθs
e∗P
= C(1)[k(1 − λθ) + λs(1 + sk)θs]e∗k−1P
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−sθs
e∗P
= C(1)(1 − λθ)ke∗k−1P + C(1)λs(1 + sk)θse∗k−1P
−sθs
e∗P
− C(1)λs(1 + sk)θse∗k−1P = C(1)(1 − λθ)ke∗k−1P
−sθs
e∗P
[
1 + λC(1)(1 + sk)e∗kP
]
= C(1)(1 − λθ)ke∗k−1P
−sθs
e∗P
[
1 + λC(1)e∗kP + λC(1)ske∗kP
]
= (1 − λθ)C(1)ke∗k−1P
∂θ
∂eP
[
1 + λC(e∗P) + λC(e∗D)
]
= (1 − λθ)C′(e∗P)
where the last equality uses the properties that C(·) is homogeneous of degree k, ske∗kP =
e∗kD , and
∂θ
∂eP
=
−sθs
eP
from Lemma 9. Hence the pair (e∗P, e∗D) satisfies Plaintiff’s FOC.
Now consider the expression for e∗D
e∗kD = s
ke∗kP =
−sk+1θs
C(1)[ksk[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λs(1 + sk)θs]
a rearrangement of which gives:
−sθs
e∗D
= C(1)[ksk[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λs(1 + sk)θs] e∗k−1Dsk
−sθs
e∗D
= [1 − λ(1 − θ)]C(1)ke∗k−1D + λC(1)s(1 + sk)θs
e∗k−1D
sk
−sθs
e∗D
− λC(1)s(1 + sk)θs
e∗k−1D
sk
= [1 − λ(1 − θ)]C(1)ke∗k−1D
−sθs
e∗D
[
1 + λC(1) (1 + s
k)e∗kD
sk
]
= [1 − λ(1 − θ)]C(1)ke∗k−1D
−sθs
e∗D
[
1 + λC(1)
(
e∗kD
sk
+ e∗kD
)]
= [1 − λ(1 − θ)]C(1)ke∗k−1D
∂(1 − θ)
∂eD
[
1 + λC(e∗P) + λC(e∗D)
]
= (1 − λθ)C′(e∗D)
where the last equality uses the properties that C(·) is homogeneous of degree k, ske∗kP =
e∗kD , and
∂(1−θ)
∂eD
=
−sθs
eD
from Lemma 9. Hence the pair (e∗P, e∗D) satisfies Defendant’s FOC.
Step (ii)
Suppose (e′P, e′D) ∈ R2++ is aNash equilibriumwith positive efforts. Denote s′ = e′D/e′P.
Some algebra reveals
e′kP =
(e′P + e′D)k
(1 + s′)k e
′k
D =
s′k(e′P + e′D)k
(1 + s′)k .
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Substituting these into Plaintiff and Defendant’s FOCs in system (4), some algebra
reveals:
−(1 + s)k sθs
C(1)[k(1 − λθ) + λs(1 + sk)θs]

s=s′
= (e′P + e′D)k
=
−(1 + s)k sθs
C(1)[ksk[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λs(1 + sk)θs]

s=s′
where the first equality (respectively, second equality) is derived from Plaintiff’s (Defen-
dant’s) FOC. Then some algebra using the equality of both sides will reveal that s = s′
induces 1−λθ = sk[1−λ(1− θ)]. Hence the uniqueness limb of Lemma 2 implies s′ = s∗.
Then some algebra using the definition of e∗P in Proposition 1 obtains:
(1 + s∗)e∗P =
[
−(1 + s)k sθs
C(1)[ksk[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λs(1 + sk)θs]
]1/k 
s=s∗=s′
= e′P + e
′
D
where the properties e′P + e
′
D = (1 + s′)e′P and s′ = s∗ imply e′P = e∗P. Similarly, use the
properties e′P + e
′
D = e
′
D(1 + s′)/s′ and s′ = s∗ to obtain e′D = e∗D. 
Lemmas 10 and 11 are technical lemmas on equilibrium properties, which will be used
to prove subsequent propositions and corollaries.
Lemma 10. Let (eP, eD) = (e∗P, e∗D), the nontrivial Nash equilibrium characterized by
Proposition 1. Let s = s∗ given by Lemma 2 and θ = θ∗ (Plaintiff’s equilibrium probability
of success). Denote C∗ = C(e∗P) + C(e∗D) and γ = s
k
(1+sk )2 . The following properties hold:
1.
λ(2θ − 1)
2 − λ =
1 − sk
1 + sk
(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] = (2 − λ)2γ.
2.
C∗ =
−(2 − λ)sθs
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs = −
[
λ +
(2 − λ)kγ
sθs
]−1
.
3.
dγ
dλ
=
kγ(1 − sk)
s(1 + sk)
ds
dλ
dγ
dµ
=
kγ(1 − sk)
s(1 + sk)
ds
dµ
dγ
dk
= − ln(s)s
k(1 − sk)
(1 + sk)3 .
Proof of Lemma 10
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Part 1
Using Lemma 2, some algebra will give these results.
Part 2
Apply Lemma 9 to system (4) to obtain:
− sθs
e∗P
[1 + λC∗] = k(1 − λθ)C(1)e∗k−1P , −
sθs
e∗D
[1 + λC∗] = k[1 − λ(1 − θ)]C(1)e∗k−1D .
Using the homogeneity of C(·) and Lemma 2, some algebra will give the result.
Part 3
some algebra reveals
dγ
dλ
=
ksk−1(1 − sk)
(1 + sk)3
ds
dλ
=
kγ(1 − sk)
s(1 + sk)
ds
dλ
.
Similarly for dγdµ and
dγ
dk . 
Lemma 11. Consider two cases that differ only in respect of Plaintiff’s prior probability of
success; it is µ in one case and µ′ = 1− µ in the other case. Suppose (e∗P, e∗D) (respectively,
(e∗′P , e∗
′
D)) is the nontrivial Nash equilibrium in the case characterized by µ (respectively,
µ′). Then Plaintiff’s equilibrium effort in one case equals to Defendant’s equilibrium effort
in the other case. Formally, e∗P = e
∗′
D and e
∗
D = e
∗′
P .
Proof of Lemma 11
To facilitate presentation and for the purpose of this proof only, let uP1 (respectively,
uP2) denote the partial derivative of Plaintiff’s payoff given by (2) with respect to its
first (second) argument, namely, Plaintiff’s effort (Defendant’s effort). Similarly, let uD1
(respectively, uD2) denote the partial derivative of Defendant’s payoff given by (3) with
respect to its first (second) argument, namely, Plaintiff’s effort (Defendant’s effort).
In respect of the case characterized by µ, fix arbitrary real numbers e1, e2 > 0 and
consider generic efforts eP, eD taken by Plaintiff and Defendant respectively. Some algebra
using Assumption 1 reveals

uP(eP, e2; µ, λ, k) = uD(e2, eP; µ′, λ, k) + 1
uD(e1, eD; µ, λ, k) = uP(eD, e1; µ′, λ, k) − 1,
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which implies

uP1(eP, e2; µ, λ, k) = uD2(e2, eP; µ′, λ, k)
uD2(e1, eD; µ, λ, k) = uP1(eD, e1; µ′, λ, k).
(74)
That the pair of positive real numbers (e∗P, e∗D) is the nontrivial Nash equilibrium in the
case characterized by µ is equivalent to

uP1(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k) = 0
uD2(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k) = 0.
(75)
Then by choosing real numbers e1 = e∗P, e2 = e
∗
D in system (74), a substitution exercise
using systems (74) and (75) reveals

uP1(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k) = uD2(e∗D, e∗P; µ′, λ, k) = 0
uD2(e∗P, e∗D; µ, λ, k) = uP1(e∗D, e∗P; µ′, λ, k) = 0.
Hence the pair of positive real numbers (e∗D, e∗P) is the nontrivial Nash equilibrium in
the case characterized by µ′. Then the uniqueness limb of Proposition 1 implies e∗P = e
∗′
D
and e∗D = e
∗′
P , where (e∗
′
P , e
∗′
D) is the nontrivial Nash equilibrium in the case characterized
by µ′. 
Proof of Corollary 1
This proof establishes that Θ({λ¯}, {k}) ⊂ Θ([0, λ¯], {k,+∞)); that is, if the success
function θ satisfies Assumptions 1-6 for a cost function of homogeneous of degree k and
the cost-shifting rule λ¯, then θ also satisfies Assumptions 1-6 for any arbitrary pair of
cost-shifting rule λ ≤ λ¯ and cost function k ≥ k. Then an application of Proposition 1 to
the pair λ, k gives the result.
Suppose the success function θ ∈ Θ({λ¯}, {k}) and choose an arbitrary pair of λ, k
satisfying λ ≤ λ¯ and k ≥ k. Let C(·) denote the homogeneous cost function characterized
by k. Satisfaction of Assumptions 1-4 does not depend on the values of λ, k. Assumption
6 is either satisfied if λ = λ¯ = k = k = 1, or not applicable otherwise. It remains to check
that θ satisfies Assumption 5 for the pair λ, k.
Some algebra using the property that θ satisfies Assumption 5 under the pair λ¯, k
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reveals
C′′(eP)
C′(eP) >
∂2
∂e2P
(
θ
1−λ¯θ
)
∂
∂eP
(
θ
1−λ¯θ
) = (1 − λ¯θ) ∂2θ∂e2P + 2λ¯
(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
∂θ
∂eP
≥
(1 − λθ) ∂2θ
∂e2P
+ 2λ
(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
∂θ
∂eP
where the last weak inequality uses the properties λ ≤ λ¯, 1− λ¯θ ≤ 1−λθ and Assumption
4. Then the result that θ satisfies Assumption 5 under (λ, k) follows from some algebra
revealing
∂2
∂e2P
(
θ
1−λθ
)
∂
∂eP
(
θ
1−λθ
) = (1 − λθ) ∂2θ∂e2P + 2λ
(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
∂θ
∂eP
C′′(eP)
C′(eP) ≤
C′′(eP)
C′(eP) .
The choice of λ, k was arbitrary; hence θ satisfies Assumptions 1-6 for any pair of
cost-shifting rule λ ≤ λ¯ and cost function k ≥ k. 
Proof of Corollary 2
This proof establishes the result for the case of µ > 0.5. Similar steps establish the
results for µ = 0.5 and µ < 0.5.
Let s = s∗ and θ = θ∗. Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 prove that in the nontrival Nash
equilibrium
sk =
1 − λθ
1 − λ(1 − θ) .
Take the total derivative of both sides with respect to λ
ksk−1
∂s
∂λ
=
(
−θ − λθs ∂s∂λ
)
[1 − λ(1 − θ)] −
(
−(1 − θ) + λθs ∂s∂λ
)
(1 − λθ)
[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2
ksk−1[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2 ∂s
∂λ
= − θ[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + (1 − θ)(1 − λθ)
− λ[1 − λ(1 − θ) + 1 − λθ]θs ∂s
∂λ
ksk[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2 ∂s
∂λ
=s(1 − 2θ) − λ(2 − λ)sθs ∂s
∂λ
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] ∂s
∂λ
=s(1 − 2θ) − λ(2 − λ)sθs ∂s
∂λ
where the last step uses Lemma 2. Then some algebra reveals
∂s
∂λ
=
s(1 − 2θ)
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs (76)
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where part 9 of Lemma 9 proves k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs > 0.
Now, take the total derivative of θ with respect to λ
dθ
dλ
= θs
ds
dλ
(77)
where Lemma 9 proves θs < 0.
Suppose µ > 0.5. Then Proposition 1 proves s ≤ 1. Part 1 of Lemma 9 and the
property θs < 0 together prove θ > 0.5. From equation (76), that θ > 0.5 implies ∂s∂λ < 0,
which is equivalent to ∂(1/s)∂λ > 0. Then equation (77) implies
dθ
dλ > 0. 
Proof of Corollary 3
In this proof, let s = s∗ and θ = θ∗. Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 prove that in the
nontrivial Nash equilibrium
sk =
1 − λθ
1 − λ(1 − θ) .
Differentiate both sides respect to µ
ksk−1
ds
dµ
=
−λ dθdµ[1 − λ(1 − θ)] − λ dθdµ(1 − λθ)
[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2 = −
λ(2 − λ)
[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2
dθ
dµ
where taking the total derivative of θ with respect to µ reveals
dθ
dµ
= θs
ds
dµ
+
∂θ
∂µ
. (78)
Then a substitution exercise reveals
ds
dµ
[
ksk−1 +
λ(2 − λ)θs
[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2
]
= − λ(2 − λ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2
∂θ
∂µ
ds
dµ
[
ksk[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2 + λ(2 − λ)sθs
s[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2
]
= − λ(2 − λ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)]2
∂θ
∂µ
ds
dµ
[k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs] = −λ(2 − λ)s ∂θ
∂µ
where the last step applies Lemma 2. Then some algebra reveals
ds
dµ
=
−λ(2 − λ)s ∂θ∂µ
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs (79)
where part 9 of Lemma 9 proves k(1−λθ)[1−λ(1− θ)]+λ(2−λ)sθs > 0 and Assumption
3 holds ∂θ∂µ > 0. Hence
ds
dµ ≤ 0, holding strictly if λ > 0. Then an application of the chain
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rule gives the results with respect to s∗.
Now, using equations (78) and (79), some algebra reveals
dθ
dµ
=
∂θ
∂µ
−
λ(2 − λ)sθs ∂θ∂µ
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs
=
∂θ
∂µ
(
1 − λ(2 − λ)sθs
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs
)
=
∂θ
∂µ
(
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)]
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs
)
(80)
which implies dθdµ > 0. Then an application of the chain rule gives the results with respect
to θ∗. 
Proof of Corollary 4
Consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium, where s = s∗ given by Lemma 2 and θ = θ∗.
Totally differentiate θ with respect to k to obtain
dθ
dk
= θs
ds
dk
where Lemma 9 proves θs < 0, and some algebra using equation (5) obtains:
k ln s = ln (1 − λθ) − ln (1 − λ(1 − θ))
d
dk
(k ln s) = d
dk
(ln (1 − λθ) − ln (1 − λ(1 − θ)))
ln s +
k
s
ds
dk
= − λθs
1 − λθ
ds
dk
− λθs
1 − λ(1 − θ)
ds
dk
ds
dk
=
− ln s
k
s +
λθs
1−λθ +
λθs
1−λ(1−θ)
ds
dk
=
−(1 − λθ)(1 − λ(1 − θ))s ln s
k(1 − λθ)(1 − λ(1 − θ)) + λ(2 − λ)θs
where part 9 of Lemma 9 proves the denominator in the right-hand side is positive.
There are three cases:
1. If λ = 0 or µ = 0.5, then Proposition 1 proves s = 1 for all k ≥ 1, implying
ln(s) = 0. Hence dsdk = 0, which implies dθdk = 0.
2. If λ > 0 and µ > 0.5, then Proposition 1 proves s < 1, implying ln(s) < 0. Then
ds
dk > 0. This and the property θs < 0 (from Lemma 9) imply
dθ
dk < 0.
3. If λ > 0 and µ < 0.5, then Proposition 1 proves s > 1, implying ln(s) > 0. Then
ds
dk < 0. This and θs < 0 imply
dθ
dk > 0. 
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Proof of Corollary 5
Corollary 1 proves the nontrivial Nash equilibrium exists for all λ ∈ [0, λ2]. Hence
Corollary 2 applies to all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] ⊂ [0, λ2].
Consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium, where θ = θ∗. Suppose µ > 0.5 (respec-
tively, µ < 0.5), then Proposition 1 and part 1 (respectively, part 3) of Corollary 2 prove
that θ∗ > 0.5 and dθ∗/dλ > 0 (respectively, θ∗ < 0.5 and dθ∗/dλ < 0). Hence that
λ2 > λ1 implies θ2 > θ1 > 0.5 (respectively, θ2 < θ1 < 0.5). 
Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof, let s = s∗ given by Lemma 2. This proof will first prove the case of
µ > 0.5, and then the case of µ < 0.5.
Case (i)
Suppose µ > 0.5. Then Proposition 1 proves that s∗ ≤ 1, holding strictly if λ > 0.
The property θs < 0 (from Lemma 9) implies θ(1, µ) ≤ θ(s∗, µ) = θ∗, where the weak
inequality holds strictly if λ > 0. Then use Assumption 7 to obtain:
θ∗ ≥ θ(1, µ) = µ
where the weak inequality holds strictly if λ > 0.
Case (ii)
Suppose µ < 0.5. Use Assumption 7 to obtain:
1 − µ = θ(1; 1 − µ) = 1 − θ(1; µ) (81)
where the last equality applies Assumption 1.
Now, Proposition 1 proves that s∗ ≥ 1, holding strictly if λ > 0. The property θs < 0
(from Lemma 9) implies 1 − θ(1, µ) ≤ 1 − θ(s∗, µ) = 1 − θ∗, where the weak inequality
holds strictly if λ > 0. Then use (81) to obtain
1 − θ∗ ≥ 1 − θ(1, µ) = 1 − µ
where the weak inequality holds strictly if λ > 0. 
Proof of Corollary 6
Corollary 1 proves the nontrivial Nash equilibrium exists for all λ ∈ [0, λ2]. Hence
Corollary 2 applies to all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] ⊂ [0, λ2]. Then use part 1 (respectively, part 2)
of Proposition 2 and part 1 (respectively, part 3) of Corollary 2 to obtain that µ > 0.5
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(respectively, µ < 0.5) implies θ2 > θ1 ≥ µ (respectively, µ ≥ θ1 > θ2). 
Proof of Proposition 3
Part 1
Suppose µ > 0.5 and consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium, where s = s∗ given
by Lemma 2 and θ = θ∗. Denote an auxiliary variable γ = sk(1+sk )2 . Lemma 10 proves
(1−λθ)[1−λ(1− θ)] = (2−λ)2γ. A substitution exercise using equation (80) in the proof
of Corollary 3 reveals
dθ
dµ
=
∂θ
∂µ
(
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)]
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs
)
=
∂θ
∂µ
(
k(2 − λ)γ
k(2 − λ)γ + λsθs
)
=
∂θ
∂µ
(
1 +
λsθs
k(2 − λ)γ
)−1
.
Denote θµ = ∂θ∂µ , θµµ =
∂2θ
∂µ2
and θsµ = ∂
2θ
∂s∂µ . Differentiate both sides of
dθ
dµ with respect
to µ to obtain
d2θ
dµ2
=
(
θµµ + θsµ
ds
dµ
) (
1 +
λsθs
k(2 − λ)γ
)−1
− θµ
(
1 +
λsθs
k(2 − λ)γ
)−2 
λ
(
θs
ds
dµ + sθss
ds
dµ + sθsµ
)
k(2 − λ)γ − λsθsk(2 − λ) dγdµ
k2(2 − λ)2γ2

=
(
θµµ + θsµ
ds
dµ
) (
k(2 − λ)γ
k(2 − λ)γ + λsθs
)
− θµ
(
k(2 − λ)γ
k(2 − λ)γ + λsθs
)2 
λ
(
θs
ds
dµ + sθss
ds
dµ + sθsµ
)
k(2 − λ)γ − λsθsk(2 − λ) dγdµ
k2(2 − λ)2γ2

=
(
θµµ + θsµ
ds
dµ
) (
k(2 − λ)γ
k(2 − λ)γ + λsθs
)
−
λθµ
[(
θs
ds
dµ + sθss
ds
dµ + sθsµ
)
k(2 − λ)γ − sθsk(2 − λ) dγdµ
]
[k(2 − λ)γ + λsθs]2 .
Denote an auxiliary variable X6 = k(2 − λ)γ. Then some algebra using equation (79)
in the proof of Corollary 3 gives
ds
dµ
= − λsθµ
X6 + λsθs
. (82)
A substitution exercise gives
(X6 + λsθs)2 d
2θ
dµ2
=
(
θµµ + θsµ
ds
dµ
)
X6(X6 + λsθs)
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− λθµ
[
X6sθsµ + X6(θs + sθss) dsdµ − sθsk(2 − λ)
dγ
dµ
]
=
(
θµµ −
λsθsµθµ
X6 + λsθs
)
X6(X6 + λsθs)
− λθµ
[
X6sθsµ −
X6(θs + sθss)λsθµ
X6 + λsθs
− sθsk
2(2 − λ)γ(1 − sk)
s(1 + sk)
ds
dµ
]
where the last step uses the property dγdµ =
kγ(1−sk )
s(1+sk )
ds
dµ from Lemma 10 and equation (82).
Hence
(X6 + λsθs)2 d
2θ
dµ2
=θµµX6(X6 + λsθs) − X6λsθµθsµ
− λθµ
[
X6sθsµ −
X6(θs + sθss)λsθµ
X6 + λsθs
+
X6k(1 − sk)θsλsθµ
(1 + sk)(X6 + λsθs)
]
(X6 + λsθs)2
X6
d2θ
dµ2
=θµµ(X6 + λsθs) − 2λsθµθsµ
+
λ2sθ2µ
X6 + λsθs
[
θs + sθss − k(1 − s
k)θs
(1 + sk)
]
(2 − λ)(X6 + λsθs)2
X6
d2θ
dµ2
=θµµ(k(2 − λ)2γ + λ(2 − λ)sθs) − 2λ(2 − λ)sθµθsµ
+
λ2(2 − λ)2sθ2µ
k(2 − λ)2γ + λ(2 − λ)sθs
[
θs + sθss − k(1 − s
k)θs
(1 + sk)
]
(83)
where the last step uses the definitions of γ and X6. Then using Lemmas 2 and 10, some
algebra reveals
(2 − λ)(X6 + λsθs)2 d2θdµ2
X6
=θµµ(k(1 − λθ)[1 − (1 − λ)θ] + λ(2 − λ)sθs) − 2λ(2 − λ)sθµθsµ
+
λ2(2 − λ)2sθ2µ
k(1 − λθ)[1 − (1 − λ)θ] + λ(2 − λ)sθs
{
sθss +
[
1 − kλ(2θ − 1)
2 − λ
]
θs
}
(84)
where X6 > 0 (due to the properties γ > 0 and 0 ≤ λ < 2), and some algebra using part 9
of Lemma 9 reveals
X6 + λsθs =
k(2 − λ)2γ + λ(2 − λ)sθs
2 − λ
=
k(1 − λθ)[1 − (1 − λ)θ] + λ(2 − λ)sθs
2 − λ > 0.
Suppose condition (9) holds. Then d2θdµ2 ≥ 0, holding strictly if condition (9) holds
strictly.
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Now suppose condition (10) holds. Then some algebra using equation (83) reveals
d2θ
dµ2 ≥ 0, holding strictly if condition (10) holds strictly.
Part 2
Suppose µ < 0.5, and let (e∗P, e∗D) denote the nontrivial Nash equilibrium given
Plaintiff’s prior probability of success is µ. Consider another case that differs only in
respect of Plaintiff’s prior probability of success, which is given by µ′ = 1− µ instead. Let
(e∗′P , e∗
′
D) denote the nontrivial Nash equilibrium if Plaintiff’s prior probability of success
is µ′. Then Lemma 11 proves e∗P = e
∗′
D , e
∗
D = e
∗′
P , and an application of Assumption 11
reveals
θ(e∗P, e∗D; µ) = 1 − θ(e∗
′
P , e
∗′
D; µ
′)
where given µ′ > 0.5, the proof for part 1 establishes θ(e∗′P , e∗
′
D; µ
′) is weakly convex in
the parameter representing Plaintiff’s prior probability of success. Hence an application
of the chain rule gives the result. 
Proof of Corollary 7
Corollary 1 proves the nontrivial Nash equilibrium exists for all λ ∈ [0, λ2]. Hence
Corollary 2 applies to all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] ⊂ [0, λ2].
Suppose µ > 0.5. That θ is weakly convex in µ (from part 1 of Proposition 3) and the
property θ ≤ 1 imply θ2 ≤ µ. Then use part 1 of Corollary 2 to obtain µ ≥ θ2 > θ1.
Now suppose µ < 0.5. That θ is weakly concave in µ (from part 2 of Proposition
3) and the property θ ≥ 0 imply θ2 ≥ µ. Then use part 3 of Corollary 2 to obtain
θ1 > θ2 ≥ µ. 
Proof of Corollary 8
In this proof, let s = s∗ given by Lemma 2. Part 2 of Lemma 10 reveals
C∗ = −
[
λ +
(2 − λ)kγ
sθs
]−1
.
Differentiate both sides of C∗ with respect to λ
dC∗
dλ
=
1 +
sθs
(
−kγ + (2 − λ)k dγdλ
)
− (2 − λ)kγ(θs + sθss) dsdλ
s2θ2s

(
λ +
(2 − λ)kγ
sθs
)−2
dC∗
dλ
=
[
s2θ2s +
(
−kγ + (2 − λ)k dγ
dλ
)
sθs − (θs + sθss)(2 − λ)kγ dsdλ
]
s−2θ−2s C
∗2
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s2θ2s
C∗2
dC∗
dλ
= s2θ2s +
(
−kγ + (2 − λ)k dγ
dλ
)
sθs − (θs + sθss)(2 − λ)kγ dsdλ
s2θ2s
C∗2
dC∗
dλ
= s2θ2s − kγsθs +
(2 − λ)(1 − sk)k2γθs
(1 + sk)
ds
dλ
− (θs + sθss)(2 − λ)kγ dsdλ
s2θ2s
C∗2
dC∗
dλ
= s2θ2s − kγsθs − kγ(2 − λ)
ds
dλ
(
θs + sθss − k(1 − s
k)θs
1 + sk
)
(85)
where the second last equality uses Lemma 10, and equation (76) in the proof of Corollary
2 reveals
∂s
∂λ
=
s(1 − 2θ)
k(1 − λθ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] + λ(2 − λ)sθs .
Then a substitution exercise using Lemma 10 and equation (85) gives the result. 
Proof of Corollary 9
To facilitate presentation, define a function g(µ, λ, k) by
g(µ, λ, k) = s2θ2s − kγsθs − kγ(2 − λ)
ds
dλ
(
θs + sθss − k(1 − s
k)θs
1 + sk
)
(86)
where s = s∗ given by Lemma 2. Using equation (85), some algebra reveals that condition
(13) is equivalent to g(µ, λ, k) > 0.
Corollary 1 proves the nontrivial Nash equilibrium exists for all λ ∈ [0, λ2]. Hence
Corollary 8 applies to all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] ⊂ [0, λ2]. This proof will establish that for an
arbitrary λ ∈ [λ1, λ2], g(µ, λ, k) > 0 in each of the following cases: (i) µ = 0.5; (ii)
0.5 < µ ≤ 0.5+σ(λ2, k); (iii) 0.5−σ(λ2, k) ≤ µ < 0.5. Than an application of Corollary
8 gives the result.
Case (i)
Suppose µ = 0.5 and consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium, where s = s∗ given by
Lemma 2 and θ = θ∗. Then Corollary 2 proves dsdλ = 0. Hence the property θs < 0 from
Lemma 9 implies g(µ, λ, k) > 0.
Case (ii)
Suppose 0.5 < µ ≤ 0.5+σ(λ2, k) and consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium, where
s = s∗ given by Lemma 2 and θ = θ∗. Use equation (76) from the proof of Corollary 2
and part 2 of Lemma 10 to obtain
−kγ(2 − λ) ∂s
∂λ
=
kγ(2 − λ)s(2θ − 1)
k(1 − λθ)(1 − λ(1 − θ)) + λ(2 − λ)sθs =
kγ(2 − λ)s(2θ − 1)
k(2 − λ)2γ + λ(2 − λ)sθs
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=
s(2θ − 1)[k(2 − λ)γ + λsθs − λsθs]
(2 − λ)[kγ(2 − λ) + λsθs] =
s(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
2 − λ .
Hence
g(µ, λ, k) = s2θ2s − kγsθs +
s(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ)
(
sθss +
(
1 − k(1 − s
k)
1 + sk
)
θs
)
=s2θ2s − kγsθs +
(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ)
(
1 − k(1 − s
k)
1 + sk
)
sθs +
(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ) s
2θss
where the properties θ > 0.5 (from Proposition 1) and sθss > (k − 1)θs + 2λsθ
2
s
[1−λ(1−θ)] (from
Lemma 9) imply
g(µ, λ, k) >s2θ2s − kγsθs +
(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ)
(
1 − k(1 − s
k)
1 + sk
)
sθs
+
(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ)
(
(k − 1)sθs + 2λs
2θ2s
[1 − λ(1 − θ)]
)
=s2θ2s − kγsθs +
2ksk(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ)(1 + sk) sθs
+
(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ)
(
2λs2θ2s
[1 − λ(1 − θ)]
)
.
Now, some algebra reveals
1 + λC∗ = 1 − λsθs
kγ(2 − λ) + λsθs =
kγ(2 − λ)
kγ(2 − λ) + λsθs
=
−sθskγ(2 − λ)
−sθs[kγ(2 − λ) + λsθs] =
kγ(2 − λ)C∗
−sθs .
Hence
g(µ, λ, k) >s2θ2s − kγsθs
+
2ksk(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ)(1 + sk) sθs +
(2θ − 1)kγ(2 − λ)C∗
−sθs(2 − λ)
(
2λs2θ2s
[1 − λ(1 − θ)]
)
=s2θ2s − kγsθs +
2ksk(2θ − 1)(1 + λC∗)
(2 − λ)(1 + sk) sθs −
2kγ(2θ − 1)λC∗
1 − λ(1 − θ) sθs
=s2θ2s − kγsθs +
2ksk(2θ − 1)
(2 − λ)(1 + sk) sθs
+ 2ksθsλC∗(2θ − 1)
[
sk
(2 − λ)(1 + sk) −
γ
1 − λ(1 − θ)
]
where some algebra using the property sk = 1−λθ1−λ(1−θ) from Lemma 2 and the definition of
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γ (that γ = sk/(1 + sk)2) reveals
sk
(2 − λ)(1 + sk) =
γ(1 + sk)
(2 − λ) =
γ(1 − λ(1 − θ) + 1 − λθ)
(2 − λ)[1 − λ(1 − θ)] =
γ
1 − λ(1 − θ) .
Hence
g(µ, λ, k) >s2θ2s − kγsθs +
2ksk(2θ − 1)
(2 − λ)(1 + sk) sθs = s
2θ2s − ksθs
[
γ − 2s
k(2θ − 1)
(2 − λ)(1 + sk)
]
=s2θ2s − ksθs
[
sk
(1 + sk)2 −
2sk(2θ − 1)
(2 − λ)(1 + sk)
]
= s2θ2s −
ksk+1θs
(1 + sk)
[
1
1 + sk
− 2(2θ − 1)
2 − λ
]
=s2θ2s −
ksk+1θs
(1 + sk)
[
1 − λ(1 − θ)
2 − λ −
2(2θ − 1)
2 − λ
]
= s2θ2s −
ksk+1θs[3 − λ − θ(4 − λ)]
(1 + sk)(2 − λ)
= − sθs
[
−sθs + ks
k[3 − λ − θ(4 − λ)]
(1 + sk)(2 − λ)
]
⇒ g(µ, λ, k) > − sθs
[
−sθs + k(1 − λθ)(2 − λ)2(4 − λ)
(
3 − λ
4 − λ − θ
)]
. (87)
Now, some algebra reveals
d
dλ
(
3 − λ
4 − λ − θ
)
= − 1(4 − λ)2 −
dθ
dλ
< 0
where the last inequality uses part 1 of Corollary 2 and the assumption µ > 0.5. Hence,
for all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2],
3 − λ
4 − λ − θ ≥
3 − λ2
4 − λ2 − θ |λ=λ2 ≥ 0
where the last inequality uses the definition of σ(λ2, k). Then the property θs < 0 from
Lemma 9 and inequality (87) imply g(µ, λ, k) > 0 for all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2].
Case (iii)
Suppose 0.5−σ ≤ µ < 0.5. Let (e∗P, e∗D) denote the nontrivial Nash equilibrium given
Plaintiff’s prior probability of success is µ. Consider another case that differs only in
respect of Plaintiff’s prior probability of success, which is given by µ′ = 1− µ instead. Let
(e∗′P , e∗
′
D) denote the nontrivial Nash equilibrium if Plaintiff’s prior probability of success
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is µ′. Then Lemma 11 proves e∗P = e
∗′
D , e
∗
D = e
∗′
P . Hence
C(e∗P) + C(e∗D) = C(e∗
′
P ) + C(e∗
′
D). (88)
Some algebra will reveal that the properties µ′ = 1 − µ and 0.5 − σ ≤ µ < 0.5 imply
0.5 < µ′ ≤ 0.5 + σ. Hence the proof for case (ii) establishes that the right hand side of
equation (88), being the litigation expenditure given Plaintiff’s prior probability of success
is µ′, is increasing with λ. Then the left hand hand side of equation (88), being the
litigation expenditure given Plaintiff’s prior probability of success is µ, is also increasing
with λ. 
Proof of Corollary 10
Corollary 1 proves the nontrivial Nash equilibrium exist for all λ ∈ [0, λ2]. Hence
Corollary 8 applies to all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] ⊂ [0, λ2].
Suppose the homogeneous cost function is of degree k ≥ 2 and consider the nontrivial
Nash equilibrium, where s = s∗ given by Lemma 2. Choose an arbitrary λ ∈ [λ1, λ2]. If
0.5 − σ(λ, k) ≤ µ ≤ 0.5 + σ(λ, k), then inequality (87) in the proof of Corollary 9 proves
the result. There are two remaining cases: µ > 0.5 + σ(λ, k); and µ < 0.5 − σ(λ, k). In
respect of the case of µ > 0.5+σ(λ, k), this will proof establish C∗2 > C∗1 by showing that
dC∗
dλ > 0 for λ ∈ [λ1, λ2]. Then the case of µ < 0.5 − σ(λ, k) follows from steps similar to
those for case (iii) in the proof of Corollary 9.
Suppose µ > 0.5 + σ(λ, k). If −(2 − λ)2sθs + k(1 − λθ)[3 − λ − θ(4 − λ)] ≥ 0, then
some algebra using inequality (87) in the proof of Corollary 9 gives the result. The rest of
this proof supposes −(2 − λ)2sθs + k(1 − λθ)[3 − λ − θ(4 − λ)] < 0; using Lemma 2, it is
equivalent to
sθs > kγ − 2k(2θ − 1)s
k
(2 − λ)(1 + sk) . (89)
Using equation (76) from the proof of Corollary 2 and part 2 of Lemma 10, some
algebra reveals
(2 − λ) ∂s
∂λ
=
(2 − λ)s(1 − 2θ)
k(2 − λ)2γ + λ(2 − λ)sθs =
s(1 − 2θ)
kγ(2 − λ) + λsθs .
Then substitute into the definition of g(µ, λ, k) (given by (86) in the proof of Corollary
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9) to obtain
g(µ, λ, k) =s2θ2s − kγsθs +
(
kγ(2θ − 1)
kγ(2 − λ) + λsθs
) (
sθs + s2θss − k(1 − s
k)sθs
1 + sk
)
.
Define an auxiliary variable X4 = kγ(2 − λ) + λsθs. Some algebra using the property
θs < 0 from Lemma 9 and inequality (89) reveals
X4g(µ, λ, k) =[s2θ2s − kγsθs][kγ(2−λ) + λsθs] + kγ(2θ−1)
(
sθs + s2θss − k(1 − s
k)sθs
1 + sk
)
≥(s2θ2s − kγsθs)
[
kγ(2 − λ) + λkγ − 2kλ(2θ − 1)s
k
(2 − λ)(1 + sk)
]
+ kγ(2θ − 1)
(
sθs + s2θss − k(1 − s
k)sθs
1 + sk
)
where the inequality holds strictly if λ > 0. Then some algebra using the properties
λ(2θ−1)/(2−λ) = (1− sk)/(1+ sk) (from Lemma 10) and γ = sk/(1+ sk)2 (the definition
of the auxiliary variable γ) reveals
X4g(µ, λ, k) ≥(s2θ2s − kγsθs)
[
2kγ − 2k(1 − s
k)sk
(1 + sk)2
]
+ kγ(2θ − 1)
(
sθs + s2θss − k(1 − s
k)sθs
1 + sk
)
=(s2θ2s − kγsθs)
[
2kγ − 2(1 − sk)kγ]
+ kγ(2θ − 1)
(
sθs + s2θss − k(1 − s
k)sθs
1 + sk
)
=2kγsk(s2θ2s − kγsθs) + kγ(2θ − 1)
(
sθs + s2θss − k(1 − s
k)sθs
1 + sk
)
⇔ X4g(µ, λ, k)
kγ
≥2sk+2θ2s −
2ks2k+1θs
(1 + sk)2 + (2θ − 1)
(
sθs + s2θss − k(1 − s
k)sθs
1 + sk
)
=2sk+2θ2s + (2θ − 1)s2θss
− sθs(1 + sk)2
[
2ks2k + (2θ − 1)(1 + sk)2
(
k(1 − sk)
1 + sk
− 1
)]
where some algebra reveals 1 = 2θ−1+2(1−θ). Then the property s > 0 from Proposition
1, and the properties θs < 0 and θss ≥ 0 from Lemma 9 imply
X4g(µ, λ, k)
kγ
> − sθs(1 + sk)2
[
4k(1 − θ)s2k + 2(2θ − 1)ks2k + (2θ − 1)(1 + sk)2
(
k(1 − sk)
1 + sk
− 1
)]
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= − sθs(1 + sk)2
{
4k(1 − θ)s2k + (2θ − 1)[2ks2k + k(1 − sk)(1 + sk) − (1 + sk)2]}
= − sθs(1 + sk)2
{
4k(1 − θ)s2k + (2θ − 1)
[
2ks2k + k
(
1 − s2k
)
− 1 − 2sk − s2k
]}
= − sθs(1 + sk)2
{
4k(1 − θ)s2k + (2θ − 1)[(k − 2)(1 + s2k) + (1 − sk)2]}.
Then the properties θs < 0 (from Lemma 9 ) and X4 > 0 (due to Lemma 10 and part
9 from Lemma 9) and kγ > 0, and the assumption k ≥ 2 imply g(µ, λ, k) > 0, which is
equivalent to dC∗dλ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Corollary 1 proves the nontrivial Nash equilibrium exist for all λ ∈ [0, λ2]. Hence
Corollary 8 applies to all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] ⊂ [0, λ2].
Choose an arbitrary λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] and consider the nontrivial Nash equilibrium, where
s = s∗ given by Lemma 2. If 0.5−σ(λ, k) ≤ µ ≤ 0.5+σ(λ, k), then inequality (87) in the
proof of Corollary 9 proves the result. If k ≥ 2, then Corollary 10 establishes the result.
There are two remaining cases: k < 2 and µ > 0.5+σ(λ, k); k < 2 and µ < 0.5−σ(λ, k).
In respect of the case of k < 2 and µ > 0.5 + σ(λ, k), this will proof establish C∗2 > C∗1
by showing that dC∗dλ > 0 for λ ∈ [λ1, λ2]. Then the case of k < 2 and µ < 0.5 − σ(λ, k)
follows from steps similar to those for case (iii) in the proof of Corollary 9.
Suppose k < 2 and µ > 0.5 + σ(λ, k). Suppose condition (15) holds. Then some
algebra using equation (85) in the proof of Corollary 8 proves the result.
Now suppose condition (14) holds. Then some algebra using Lemma 2 and equation
(85) gives the result. 
Proof of Lemma 3
This proof applies the principle of finite induction. The result clearly holds for the
base case θ = θ1. The rest of this proof assumes the result holds for all integer value
j ≤ n − 1, and proves that it holds for j = n. To facilitate presentation, define auxiliary
variables 0 ≤ a, a¯ ≤ 1 and a success function θI : R2+ → R by
a = p1 + p2+, ...,+pn−1 a¯ = 1 − a θI =
n−1∑
i
( pi
a
θi
)
where p1, p2, ..., pn−1 are weights assigned to θ1, θ2, ..., θn−1 respectively. The assumption
that the result holds for j = n − 1 implies θI ∈ Θ({λ}, {k}).
Assumption 1
Consider three arbitrary real numbers e1, e2 > 0 and 0 < µ0 < 1. The definition of θ
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and the property that θI, θn satisfy Assumption 1 imply
θ(e1, e2; µ0) =aθI(e1, e2; µ0) + a¯θn(e1, e2; µ0) = a[1 − θI(e2, e1; 1 − µ0)]
+ a¯[1 − θn(e2, e1; 1 − µ0)]
=1 − [aθI(e2, e1; 1 − µ0) + a¯θn(e2, e1; 1 − µ0)] = 1 − θ(e2, e1; 1 − µ0).
Assumption 2
For any x > 0, use the definition of θ and the property that θI, θn satisfy Assumption
2 to obtain
θ(xeP, xeD, µ) =aθI(xeP, xeD; µ) + a¯θn(xeP, xeD; µ)
=aθI(eP, eD; µ) + a¯θn(eP, eD; µ) = θ(eP, eD; µ).
Assumptions 3-4
Using the linearity of differentiation, some algebra will establish the result.
Assumption 5
Using the property that θI, θn satisfy condition (1), some algebra reveals
a
∂2θI
∂e2P
+ a
2λ
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI) < a
∂θI
∂eP
C′′(eP)
C′(eP) , a¯
∂2θn
∂e2P
+ a¯
2λ
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθn) < a¯
∂θn
∂eP
C′′(eP)
C′(eP) .
Summing these inequalities give
a
∂2θI
∂e2P
+ a¯
∂2θn
∂e2P
+ a
2λ
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI) + a¯
2λ
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθn) < a
∂θI
∂eP
C′′(eP)
C′(eP) + a¯
∂θn
∂eP
C′′(eP)
C′(eP)
⇔ ∂
2θ
∂e2P
+ a
2λ
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI) + a¯
2λ
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθn) <
∂θ
∂eP
C′′(eP)
C′(eP) (90)
where the last step uses the definition of θ and the linearity of differentiation.
Now, some algebra reveals
0 ≤ aa¯
[
∂θI
∂eP
(1 − λθn) − ∂θn
∂eP
(1 − λθI)
]2
⇔ 2aa¯ ∂θI
∂eP
∂θn
∂eP
(1 − λθI)(1 − λθn) ≤ aa¯
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθn)2 + aa¯
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI)2
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⇔ 2aa¯ ∂θI
∂eP
∂θn
∂eP
+ a2
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
+ a¯2
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
≤
aa¯
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2(1−λθn)2 + aa¯( ∂θn∂eP )2(1−λθI)2
(1 − λθI)(1 − λθn)
+ a2
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
+ a¯2
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
⇔
a2
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
+ 2aa¯ ∂θI∂eP
∂θn
∂eP
+ a¯2
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
a(1 − λθI) + a¯(1 − λθn) ≤
a(1 − λθn)
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
+ a¯(1 − λθI)
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI)(1 − λθn)
⇔
[
a ∂θI∂eP + a¯
∂θn
∂eP
]2
1 − λ(aθI + a¯θn) ≤
a(1 − λθn)
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
+ a¯(1 − λθI)
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI)(1 − λθn)
⇔
(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
1 − λθ ≤
a(1 − λθn)
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
+ a¯(1 − λθI)
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI)(1 − λθn)
where the last step uses the definition of θ and the linearity of differentiation. Hence(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
1 − λθ ≤
a(1 − λθn)
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
+ a¯(1 − λθI)
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI)(1 − λθn) = a
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
1 − λθI + a¯
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
1 − λθn
which implies
2λ
(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθ) ≤ a
2λ
(
∂θI
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθI) + a¯
2λ
(
∂θn
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθn) .
Then use inequality (90) to obtain
∂2θ
∂e2P
+
2λ
(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
(1 − λθ) <
∂θ
∂eP
C′′(eP)
C′(eP)
where some algebra will reveal that it implies θ satisfies condition (1).
Assumption 6
Suppose k = λ = 1. Use the definition of θ and the properties of limits to obtain
lim
s→0
θ = lim
s→0
(aθI + a¯θn) = a
(
lim
s→0
θI
)
+ a¯
(
lim
s→0
θn
)
< a + a¯ = 1
where the last inequality uses the property that θI, θn satisfy Assumption 6. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Part 1
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Suppose µ > 0.5. Using part 2 of Lemma 10, some algebra reveals
dC∗
dµ
=
{
sθs(2 − λ)k dγdµ − (2 − λ)kγ
[
(θs + sθss) dsdµ + sθsµ
]}
s−2θ−2s
[
λ +
(2 − λ)kγ
sθs
]−2
where Lemma 10 gives
dγ
dµ
=
kγ(1 − sk)
s(1 + sk)
ds
dµ
.
Then a substitution exercise reveals
[(2 − λ)kγ + λsθs]2 dC
∗
dµ
=
θs(2 − λ)k2γ(1 − sk)
(1 + sk)
ds
dµ
− (2 − λ)kγ
[
(θs + sθss) dsdµ + sθsµ
]
[(2 − λ)kγ + λsθs]2 dC∗dµ
(2 − λ)kγ =
k(1 − sk)θs
(1 + sk)
ds
dµ
− (θs + sθss) dsdµ − sθsµ
=
ds
dµ
[
k(1 − sk)θs
(1 + sk) − θs − sθss
]
− sθsµ
= − λsθµ
k(2 − λ)γ + λsθs
[
k(1 − sk)θs
(1 + sk) − θs − sθss
]
− sθsµ (91)
where the last step uses equation (82) in the proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose condition (16) holds. Then using the properties (2− λ)kγ + λsθs > 0 (due to
part 9 of Lemma (9) and γ > 0, equation (91) reveals dC∗dµ ≥ 0, holding strictly if condition
(16) holds strictly.
Now suppose condition (17) hold. Then using Lemma (10), some algebra will reveal
that dC∗dµ ≥ 0, holding strictly if condition (17) holds strictly.
Part 2
Suppose µ < 0.5. Let (e∗P, e∗D) denote the nontrivial Nash equilibrium given Plaintiff’s
prior probability of success is µ. Consider another case that differs only in respect of
Plaintiff’s prior probability of success, which is given by µ′ = 1 − µ instead. Let (e∗′P , e∗
′
D)
denote the nontrivial Nash equilibrium if Plaintiff’s prior probability of success is µ′. Then
Lemma 11 proves e∗P = e
∗′
D , e
∗
D = e
∗′
P . Hence
C(e∗P) + C(e∗D) = C(e∗
′
P ) + C(e∗
′
D)
where the proof for part 1 establishes that the right hand side is convex in Plaintiff’s prior
probability of success µ′. Then an application of the chain rule gives the result. 
Proof of Proposition 6
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Using equation (91) in the proof of Proposition 5, some algebra will give the result. 
A.2 Derivatives of Illustrative Success Functions for Chapter 2
This Appendix calculates the partial, second partial and cross derivatives for the illustrative
success functions θT in (6) and θL in (11).
The Tullock success function θT satisfies the following properties:
∂θT
∂eP
=
µ(1 − µ)eD
[µeP + (1 − µ)eD]2
∂2θT
∂e2P
=
−2µ2(1 − µ)eD
[µeP + (1 − µ)eD]3
∂θT
∂µ
=
s
[µ + (1 − µ)s]2
∂2θT
∂µ2
=
2(s − 1)s
[µ + (1 − µ)s]3
∂θT
∂s
=
−µ(1 − µ)
[µ + (1 − µ)s]2
∂2θT
∂s2
=
2µ(1 − µ)2
[µ + (1 − µ)s]3
∂2θT
∂µ∂s
=
µ − (1 − µ)s
[µ + (1 − µ)s]3
∂θT
∂s
+ s
∂2θT
∂s2
=
µ(1 − µ)[(1 − µ)s − µ]
[µ + (1 − µ)s]3 .
The linear success function θL satisfies the following properties:
∂θL
∂eP
=
(1 − η)eD
[eP + eD]2
∂2θL
∂e2P
=
−2(1 − η)eD
[eP + eD]3
∂θL
∂µ
= η
∂2θL
∂µ2
= 0
∂θL
∂s
=
−(1 − η)
(1 + s)2
∂2θL
∂s2
=
2(1 − η)
(1 + s)3
∂θL
∂µ∂s
= 0
∂θL
∂s
+ s
∂2θL
∂s2
=
(s − 1)(1 − η)
(1 + s)3 .
A.3 Proofs for Chapter 3
This appendix contains all proofs for chapter 3.
Proof of Lemma 4
This proof establishes the result for Plaintiff. Defendant’s result follows symmetric
steps. This proof takes the following steps: (i) establish that if Plaintiff’s FOC holds at a
pair of efforts, then her SOC is negative at that pair; (ii) using the results established in
step (i), a theorem by Diewert et al. (1981) proves that Plaintiff’s payoff function is strictly
quasiconcave in her own effort.
Step (i)
Take the partial derivatives of Plaintiff’s emotional payoff function in (24) with respect
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to her effort eP to obtain
∂u˘P
∂eP
=
∂θ
∂eP
(1 − ξ)[1 + υ + λ˘C(eP) + λ˘C(eD)] − [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]C′(eP) (92)
∂2u˘P
∂e2P
=
∂2θ
∂e2P
(1 − ξ)[1 + υ + λ˘C(eP) + λ˘C(eD)] + 2λ˘(1 − ξ) ∂θ
∂eP
C′(eP) (93)
− [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]C′′(eP).
Suppose Plaintiff’s FOC holds, then some algebra using equation (92) reveals
(1 − ξ)[1 + υ + λ˘C(eP) + λ˘C(eD)] = [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]C
′(eP)
∂θ/∂eP .
A substitution exercise using equation (93) gives
∂2u˘P
∂e2P
=
∂2θ
∂e2P
[ [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]C′(eP)
∂θ/∂eP
]
+ 2λ˘(1 − ξ) ∂θ
∂eP
C′(eP) − [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]C′′(eP)
= C′(eP)[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]

[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ] ∂2θ
∂e2P
+ 2λ˘(1 − ξ)
(
∂θ
∂eP
)2
[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ] ∂θ∂eP
− C
′′(eP)
C′(eP)
 < 0
where the last inequality uses Assumptions (16), (17).
Step (ii)
Corollary 9.3 of Diewert et al. (1981) holds that a twice continuously differentiable
function f defined on an open S is strictly quasiconcave if and only if y0 ∈ S, wTw = 1 and
wT∇ f (y0)w = 0 implies wT∇2 f (y0)w < 0; or wT∇2 f (y0)w = 0 and g(z) ≡ f (y0 + zw)
does not attain a local minimum at z = 0. We apply their result.
Fix Defendant’s effort eD = e1 for some arbitrary e1 > 0, and consider Plaintiff’s
emotional payoff function u˘P(·). Suppose eP > 0, wTw = 1 and
0 = wT∇u˘P(eP, e1)w = wT ∂
∂eP
u˘P(eP, e1)w.
That wTw = 1 implies w , 0. Hence ∂∂eP u˘P(eP, e1) = 0. Then step (i) proves
0 >
∂2
∂e2P
u˘P(eP, e1) = ∇2u˘P(eP, e1).
That w , 0 implies wT∇2u˘P(eP, e1)w < 0. Hence an application of Corollary 9.3 of
Diewert et al. (1981) proves u˘P is strictly quasiconcave in eP. 
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Proof of Lemma 5
That the success function θ and the cost-shifting rule λ˘ satisfy Assumptions 12-17 in
the present Emotional Litigation Game implies θ and a different cost-shifting rule defined
by λ = λ˘(1 − ξ) satisfy Assumptions 1-6 on the Litigation Game constructed in chapter
2, section 2.2. Lemma 2 in section 2.3 proves that there exists a unique real number s∗
satisfying
s∗k =
1 − λθ(s∗; µ)
1 − λ(1 − θ(s∗; µ)) .
Choosing s = s∗ gives the result for the present Emotional Litigation Game. 
Proof of Proposition 7
This proof will first establish that the pair (e∗P, e∗D) satisfies both Plaintiff and Defen-
dant’s FOCs in system (28), thereby characterizing a Nash equilibrium. It will then prove
the other direction and uniqueness.
Step (i)
Let s = s∗ and use the expression for e∗P to obtain
e∗kP =
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sθs
C(1)[ksk[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)] + λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθs]
=
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sθs
C(1)[k[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ] + λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθs]
where the last equality uses the property 1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ = sk[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)] from
Lemma 5. Then
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sθs
e∗P
= C(1)[k[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ] + λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθs]e∗k−1P
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sθs
e∗P
= C(1)[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]ke∗k−1P + C(1)λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθse∗k−1P
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sθs
e∗P
− C(1)λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθse∗k−1P = C(1)[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]ke∗k−1P
−(1 − ξ)sθs
e∗P
[
1 + υ + λ˘C(1)(1 + sk)e∗kP
]
= C(1)[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]ke∗k−1P
∂θ
∂eP
(1 − ξ)[1 + υ + λ˘C(e∗P) + λ˘C(e∗D)] = [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ]C′(e∗P)
where the last equality uses the properties that C(·) is homogeneous of degree k, ske∗kP =
e∗kD . Hence the pair (e∗P, e∗D) satisfies Plaintiff’s FOC.
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Now consider the expression for e∗D
e∗kD = s
ke∗kP =
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sk+1θs
C(1)[ksk[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)] + λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθs]
a rearrangement of which gives:
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sθs
e∗D
= C(1)[ksk[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)] + λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθs] e∗k−1Dsk
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sθs
e∗D
= [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)]C(1)ke∗k−1D + λ˘(1 − ξ)C(1)(1 + sk)sθs
e∗k−1D
sk
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)sθs
e∗D
− λ˘(1 − ξ)C(1)(1 + sk)sθs
e∗k−1D
sk
= [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)]C(1)ke∗k−1D
−(1 − ξ)sθs
e∗D
[
1 + υ + λ˘C(1)
(
e∗kD
sk
+ e∗kD
)]
= [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)]C(1)ke∗k−1D
∂(1 − θ)
∂eD
(1 − ξ)[1 + υ + λ˘C(e∗P) + λ˘C(e∗D)] = [1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)]C′(e∗D)
which implies the pair (e∗P, e∗D) satisfies Defendant’s FOC.
Step (ii)
Suppose (e′P, e′D) ∈ R2++ is aNash equilibriumwith positive efforts. Denote s′ = e′D/e′P.
Some algebra reveals
e′kP =
(e′P + e′D)k
(1 + s′)k e
′k
D =
s′k(e′P + e′D)k
(1 + s′)k .
Substituting these into Plaintiff and Defendant’s FOCs in system (28), some algebra
reveals:
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)s(1 + s)kθs
C(1)[k[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ] + λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθs]

s=s′
= (e′P + e′D)k
=
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)s(1 + s)kθs
C(1)[ksk[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)] + λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθs]

s=s′
where the first equality (respectively, second equality) is derived from Plaintiff’s (Defen-
dant’s) FOC. Then some algebra using the equality of both sides will reveal that s = s′
induces 1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)θ = sk[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)]. Hence the uniqueness limb of Lemma 5
implies s′ = s∗.
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Then obtain from the definition of e∗P in Proposition 7
e′P + e
′
D =
[
−(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)s(1 + s)kθs
C(1)[ksk[1 − λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 − θ)] + λ˘(1 − ξ)(1 + sk)sθs]
]1/k 
s=s∗=s′
= (1 + s∗)e∗P
where the properties e′P + e
′
D = (1 + s′)e′P and s′ = s∗ imply e′P = e∗P. Similarly, use the
properties e′P + e
′
D = e
′
D(1 + s′)/s′ and s′ = s∗ to obtain e′D = e∗D. 
Proof of Corollary 11
An application of Lemma 5 and Proposition 7 gives the result. 
Proof of Corollary 12
To facilitate presentation, define a function λ = λ˘(1 − ξ). An application of Corollary
11 and the chain rule reveals
d
dξ
s∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = d
dξ
s∗(0, 0, λ) = dλ
dξ
d
dλ
s∗(0, 0, λ) = −λ˘ d
dλ
s∗(0, 0, λ).
Then part 1 follows from letting λ˘ = 0, and parts 2-3 an application of Corollary 2 in
chapter 2, section 2.4. 
Proof of Corollary 13
Lemma 5 reveals that the equilibrium effort ratio s∗ does not depend on the value of
joy of winning υ. The success function θ also does not depend on υ. 
Proof of Corollary 14
Using equation (30), Corollary 11 and the homogeneity of the cost functionC(·), some
algebra obtains
C∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) =C(e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘)) + C(e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘))
=C((1 + υ)1/k(1 − ξ)1/ke∗P(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)))
+ C((1 + υ)1/k(1 − ξ)1/ke∗D(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)))
=(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)C(1)[e∗P(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ))]k + C(1)(1 − ξ)[e∗D(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ))]k
=(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)C∗(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)) (94)
where C∗(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)) is the (equilibrium) litigation expenditure in the transformed
Monetary Litigation Game with a different cost-shifting rule defined by λ = λ˘(1 − ξ).
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Then an application of the product rule and the chain rule reveals
d
dξ
C∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = d
dξ
[(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)C∗(0, 0, λ)]
= (1 + υ)
[
(1 − ξ) d
dξ
C∗(0, 0, λ) − C∗(0, 0, λ)
]
= (1 + υ)
[
(1 − ξ)dλ
dξ
d
dλ
C∗(0, 0, λ) − C∗(0, 0, λ)
]
= −(1 + υ)
[
C∗(0, 0, λ) + (1 − ξ)λ˘ d
dλ
C∗(0, 0, λ)
]
. (95)
Then part 1 follows from letting λ˘ = 0 and noting C∗(0, 0, λ) > 0. Parts 2 and 3
respectively follow from Corollaries 8 and 9 in chapter 2, section 2.7. 
Proof of Corollary 15
Part 1
The proof for this part will establish the result for Plaintiff’s monetary payoff; similar
steps gives the result for Defendant’s.
Using equations (22), (94) and Corollary 11, some algebra reveals
d
dυ
u∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) =
d
dυ
[
θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘)[1 + λ˘C∗(ξ, υ, λ˘)] − C(e∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘)) − λ˘C(e∗D(ξ, υ, λ˘))
]
=
d
dυ
[
θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘)[1 + λ˘(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)C∗(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ))]]
− d
dυ
[(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)[C(e∗P(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ))) + λ˘C(e∗D(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)))]]
=[1 + λ˘(1 + υ)(1 − ξ)C∗(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ))] d
dυ
θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘)
− θ∗(ξ, υ, λ˘)λ˘(1 − ξ)C∗(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ))
− (1 − ξ)[C(e∗P(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ))) + λ˘C(e∗D(0, 0, λ˘(1 − ξ)))]
where Corollary 13 reveals ddυ θ
∗(ξ, υ, λ˘) = 0. Hence ddυu∗P(ξ, υ, λ˘) < 0.
Part 2
The result follows from differentiating both sides of equation (94) with respect to
υ. 
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A.4 Proofs for Chapter 4
This appendix contains all proofs for chapter 4. Lemma 12 is a technical lemma that will
facilitate calculations. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, define functions θ( j)i , φii : R++ → R by
θ
( j)
i (ri j) =
∂
∂ri j
θi
(
r−1i j
)
(96)
φii(ri j) =
−viθ( j)i (ri j)
1 − lii − δiiθi
(
r−1i j
)
+
(
δii + δi jri j
)
ri jθ
( j)
i (ri j)
. (97)
Lemma 12. Whenever expenses ei, e j > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}, the following
properties hold:
1. The expenses ratios rii, ri j and success function θi satisfy
∂rii
∂ei
=
rii
ei
,
∂ri j
∂ei
=
−ri j
ei
,
∂θi
∂ei
=
riiθ
(i)
i
ei
=
−ri jθ( j)i
ei
,
θ
(i)
i > 0, θ
( j)
i < 0, riiθ
(i)
i = −ri jθ( j)i .
2. 1 − lii − δiiθi(rii) >
[
δiirii + δi j
]
θ
(i)
i , where the inequality holds strictly in the limit
when rii → 0.
3. 1 − lii − δiiθi
(
r−1i j
)
> −[δii + δi jri j ]ri jθ( j)i .
4. riiφi j(rii) = ri jφii(ri j).
5. 1 − lii − δiiθi(rii) > 0, and
lim
rii→0+
(1 − lii − δiiθi(rii)) ∈ (0,+∞), lim
ri j→0+
(
1 − lii − δiiθi
(
r−1i j
))
∈ (0,+∞).
6. ∂θ
(i)
i
∂rii
≤ 0, and limrii→0+ θ(i)i ∈ (0,+∞).
7. ∂θ
(j)
i
∂ri j
≥ 0, and limri j→0+ θ( j)i ∈ (−∞, 0).
8. φi j(rii) > 0, and limrii→0+ φi j(rii) ∈ (0,+∞).
9. φii(ri j) > 0, and limri j→0+ φii(ri j) ∈ (0,+∞).
Proof of Lemma 12
Part 1
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The chain rule and some algebra will give
∂rii
∂ei
=
∂
∂ei
(
ei
ekij
)
=
1
ekij
=
rii
ei
,
∂ri j
∂ei
=
∂
∂ei
(
ekij
ei
)
= −
ekij
e2i
= −ri j
ei
,
and, using equation (35),
∂θi
∂ei
=
∂θi
∂rii
∂rii
∂ei
=
∂θi
∂rii
rii
ei
,
∂θi
∂ei
=
∂θi
∂ri j
∂ri j
∂ei
= − ∂θi
∂ri j
ri j
ei
.
Then an application of the chain rule using these results and the property ∂θi∂ei > 0 from
Assumption 19 gives θ(i)i > 0 and θ
( j)
i < 0.
Parts 2-3
Some algebra using Assumption 20 and part 1 gives the result.
Part 4
Some algebra using part 1 gives the result.
Part 5
Some algebra using Assumption 22 and part 1 gives the result.
Part 6
Using part 1 and equation (35), some algebra reveals
θi(ei, e j) = e−2kij
∂θ
(i)
i
∂rii
≤ 0
where the last inequality comes from Assumption 19; this implies ∂θ
(i)
i
∂rii
≤ 0. This result,
the property θ(i)i = e
ki
j
∂θi
∂ei
> 0 (from part 1) and the upper-bound aspect of Assumption 19
implies limrii→0+ θ
(i)
i ∈ (0,+∞).
Part 7
Conceive a function eˆ j(ri j) = r1/kii j and use equations (35), (96) to obtain
θ
( j)
i =
∂
∂ri j
θi
(
1, r1/kii j
)
=
[
∂
∂ri j
(
eˆkij
)] [ ∂
∂eˆkij
θi
(
1, eˆ j
) ]
=
∂
∂eˆkij
θi
(
1, eˆ j
)
where the second last equality follows from the chain rule. Then
lim
ri j→0+
θ
( j)
i = lim
eˆkij →0+
(
∂
∂eˆkij
θi
(
1, eˆ j
))
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∂θ
( j)
i
∂ri j
=
(
∂
∂ri j
(
eˆkij
))©­­«
∂2
∂
(
eˆkij
)2 θi (1, eˆ j )ª®®¬ =
∂2
∂
(
eˆkij
)2 θi (1, eˆ j ) .
The results then follow from Assumption 19 and the property θ( j)i < 0 in part 1.
Part 8
Parts 2 and 6 respectively prove that the denominator and numerator of φi j(rii) (defined
by equation (37)) are positive; thus φi j(rii) > 0. Then some algebra using part 6 and the
properties of limits reveals
lim
rii→0+
φi j(rii) =
vi
(
limrii→0+ θ
(i)
i (rii)
)
limrii→0+
(
1 − lii − δiiθi(rii) − δi jθ(i)i (rii)
)
where parts 5 and 2 respectively prove the numerator and denominator of the right-hand
side are (strictly) positive and bounded above, giving the result.
Part 9
Parts 3 and 7 respectively prove that the denominator and numerator of φii(ri j) (defined
by equation (97)) are positive; thus φii(ri j) > 0. Then some algebra using part 6 and the
properties of limits reveals
lim
ri j→0+
φii(ri j) =
−vi limri j→0+ θ( j)i (ri j)
limri j→0+
(
1 − lii − δiiθi
(
r−1i j
))
where parts 5 and 7 respectively prove the denominator and numerator of the right-hand
side are positive and bounded above, giving the result. 
Proof of Lemma 6
Take the partial derivatives of player i’s payoff function in equation (32) with respect
to her expenses ei to obtain
∂Ui
∂ei
=
∂θi
∂ei
[
vi + δiiei + δi je
ki
j
]
+ δiiθi(ei, e j) − (1 − lii) (98)
∂2Ui
∂e2i
=
∂2θi
∂e2i
[
vi + δiiei + δi je
ki
j
]
+ 2δii
∂θi
∂ei
. (99)
Supposing player i’s FOC holds and using equation (98), (99), a substitution exercise
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reveals
∂2Ui
∂e2i
=
∂2θi
∂e2i
[ (1 − lii − δiiθi(ei, e j))
∂θi/∂ei
]
+ 2δii
∂θi
∂ei
=
(
1 − lii − δiiθi(ei, e j)
) 
(
1 − lii − δiiθi(ei, e j)
) ∂2θi
∂e2i
+ 2δii
(
∂θi
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δiiθi(ei, e j)
) ∂θi
∂ei
 < 0 (100)
where the last inequality follows from some algebra using Assumption 21 and part 5 of
Lemma 12.
Corollary 9.3 of Diewert et al. (1981) holds that a twice continuously differentiable
function f defined on an open S is strictly quasiconcave if and only if (i) x0 ∈ S, vTv = 1
and vT∇ f (x0)v = 0 implies vT∇2 f (x0)v < 0; or (ii) vT∇2 f (x0)v = 0 and g(t) ≡ f (x0+ tv)
does not attain a local minimum at t = 0. Fixing player j’s expenses e j , inequality (100)
implies player i’s payoff function Ui is strictly quasiconcave in her expenses ei. 
Proof of Lemma 7
Fix an arbitrary e′j > 0, and let Ui(·, e′j) denote the player i’s payoff function Ui
restricted to one variable, ei. Suppose there exists some e′i > 0 that satisfies the FOC for
Ui(·, e′j). Then the proof of Lemma 6 (see inequality inequality (100)) proves that e′i also
satisfies the SOC for Ui(·, e′j). Hence e′i is a local maximum of Ui(·, e′j). Then Lemma 6
implies e′i is a global maximum of Ui(·, e′j). 
Proof of Lemma 8
This proof will consider three different cases: (i) k1k2 = 1; (ii) k1k2 < 1; (iii)
1 < k1k2 ≤ 2 (Assumption 23 imposes the upper bound 2 ≥ k1k2).
Case (i): k1k2 = 1
Use equations (37) and (97) to define functions F, F¯ : R++ → R by
F(r2) = r2φ11(r2) −
[
φ21
(
r1/k12
)]1/k2
, (101)
F¯(r1) = φ12(r1) − r1
[
φ22
(
r1/k11
)]1/k2
,
where r2, r1 > 0 are positive real numbers. Some algebra using parts 1,4 of Lemma 12
and the specification r1 = 1/r2 reveals
r2F(r2) = F¯(r1) (102)
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Some algebra using parts 8-9 in Lemma 12 and the properties of limits obtains
lim
r2→0+
F(r2) = − lim
r2→0+
[
φ21
(
r1/k12
)]1/k2
< 0,
lim
r1→0+
F¯(r1) = lim
r1→0+
φ12(r1) > 0.
Hence there exist sufficiently small positive real numbers 1, 2 > 0 satisfying
0 > F(2), (103)
0 < F¯(1) = −11 F
(
−11
)
, (104)
where the last equality uses equation (102).
Conditions (103), (104) and the intermediate value theorem imply there exists some
positive real number r∗2 ∈
(
2, 
−1
1
)
such that F(r∗2 ) = 0. Choosing r∗11 = 1/r∗2 , r∗22 = r∗k12
gives the result in part 1 of Lemma 8.
Case (ii): k1k2 < 1
Define functions R22, R21,G, G¯ : R++ → R++ by
R22(r12) = r (2−k1k2)/k112 [φ11(r12)](1−k1k2)/k1, (105)
R21(r11) = r k211[φ12(r11)](k1k2−1)/k1, (106)
G(r12) = r (k1k2−1)k212 [φ11(r12)](k1k2−1)k2 − [φ21(R22(r12))]k1k2−1, (107)
G¯(r11) = r (1−k1k2)k211 [φ12(r11)](k1k2−1)(2−k1k2)/k1 − [φ22(R21(r11))]k1k2−1, (108)
where r12, r11 > 0 are positive real numbers and part 9 of Lemma 12 imply
R21(r11) > 0. (109)
Some algebra using parts 1,4 of Lemma 12 and the specification r12 = 1/r11 reveals
R21(r11) = [R22(r21)]−1, (110)
r k212
[R22(r12)]k1k2
= r (k1k2−1)k212 [φ11(r12)](k1k2−1)k2, (111)
[R21(r11)]2−k1k2
r k211
= r (1−k1k2)k211 [φ12(r11)](k1k2−1)(2−k1k2)/k1, (112)
G(r12) = [R21(r11)]2(k1k2−1)G¯(r11), (113)
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where the last equality follows from some algebra commencing with substituting equations
(112), (113) into equations (107), (108) respectively.
Some algebra using parts 8-9 of Lemma 12, the specification k1k2 ≤ 2 and the
properties of limits obtains
lim
r12→0+
R22(r12) ∈ [0,+∞), (114)
lim
r11→0+
R21(r11) = 0. (115)
Using these limit properties, those in parts 8-9 of Lemma 12, and the specification
k1k2 < 1, some algebra obtains
lim
r12→0+
G(r12) = +∞, lim
r11→0+
G¯(r11) < 0,
which respectively imply the existence of some small positive real numbers α1, α2 > 0
such that
0 < G(α2), (116)
0 > G¯(α1) = [R21(α1)]2(k1k2−1)G
(
α−11
)
, (117)
where the last equality follows from equation (113).
Conditions (109), (116), (117) and the intermediate value theorem imply there exists
some positive real number r∗12 ∈
(
α−11 , α2
)
such that G
(
r∗12
)
= 0. Choosing r∗11 = 1/r∗12
and r∗22 = R22
(
r∗12
)
as defined by (105) and using equations (107) and (111), some algebra
gives the result in part 2 of Lemma 8 when k1k2 < 1.
Case (iii): 1 < k1k2 ≤ 2
Consider functions R22(r12), R21(r11), G(r12) and G¯(r11) respectively defined by equa-
tions (105)-(108). These functions continue to satisfy conditions (109)-(117) under the
specification 1 < k1k2 ≤ 2. Using conditions (116)-(117), parts 8-9 of Lemma 12, and
the specification 1 < k1k2 ≤ 2, some algebra obtains
lim
r12→0+
G(r12) < 0, lim
r11→0+
G¯(r11) = +∞,
which respectively imply the existence of some small positive real numbers β1, β2 > 0
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such that
0 > G(β2), (118)
0 < G¯(β1) = [R21(β1)]2(k1k2−1)G
(
β−11
)
, (119)
where the last equality follows from equation (113).
Conditions (109), (118), (119) and the intermediate value theorem imply there exists
some positive real number r∗12 ∈
(
β2, β
−1
1
)
such thatG
(
r∗12
)
= 0. Choosing r∗11 = 1/r∗12 and
r∗22 = R22
(
r∗12
)
, some algebra gives the result in part 2 of Lemma 8 when 1 < k1k2 ≤ 2. 
Proof of Proposition 8
This proof will establish that the characterizations of e∗1, e
∗
2 in this Proposition simul-
taneously satisfy the players’ FOCs (system (34)) in two different cases: (i) k1k2 = 1; (ii)
k1k2 , 1.
Case (i): k1k2 = 1
Assuming k1k2 = 1, some algebra reveals that, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i},
part 1 of Lemma 8 is equivalent to
r∗iir
∗ki
j j = 1 (120)
r∗iiφi j(r∗ii) =
[
φ ji(r∗j j)
] ki
. (121)
To establish FOC satisfaction for player i, use the expression for e∗j and equations
(120)-(121) to obtain
e∗kij = r
∗ki
j j
[
φ ji(r∗j j)
]∗ki
= r∗kij j
[
r∗iiφi j(r∗ii)
]∗kik j
= r∗kij j r
∗kik j
ii
[
φi j(r∗ii)
]∗kik j
= φi j(r∗ii)
e∗kij = e
∗
i /r∗ii (122)
where the second last equality uses part 1 of Lemma 8 and the assumption k1k2 = 1, and
the last equality uses the expression for e∗i .
Then some algebra using equation (37) and the expression for e∗i obtains
viθ
(i)
i (r∗ii)r∗ii
1 − lii − δiiθi(r∗ii) −
(
δiir∗ii + δi j
)
θ
(i)
i (r∗ii)
= e∗i (123)
viθ
(i)
i (r∗ii)r∗ii +
(
δiir∗ii + δi j
)
θ
(i)
i (r∗ii)e∗i = [1 − lii − δiiθi(r∗ii)]e∗i (124)
θ
(i)
i (r∗ii)r∗ii
[
vi +
(
δiir∗ii + δi j
) e∗i
r∗ii
]
= [1 − lii − δiiθi(r∗ii)]e∗i (125)
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θ
(i)
i (r∗ii)r∗ii
e∗i
[
vi + δiie∗i +
δi je∗i
r∗ii
]
= 1 − lii − δiiθi(r∗ii) (126)
∂θi
∂ei
(ei,ej )=(e∗i ,e∗j )
[
vi + δiie∗i + δi je
∗ki
j
]
= 1 − lii − δiiθi(e∗i , e∗j ) (127)
where the last equality uses equations (35), (122) and part 1 of Lemma 12, establishing
player i’s FOC in system (34).
Case (ii): k1k2 , 1
Assuming k1k2 , 1, some algebra reveals that, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i},
part 2 of Lemma 8 is equivalent to
r∗kik jii r
∗ki
j j =
[
φi j(r∗ii)
]1−kik j (128)
r∗kik jj j r
∗k j
ii =
[
φ ji(r∗j j)
]1−kik j
. (129)
Then use the expression for e∗j and equation (129) to obtain
e∗kij = r
∗ki
j j
[
φ ji(r∗j j)
]∗ki
= r∗kij j
[
r∗kik jj j r
∗k j
ii
] ki/(1−kik j )
=
(
r∗j j
) ki+[k2i k j/(1−kik j )] (
r∗ii
) kik j/(1−kik j )
=
(
r∗j j
) ki/(1−kik j ) (
r∗ii
) kik j/(1−kik j ) = φi j(r∗ii) = e∗i /r∗ii
where the second last equality uses equation (128), and the last equality uses the expression
for e∗i . Then the steps establishing equations (123)-(127) prove FOC satisfaction for player
i ∈ {1, 2} \ { j}. 
Proof of Corollary 16
Suppose Lemma 8 defines a unique pair (r∗11, r∗22). Suppose, for a contradiction, there
exists a nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the Contest Game, denoted (e¯1, e¯2), such that
(e¯1, e¯2) , (e∗1, e∗2) given by Proposition 8.
Define auxiliary constants r¯11 = e¯1/e¯k12 and r¯22 = e¯2/e¯k21 . Using the property that
(e¯1, e¯2) satisfies the FOC in system (34) and reversing the steps establishing equations
(123)-(127), some algebra obtains
e¯1 = r¯11φ12(r¯11) (130)
e¯k12 = φ12(r¯11) (131)
e¯2 = r¯22φ21(r¯22) (132)
e¯k21 = φ21(r¯22). (133)
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Then some algebra comparing equation (130) with equation (133), and equation (131)
with equation (132), obtains
φ21(r¯22) = r¯ k211[φ12(r¯11)]k2 (134)
φ12(r¯11) = r¯ k122[φ21(r¯22)]k1 (135)
where a substitution exercise using these equations reveals
r¯ k1k222 r¯
k2
11 = [φ21(r¯22)]1−k1k2 (136)
r¯ k1k211 r¯
k1
22 = [φ12(r¯11)]1−k1k2 . (137)
Consider two different cases: (i) k1k2 , 1; (ii) k1k2 = 1.
Case (i): k1k2 , 1
Equations (136) and (137), the assumption k1k2 , 1 and the assumption that Lemma
8 defines a unique pair (r∗11, r∗22) imply (r¯11, r¯22) = (r∗11, r∗22). Then an application of
Proposition 8 obtains (e¯1, e¯2) = (e∗1, e∗2), a contradiction.
Case (ii): k1k2 = 1
The assumption k1k2 = 1 and equation (136) imply
r¯11r¯
k1
22 = 1. (138)
A substitution exercise using equations (135) and (138) and the assumption k1k2 = 1
obtains
[r¯11φ12(r¯11)]k2 = φ21(r¯22). (139)
Equations (138) and (139), the assumption k1k2 = 1 and the assumption that Lemma
8 defines a unique pair (r∗11, r∗22) imply (r¯11, r¯22) = (r∗11, r∗22). Then an application of
Proposition 8 obtains (e¯1, e¯2) = (e∗1, e∗2), a contradiction. 
Proof of Corollary 17
Following similar steps in the proof of Corollary 21, some algebra reveals F(r2) = 0
and r2 > 0 if and only if
r2 =
θ1
θ2
=
ηµ1 +
1−η
1+r2
ηµ2 +
(1−η)r2
1+r2
(140)
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Some algebra using equation (40) reveals equation (140) is equivalent to
[1 − η(1 − µ2)]r22 − η[(1 − µ2) − (1 − µ1)] − [1 − η(1 − µ1)] = 0.
Using the quadratic formula, some algebra obtains
r2 =
η[(1 − µ2) − (1 − µ1)] ±
√
∆
2[1 − η(1 − µ2)] (141)
where
∆ =η2[(1 − µ2) − (1 − µ1)]2 + 4[1 − η(1 − µ2)][1 − η(1 − µ1)]
=η2[(1 − µ2) − (1 − µ1)]2 + 4[1 − η[(1 − µ2) + (1 − µ1)]] − 4η2(1 − µ2)(1 − µ1)
=η2[(1 − µ2)2 − 2(1 − µ2)(1 − µ1) + (1 − µ1)2 − 4(1 − µ2)(1 − µ1)]
+ 4[1 − η[(1 − µ2) + (1 − µ1)]]
=η2[(1 − µ2)2 + 2(1 − µ2)(1 − µ1) + (1 − µ1)2] + 4[1 − η[(1 − µ2) + (1 − µ1)]]
=η2[(1 − µ2) + (1 − µ1)]2 − 4η[(1 − µ2) + (1 − µ1)] + 4
=[2 − η[(1 − µ2) + (1 − µ1)]]2
where 2 − η[(1 − µ2) + (1 − µ1)] > 0 because 0 ≤ η, µ1, µ2, ≤ 1. Substituting back to
equation (141) obtains the only positive solution
r2 =
1 − η + ηµ1
1 − η + ηµ2 .
Then a substitution exercise using Proposition 8 gives the result. 
Proof of Corollary 18
Some algebra using Corollary 17 reveals part 1 and
θ∗i − θ∗j =
(µi − µ j)η[η(µ1 + µ2) + 1 − η]
2(1 − η) + η(µ1 + µ2)
where the right-hand side is negative if and only if µi < µ j , giving part 2. 
Proof of Corollary 19
Some algebra using Corollary 17 obtains
e∗1 + e
∗
2 =
v(1 − η)
λ[2(1 − η) + η(µ1 + µ2)] =
v(1 − η)
λ[2 − η + ησ]
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then a differentiation exercise gives the result.
Proof of Corollary 20
Some algebra using the product rule and the property θ∗1 + θ
∗
2 = 1 + ησ from equation
(41) reveals
dU∗
dσ
=
[
v − λ (e∗1 + e∗2) ] ddσ (1 + ησ) − [1 + ησ]λ ddσ (e∗1 + e∗2)
=
[
v − λ (e∗1 + e∗2) ]η − (1 + ησ)λ ddσ (e∗1 + e∗2)
where Corollary 19 proves ddσ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
< 0 and some algebra using the properties 0 ≤
µ1, µ2 ≤ 1 and Corollary 17 obtains
1 + ησ > 0, v − λ (e∗1 + e∗2) = v(1 + ησ)2 − η + ησ > 0,
giving the result. 
Proof of Corollary 21
Denote an auxiliary variable r2 = r12. The assumption k1 = k2 implies r22 = r12 = r2.
Some algebra reveals that the FOCs in system (34) hold simultaneously if and only if
the function F(r2) = 0, where equation (101) defines F. Some algebra further reveals
F(r2) = 0 and r2 > 0 if and only if r2 = 1. Then a substitution exercise using Proposition
8 gives the result. 
Proof of Corollary 22
Using Corollary 21, some algebra reveals
d
dδ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
=
2vµ2(1 − µ)2
[1 − δµ(1 − µ)]2
d
d(µ(1 − µ))
(
d
dδ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
) )
=
4vµ(1 − µ)
[1 − δµ(1 − µ)]3 . (142)
The result follows from inequality (142) and the assumption δ < min{µ−1(1− µ), (1−
µ)−1µ} (which implies 1 − δµ(1 − µ) > 0). 
Proof of Corollary 23
Some algebra using Corollary 21 obtains
U∗1 +U
∗
2 =
v[1 − 2µ(1 − µ)(1 − l)]
1 − (w − l)µ(1 − µ) .
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Then a calculus exercise reveals
d
dw
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
=
vµ(1 − µ)
[1 − (w − l)µ(1 − µ)]2
d
dl
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
=
vµ(1 − µ)[1 + 2µ(1 − µ)(1 − w)]
[1 − (w − l)µ(1 − µ)]2
d
dτ
(
U∗1 +U
∗
2
)
=
v(w + l − 2)
[1 − (w − l)µ(1 − µ)]2
giving the results. 
Proof of Corollary 24
Using Corollary 21, a calculus exercise reveals
d
dτ
(
e∗1 + e
∗
2
)
=
2v
[1 − δτ]2 > 0
where the last inequality follows from the assumption δ < min{µ−1(1 − µ), (1 − µ)−1µ}
and the property τ = µ(1 − µ) ≤ 0.25. 
Proof of Corollary 25
Steps similar to those in the proof of Corollary 21 give the result. 
Proof of Corollary 26
Consider Corollary 25, which finds the close-form expression for the nontrivial Nash
equilibrium of the Alternative R&D Game. Part 1 of Corollary 26 follows from the
absence of τ— the variable that measures the relative advantages of the players — in the
close-form expression. Part 2 of Corollary 26 follows from a calculus exercise using the
close-form expression. 
Proof of Proposition 9
This proof applies the principle of finite induction. The result clearly holds for the
base case θi = θi(1). The rest of this proof assumes the result holds for all integer z ≤ n−1,
and proves that it holds for z = n. Define auxiliary constants 0 ≤ a, a¯ ≤ 1 and a success
function θ˜ : R2+ → R by
a = pi(1) + pi(2) + ... + pi(n−1), a¯ = 1 − a, θ˜ =
n−1∑
z=1
( pi(z)
a
θi(z)
)
.
Assuming θ˜, θi(n) satisfy Assumption 18 (respectively, 19, 22, 23), some algebra
immediately reveals that their linear combination θi = aθ˜+ a¯θi(n) also satisfies Assumption
18 (19, 22, 23). The following will prove that θi satisfies the remaining Assumptions 20
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and 21.
Assumption 20
Some algebra using the linearity of derivation obtains
∂θi
∂ei
[
δiiei + δi je
ki
j
]
+δiiθi =
∂
∂ei
(
aθ˜ + a¯θi(n)
) [
δiiei + δi je
ki
j
]
+ δii
(
aθ˜ + a¯θi(n)
)
= a
(
∂θ˜
∂ei
[
δiiei + δi je
ki
j + δii θ˜
])
+ a¯
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
[
δiiei + δi je
ki
j
]
+ δiiθi(n)
)
< a(1 − lii) + a¯(1 − lii) = 1 − lii
where the inequality uses the assumption that θ˜, θi(n) satisfy Assumptions 20. Hence θi
satisfies Assumption 20.
Assumption 21
Assuming θ˜, θn satisfy Assumption (21), some algebra reveals
a
∂2θ˜
∂e2i
+
2aδii
(
∂θ˜
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δii θ˜
) < a ∂θ˜
∂ei
, a¯
∂2θi(n)
∂e2i
+
2a¯δii
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
) < a¯∂θi(n)
∂ei
.
Some algebra summing these inequalities and using the definition of θi and the linearity
of differentiation obtains
∂2θi
∂e2i
+ 2δii

a
(
∂θ˜
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δii θ˜
) + a¯
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
)  <
∂θi
∂ei
. (143)
Some algebra using the non-negative property of squares obtains
aa¯
[
∂θ˜
∂ei
(
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
) − ∂θi(n)
∂ei
(1 − lii − δii θ˜)
]2
≥ 0
2aa¯
∂θ˜
∂ei
∂θi(n)
∂ei
(1 − lii − δii θ˜)
(
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
) ≤aa¯( ∂θ˜
∂ei
)2 (
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
)2
+ aa¯
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2 (
1 − lii − δii θ˜
)2
2aa¯
∂θ˜i
∂ei
∂θi(n)
∂ei
+a2
(
∂θ˜i
∂ei
)2
+a¯2
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2
≤
aa¯
(
∂θ˜i
∂ei
)2(
1−lii−δiiθi(n)
)2
+aa¯
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2(
1−lii−δii θ˜i
)2(
1 − lii − δii θ˜i
) (
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
)
+ a2
(
∂θ˜i
∂ei
)2
+ a¯2
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2
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a2
(
∂θ˜
∂ei
)2
+ 2aa¯ ∂θ˜∂ei
∂θi(n)
∂ei
+ a¯2
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2
a
(
1−lii−δii θ˜
)
+ a¯
(
1−lii−δiiθi(n)
) ≤ a (1−lii−δiiθi(n))
(
∂θ˜
∂ei
)2
+ a¯
(
1−lii−δii θ˜
) (
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δii θ˜
) (
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
)[
a ∂θ˜∂ei + a¯
∂θi(n)
∂ei
]2
1 − lii − δii(aθ˜ + a¯θi(n))
≤
a
(
∂θ˜
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δii θ˜
) + a¯
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
)
(
∂θi
∂ei
)2
1 − lii − δiiθi ≤
a
(
∂θ˜
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δii θ˜
) + a¯
(
∂θi(n)
∂ei
)2(
1 − lii − δiiθi(n)
) (144)
where the last step uses the definition of θi and the linearity of differentiation. Then some
algebra using inequalities (143), (144) obtains
(1 − lii − δiiθi) ∂2θi∂e2i + 2δii
(
∂θi
∂ei
)2
(1 − lii − δiiθi) ∂θi∂ei
< 0,
where some further algebra will reveal that it implies θi satisfies Assumption 21. 
Proof of Proposition 10
The FOC of player i in the Homogeneous Contest Game is
∂Ûi
∂yi
=
∂θi
∂yi
[
vi + ∆ii(1)ykiii + ∆i j(1)y
ki j
j
]
− [Ei(1) − Lii(1) − ∆ii(1)θi]kiiykii−1i = 0,
0 = E′i (yi)
©­­«
∂θi
∂Ei
vi +
∆ii(1)
Ei(1) Ei(yi) +
∆i j(1)
E j(1)
ki j
kj j
[
E j(y j)
] ki j
kj j
 −
[
1 − Lii(1)
Ei(1) −
∆ii(1)
Ei(1) θi
]ª®®¬,
(145)
where the last step applies the chain rule and uses the properties of homogeneous functions.
Now, let the spillover parameters in the original Contest Game be those defined by
(55). Then a comparison of (145) and system (34) reveals that a pair of positive efforts
(y∗1, y∗2) satisfies (145) if and only if it relates to a nontrivial Nash equilibrium (e∗1, e∗2) of
the Contest Game (see Proposition 8) via the transformation in (56).
To see that the pair (y∗1, y∗2) satisfies player i’s SOC, some algebra using the chain rule
and equation (145) obtains
∂2Ûi
∂y2i
=E′′i (yi)
(
∂Ûi
∂Ei
)
+
(
E′i (yi)
)2 (∂2Ûi
∂E2i
)
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which is negative when evaluated at (y∗1, y∗2), because E′′i (y∗i ) ≥ 0, E′i (y∗i ) > 0 and
∂Ûi
∂Ei

yi=y
∗
i
=
∂Ui
∂ei

ei=e∗i
= 0,
∂2Ûi
∂E2i

yi=y
∗
i
=
∂U2i
∂e2i

ei=e∗i
< 0
whereUi is player i’s payoff in the original ContestGame, and the last inequality established
in the proof of Lemma 6.
Hence, in the Homogeneous Contest Game, player i by exerting positive effort y∗i
indeed maximizes her payoff Ûi when her opponent j exerts positive effort y∗j . The pair
(y∗1, y∗2) thus characterizes a nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the Homogeneous Contest
Game. 
A.5 Modifications of the Model in Chapter 5
These appendices modify the Model in section 5.2 to demonstrate the scope of the
Externalities-Optimization Principle. To simplify presentation, assume the actor bears
all of her private cost (γ = 0).
A.5.1 Positive Externalities
This appendix modifies the Model to capture the actor’s direct production of positive
externalities. Suppose that, instead of generating social harm H(x), her action x generates
social benefit B(x), where B is a real-valued function satisfying B′ > 0 and B′′ ≤ 0.
Suppose further that, instead of a harm-allocation rule (λ), the law allocates β ∈ [0, 1]
proportion of the social benefit to the actor. The actor’s utility function becomes
Â(x) = (1 − δ)G(x) + βB(x) − C(x),
where the law continues to disgorge δ proportion of her private gain G(x).
The net externalities and social welfare functions respectively become
V̂(x) = δG(x) + (1 − β)B(x)
Ŝ(x) = G(x) + B(x) − C(x).
To guarantee the social welfare function Ŝ has a unique optimizer, assume that as the
action x becomes very large, the marginal cost of acting eventually exceeds the marginal
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gain and the marginal social benefit.154
The Externalities-Optimization Principle continues to hold in the present modified
model. To see this, observe that the proofs of Proposition 11 and 12 (see section 5.3) do
not depend on the assumption H′ > 0 on the harm function H in the (original) Model (see
section 5.2). Thus specifying B = −H and β = λ immediately brings the present modified
model within the scope of Propositions 11, 12.
However, Corollary 28 depends on the assumption H′ > 0, and does not hold in the
present model. Under the assumption B′ > 0 that the present modified model adopts, if
the socially optimal action is positive (x∗ > 0), then the unique pair of optimal allocation
rules is (δ, β) = (0, 1). This pair completely internalizes externalities, and is a special case
of the Externalities-Optimization Principle.
A.5.2 Endogenous Choice between Restitution and Compensation
This appendix modifies the Model in section 5.2 to capture the victim’s optimal choice
between compensation and restitution. Modify the Model so that as a result of the victim’s
choice after the Actor has chosen her action, the actor’s liability becomes
L˜(x) = max{δG(x), λH(x)},
that is, the victim chooses the maximum of restitution (δG(x)) and compensation (λH(x)).
The actor’s utility function and the net externalities function respectively become
A˜ = G − C − L˜, V˜ = L˜ − H,
while the social welfare function and its unique optimizer continue to be S defined by
equation (58) and x∗ defined by condition (61), respectively.
To ensure that the actor’s utility function A˜ has an optimizer, assume that as her
action becomes very large, her private gain does not exceed her private cost.155 To avoid
unnecessary technicalities, assume that if her takes the socially optimal action x∗, then the
victim is not indifferent between compensation and restitution.156
The present modified model has welfare results that correspond to those in section 5.3,
154Formally, G′′ < 0, B′′ < 0 or C ′′ > 0; and there exists some x¯ > 0 such that G′(x¯) + B′(x¯) ≤ C ′(x¯).
155Formally, assume there exists some x¯ > 0 such that G′(x¯) ≤ C ′(x¯).
156More precisely, assume δG(x∗) , λH(x∗). This assumption ensures that both the actor’s utility function
A˜ and the net externalities function V˜ are differentiable at x∗.
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for the original Model. Because the actor’s utility function A˜ remains concave,157 steps
similar to those taken to prove Propositions 11 and 12 obtain the Externalities-Optimization
Principle for the present modified model:
1. Assume x∗ > 0. Then x˜ = x∗ if and only if V˜ ′(x˜) = 0. This result corresponds to
Proposition 11.
2. Assume x∗ = 0. Then x˜ = x∗ if V˜ ′(x˜) ≤ 0. This result corresponds to Proposition
12.
A.5.3 Action-Dependent Restitution and Compensation
This appendix modifies the Model to capture rules and standards that adjust the extent
of restitution or compensation in accordance with the wrongful action taken. Modify the
Model so that, instead of two constants (δ, λ), two functions ∆,Λ : R+ → [0, 1] satisfying
∆′,Λ′,∆′′,Λ′′ ≥ 0 capture the operation of the law. If the wrongful action is x, then the law
allocates to the actor 1−∆(x) proportion of the resulting gainG(x) andΛ(x) proportion of
the resulting harm H(x). The law allocates to the victim the remaining ∆(x) proportion of
the gain and 1 − λ(x) proportion of the harm. To ensure the actor has a utility-optimizing
action, assume that as her action becomes very large, her private gain does not exceed her
private cost.158
The actor’s utility function and the net externalities respectively become
A¯(x) = [1 − ∆(x)]G(x) − Λ(x)H(x) − C(x)
V¯(x) = ∆(x)G(x) − [1 − Λ(x)]H(x),
while the social welfare function (S defined by equation (58)) remains the same.
The actor’s liability is L¯(x) = ∆(x)G(x) + Λ(x)H(x) in the present modified model.
The assumption ∆′ ≥ 0 captures the intuition that, as she takes more wrongful action x,
the law cannot allow her to retain a greater share of the resulting gain. The assumption
Λ′ ≥ 0 captures a similar intuition; as x increases, the law cannot reduce her share of
the resulting harm. The assumptions ∆′′,Λ′′ ≥ 0 are imposed to guarantee that her utility
function A¯ is concave, so that her first order condition characterizes a maximizer.
The present modified model has welfare results that are similar those in section 5.3, for
157To see this, observe that A˜ = G − C + min{−δG,−λH} = min{(1 − δ)G − C,G − C − λH}. Because
both functions (1 − δ)G − C, G − C − λH are concave, their minimum A˜ is also concave.
158Formally, assume there exists some x¯ > 0 such that G′(x¯) ≤ C ′(x¯).
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the original Model. Let x¯ denote the actor’s utility-maximizing action here. Steps similar
to those taken to prove Propositions 11 and 12 obtain the Externalities-Optimization
Principle for the present modified model:
1. Assume x∗ > 0. Then x¯ = x∗ if and only if V¯ ′(x¯) = 0, where
V¯ ′(x¯) = ∆′(x¯)G(x¯) + ∆(x¯)G′(x¯) + Λ′(x¯)H(x¯) − [1 − Λ(x¯)]H′(x¯).
This result corresponds to Proposition 11.
2. Assume x∗ = 0. Then x¯ = x∗ if V¯ ′(x¯) ≤ 0. This result corresponds to Proposition
12.
A.5.4 Two-Player Model
This appendix shows that the Externalities-Optimization Principle continues to hold in
a two-player model. Calling one of these players the “actor” and the other the “victim”
will capture those cases falling within the scope of the competing-equities analysis (see
subsection 5.4.2). Examples that fall within the scope of the two-player model include
partnerships and joint-ventures, which are subject to fiduciary law and the law of restitu-
tion.159
Consider a simultaneous-move game of complete information, in which two utility-
maximizing players respectively choose actions y, z ∈ R+. These actions generate a
(real-valued) total gain of G˘(y, z) and a (real-valued) total harm of H˘(y, z). Each player’s
action increases the total gain at a diminishing rate, formally, ∂G˘∂y > 0,
∂G˘
∂z > 0,
∂2G˘
∂y2
≤ 0,
∂2G˘
∂z2 ≤ 0. Each player’s action increases the total harm at an increasing rate, formally,
∂H˘
∂y > 0,
∂H˘
∂z > 0,
∂2H˘
∂y2
≥ 0, ∂2H˘
∂z2 ≥ 0.
The player whose action is denoted y incurs the (real-valued) private cost of C˘y(y),
where function C˘y satisfies C˘′y > 0, C˘′′y ≥ 0. Similarly, the player whose action is denoted
z incurs the (real-valued) private cost of C˘z(z), where function C˘z satisfies C˘′z > 0, C˘′′z ≥ 0.
Let S˘ denote the social welfare function, where
S˘(y, z) = G˘(y, z) − H˘(y, z) − C˘y(y) − C˘z(z).
Let a pair of constants (σ, τ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] describe the law’s allocation of the total
gain and total harm between the players. The law allocates σ proportion of the total
159See, for example, Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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gain and τ proportion of the total harm to the player whose action is denoted y. The
law allocates the remaining 1 − σ proportion of the total gain and the remaining 1 − τ
proportion of the total harm to the player whose action is denoted z. The utility functions
of these players are respectively
Ay(y, z) = σG˘(y, z) − τH˘(y, z) − C˘y(y)
Az(y, z) = (1 − σ)G˘(y, z) − (1 − τ)H˘(y, z) − C˘z(z)
where Ay is the utility function of the player whose action is y, and Az the utility function
of the player whose action is z.
It remains to impose assumptions on derivatives to ensure that a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium exists, and that the social welfare function has a unique optimizer.160
Let (y, z) denote the pair of individual-utility-optimizing actions comprising theNash
equilibrium. The pair satisfies the following system of first order conditions:

∂Ay
∂y (y, z) = σ ∂G˘∂y (y, z) − τ ∂H˘∂y (y, z) − C˘′y(y) ≤ 0
∂Az
∂z (y, z) = (1 − σ) ∂G˘∂z (y, z) − (1 − τ) ∂H˘∂z (y, z) − C˘′z(z) ≤ 0.
(146)
A pair of actions (y∗, z∗)maximizes social welfare if and only if it satisfies the following
system of first order conditions:

∂S˘
∂y (y∗, z∗) = ∂G˘∂y (y∗, z∗) − ∂H˘∂y (y∗, z∗) − C˘′y(y∗) ≤ 0
∂S˘
∂z (y∗, z∗) = ∂G˘∂z (y∗, z∗) − ∂H˘∂z (y∗, z∗) − C˘′z(z∗) ≤ 0.
(147)
A substitution exercise using system (146) and evaluating the derivatives of the social
welfare function at the pair (y, z) gives the marginal externalities arising from these
actions. Let My and Mz respectively denote the marginal externalities arising from y, z;
160More precisely, to guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, assume ∂2G˘
∂y2
< 0 or
C˘ ′′y > 0; and ∂G˘∂y (y¯, z) ≤ C˘ ′y(y¯) for some large y¯ > 0 that does not depend on z. To guarantee the utility
function Az has an optimizer, assume ∂
2G˘
∂z2
< 0 or C˘ ′′z > 0; and ∂G˘∂z (y, z¯) ≤ C˘ ′z(z¯) for some large z¯ > 0 that
does not depend on y.
To ensure the social welfare function S˘ has a unique optimizer, assume its cross-derivative is sufficiently
small so that its Hessian is negative semidefinite; formally,(
∂2S˘
∂y∂z
)2
<
∂2S˘
∂y2
∂2S˘
∂z2
.
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these function are defined by

My(y, z) = ∂S˘∂y (y, z) −
∂Ay
∂y (y, z)
Mz(y, z) = ∂S˘∂z (y, z) − ∂Az∂z (y, z),
(148)
where some algebra obtains

My(y, z) = (1 − σ) ∂G˘∂y (y, z) − (1 − τ) ∂H˘∂y (y, z)
Mz(y, z) = σ ∂G˘∂z (y, z) − τ ∂H˘∂z (y, z).
A comparison of systems (147) and (148) reveals the present two-player model has
welfare results that are similar to those in section 5.3, for the original Model. Steps similar
to those taken to prove Propositions 11 and 12 obtain the Externalities-Optimization
Principle for the present modified model:
1. Assume y∗, z∗ > 0. Then (y, z) = (y∗, z∗) if and only if My(y, z) = Mz(y, z) =
0. This result corresponds to Proposition 11.
2. Assume y∗ = 0 or z∗ = 0. Then (y, z) = (y∗, z∗) if My(y, z) = Mz(y, z) = 0.
This result corresponds to Proposition 12.
A.5.5 General Technical Foundation
The Model set up in subsection 5.2.1 assumes the actor’s utility function and the social
welfare function are concave and differentiable in her action. Dropping these assumptions,
Proposition 13 in this appendix offers a general technical foundation for the Externalities-
Optimization Principle.
Proposition 13. Consider a continuous function S : X → R with a compact domain X .161
Then x∗ ∈ X maximizes S if and only if there exist two functions A,V : X → R such that
A + V = S and x∗ maximizes each of A and V .
Proof
That S is a continuous function on a compact set X guarantees the existence of a
maximizer.
1. For one direction, suppose x∗maximizes S. Define functions A,V by A = V = 0.5S.
These functions satisfy A + V = S and have x∗ as a common maximizer.
161Compactness and continuity here follow their respective meanings in topology.
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2. For the other direction, suppose there exist two functions A, V satisfying A+V = S
and having a common maximizer x∗. Consider an arbitrary x ∈ X . That x∗ is a
maximizer of A and V implies A(x∗) ≥ A(x) and V(x∗) ≥ V(x). Then
S(x∗) = A(x∗) + V(x∗) ≥ A(x) + V(x) = S(x).
The choice of x is arbitrary, hence x∗ is a maximizer of S. 
The obvious result in Proposition 13 lays a general foundation for the Externalities-
Optimization Principle. To see this, interpret function S in Proposition 13 as the social
welfare function, the set X as the actor’s action space, and functions A, V as her utility
function and the net externalities function respectively. So interpreted, Proposition 13
reveals that there exist ways to “slice” S into A and V so that all three functions have
a common maximizer; this is the Externalities-Optimization Principle at a high level of
generality.
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